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HL-1719
001911

July 9, 1991


U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

PLANT HATCH - UNIT 1
NRC DOCKET 50-321
OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
INADEQUATE PROCEDURE RESULTS IN MISSED
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SURVEILLANCES

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) and Technical Specifications, section 6.9.2, Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) concerning an inadequate procedure which resulted in missed Technical Specification surveillances. This event occurred at Plant Hatch - Unit 1.

Sincerely,



J. T. Beckham, Jr.

OCV/cr

Enclosure: LER 50-321/1991-011

cc: (See next page.)

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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cc: Georgia Power Company

Mr. H. L. Sumner, General Manager - Nuclear Plant

Mr. J. D. Heidt, Manager Engineering and Licensing - Hatch
NORMS

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.

Mr. K. Jabbour, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II

Mr. S. D. Ebner, Regional Administrator

Mr. L. D. Wert, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch

001911

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) PLANT HATCH, UNIT 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000321			PAGE (3) 1 OF 5			
TITLE (4) INADEQUATE PROCEDURE RESULTS IN MISSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SURVEILLANCES																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)							
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ NUM	REV	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES			DOCKET NUMBER(S)				
									PLANT HATCH, UNIT 2			05000366				
06	12	91	91	011	00	07	09	91				05000				
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (11)														
1		20.402(b)			20.405(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)					
POWER LEVEL		100			20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(c)		
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)			X OTHER (Specify in Abstract below)					
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)			X 50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)								
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)								
		20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(x)								
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME										TELEPHONE NUMBER						
STEVEN B. TIPPS, MANAGER NUCLEAR SAFETY AND COMPLIANCE, HATCH										AREA CODE		712 367-7851				
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORT TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORT TO NRC						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				
EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)																

ABSTRACT (16)

On 06/12/91, at 1500 CDT, Unit 1 and Unit 2 were in the Run mode at a power level of 2436 CMWT (100% rated thermal power in both units). At that time, plant chemistry personnel reviewing the surveillance history of diesel fuel oil sampling and analysis discovered that laboratory results of analyses were not being reported to the plant in a timely manner. These analyses are required once every 92 days per both units' Technical Specifications and the Fire Hazards Analysis. Additionally, it was found that one set of samples had been lost while in shipment to a test laboratory, and therefore was not analyzed at all. This is a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications, but is also reportable per Technical Specifications section 6.9.2. When the condition was discovered, the results of past analyses were reviewed and it was determined that operability of diesel engines had not been impacted by the event.

The cause of the event is an inadequate procedure. Specifically, surveillance procedure 64CH-SAM-002-OS, "DIESEL FUEL OIL: SAMPLING," did not contain steps to assure the results of laboratory analyses were reported to the plant within the required time frame.

Corrective actions for this event will include revising the affected procedure to require verification of receipt of samples and timely reporting and evaluation of analyses. This action will be complete by 8/15/91.

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PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor
Energy Industry Identification System codes are identified in the text as
(EIIIS Code XX)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On 06/12/91 at approximately 1500 CDT, Unit 1 and Unit 2 were in the Run mode, both at a power level of 2436 CMWT (100% of rated thermal power). At that time, plant chemistry personnel were reviewing the surveillance history of diesel fuel oil sampling and analysis. This review was performed because the response to Licensing Action Request (LAR) 91-048, dated 06/10/91, indicated that inadequacies possibly existed in the diesel fuel oil sampling and analysis procedure, 64CH-SAM-002-OS, "DIESEL FUEL OIL: SAMPLING." Specifically, the procedure did not require any follow-up action to be performed within the surveillance interval to verify that analysis results had been received from contract test laboratories or were determined to be within acceptable limits. The review of the surveillance history revealed that on several occasions the results of fuel oil analyses had been returned to the plant from contract laboratories after the surveillance interval had expired. Since the surveillance interval had expired before the analysis results were known, the Technical Specifications and Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) requirements to "verify" that fuel oil met the prescribed standards were not satisfied. Furthermore, the reviewers discovered that one set of samples collected for the first quarter 1991 had been shipped offsite, but the results of the analysis had never been received by the plant. Therefore, Deficiency Card 1-91-2728 was written to document the condition.

On 6/13/91, a tracer action was performed to locate the missing 1991 sample. It was discovered that the sample set, which had been collected in glass Wheaton bottles (American Society for Testing and Materials, D 270-65, section 4.1), had been spilled when the bottles were broken by the contract courier during shipment to the testing laboratory. The spilled diesel fuel had then smeared the ink on the labels of the bottles so that the courier could not read them. Since courier personnel could not read the labels, they did not know who had shipped them, and therefore did not contact Plant Hatch to report the incident. Consequently, the surveillance was missed.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this event is an inadequate procedure. Specifically, procedure 64CH-SAM-002-OS, "DIESEL FUEL OIL: SAMPLING," did not contain instructions requiring follow-up action to verify diesel fuel oil samples were received by the testing laboratory or that results of analyses were received and evaluated by plant personnel.

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REPORTABILITY AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT

This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) because a condition was entered which is prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. Specifically, the surveillance interval required by Unit 1 Technical Specifications section 4.9.A.2 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications section 4.8.1.1.2.c. was exceeded, and in one instance, a surveillance was missed altogether. This event is also reportable per the FHA, Appendix B, section 1.3.1, action statement a., because the surveillance interval prescribed in section 2.3.2.b. was exceeded.

The prime mover for the standby ac power system consists of five Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs, EISS Code EK) for both Hatch Nuclear Plants, Unit 1 and Unit 2, which supply standby power for the 4160-V emergency service buses. The fuel supplies for the EDGs are located in five "day" tanks (EISS Code DE), which hold enough fuel to provide approximately 4 hours of continuous operation at each EDG at rated load, and in five main fuel oil storage tanks (EISS Code L) which hold enough fuel for approximately seven days of operation for each EDG at rated load. The Technical Specifications cited above require these fuel supplies to be sampled and analyzed in order to assure compliance with applicable standards for fuel viscosity as well as water and sediment content. Standby diesel power is also provided for the plant security system (EISS Code IA) and for the fire water pump system (EISS Code KP). The fuel oil supply for the diesel backup for the security system is not required to be tested by the Plants' Security Plan. However, the fuel oil supply for the diesel fire water pump is required to be tested once every 92 days according to the standard described in Unit 2 Technical Specifications section 4.8.1.1.2.c.

All the above named diesel fuel oil supplies are sampled and analyzed per plant procedures 64CH-ADM-001-OS, "CHEMISTRY PROGRAM," and 64CH-SAM-002-OS, "DIESEL FUEL OIL: SAMPLING." The latter procedure was in error in that it did not contain instructions requiring personnel to verify receipt of analysis results within the specified surveillance interval. Hence, several sets of diesel fuel oil analyses were received and evaluated by plant personnel after the surveillance interval had expired. Also, one set of diesel fuel oil samples was lost during shipment to the testing laboratory and, therefore, the surveillance was missed altogether. This incident was not discovered in a timely manner because no administrative mechanism existed in the surveillance procedure to require follow-up on the samples within the specified time frame.

The events described in this report occurred over a period of several years and were not regarded as contrary to the plants' Technical Specifications until a clarification was issued in response to LAR 91-048. All of the diesel engines affected by this event have been subjected to other surveillances and tests throughout this time frame which periodically require them to be started and load tested. No failures attributable to contaminated or degraded fuel supplies have occurred. Moreover, even though the fuel oil samples were not analyzed within the required time frame, the analyses were, in fact, performed, except

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for the one sample which was lost. Analysis results were reviewed for surveillances performed in the last two years, and no instance was found where fuel oil failed to meet the standards prescribed by the plants' Technical Specifications or FHA. Additionally, an analysis has been performed on the diesel fuel oil for the second quarter of 1991, and the result of this analysis was also acceptable.

Based on the above analysis, it is concluded that this event had no adverse impact on nuclear safety. This analysis is applicable to all power level.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Corrective actions for this event include revising surveillance procedure 64CH-SAM-002-OS, "DIESEL FUEL OIL: SAMPLING," to require that Chemistry Department personnel verify fuel oil samples are received by the contract test laboratory within five days of shipment and complete the entire process of analysis and evaluation of fuel oil samples within the surveillance interval. This action will be complete by 8/15/91.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Other Systems Affected: No systems were affected other than those already mentioned in this report.
2. Previous Similar Events: Events reported in the past two years in which errors in Technical Specifications surveillance procedures resulted in conditions prohibited by the plants' Technical Specifications are described in the following LERs:

50-321/1989-005, dated 04/21/89
50-321/1989-009, dated 09/21/89
50-321/1989-011, dated 09/26/89
50-321/1989-016, dated 11/30/89
50-321/1990-002, dated 02/26/90
50-321/1990-003, dated 03/12/90
50-321/1990-014, dated 08/08/90
50-321/1991-008, dated 04/19/91
50-366/1989-002, dated 03/14/89
50-366/1989-006, dated 10/23/89
50-366/1989-010, dated 01/02/89
50-366/1990-007, dated 10/12/90
50-366/1991-016, dated 06/14/91

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The corrective actions for these events would not have prevented this event because the previous events involved different Technical Specifications surveillances and procedures. Moreover, the Company believes that no administrative changes in procedure processing are necessary to assure that Technical Specifications are correctly implemented. Corrections will continue to be incorporated into procedures when they are found necessary.

3. Failed Components Identification: No failed components contributed to this event.