



Entergy
Operations

Entergy Operations, Inc.

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Springdale AR 72601

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June 7, 1991

2CAN069110


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Washington, D. C. 20555

SUBJECT: Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2
Docket No. 50-368
License No. NPF-6
Licensee Event Report 50-368/91-013-00
"Fire Barrier Posting"

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) enclosed is the subject report.

Very truly yours,


James J. Fisicaro
Director, Licensing

JJF/TFS/kdr
Enclosure

cc: Regional Administrator
Region IV
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76011

INPO Records Center Suite 1500
1100 Circle, 75 Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30339-3064

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit Two

DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)
050003 681 OF 03TITLE (4) Fire Watches Released From Inoperable Fire Barriers Due To Inadequate Documentation Concerning
Posting Requirements

| EVENT DATE (5) | | | LER NUMBER (6) | | REPORT DATE (7) | | | OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) | | |
|----------------|-----|------|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|-------|-----|-------------------------------|----------------|------------------|
| Month | Day | Year | Year | Sequential Number | Revision Number | Month | Day | Year | Facility Names | Docket Number(s) |
| 05 | 12 | 91 | 91 | 013 | 00 | 06 | 07 | 91 | | 050003 |

OPERATING MODE (9) 1 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §:
(Check one or more of the following) (11)

| POWER LEVEL (10) | 20.402(b) | 20.405(a)(1)(i) | 20.405(a)(1)(ii) | 20.405(a)(1)(iii) | 20.405(a)(1)(iv) | 20.405(a)(1)(v) | 20.405(c) | 50.36(c)(1) | 50.36(c)(2) | 50.73(a)(2)(i) | 50.73(a)(2)(ii) | 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | 50.73(a)(2)(iv) | 50.73(a)(2)(v) | 50.73(a)(2)(vii) | 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | 50.73(a)(2)(x) | 73.71(b) | 73.71(c) | Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A) |
|------------------|-----------|-----------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|----------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|----------------|------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------|----------|----------|--|
| 100 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

| Name | Telephone Number |
|--|-------------------------|
| Thomas F. Scott, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Specialist | Area Code: 501 964-5000 |

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

| Cause | System | Component | Manufacturer | Reportable to NRCIS | Cause | System | Component | Manufacturer | Reportable to NRCIS |
|-------|--------|-----------|--------------|---------------------|-------|--------|-----------|--------------|---------------------|
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |

SUPPLEMENT REPORT EXPECTED (14)

| EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) | Month | Day | Year |
|---|-------|-----|------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Yes (If yes, complete Expected Submission Date) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No | | | |

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On May 12, 1991, the Operations shift supervisor authorized release of fire watches that had been posted as required by a Technical Specification action statement at certain inoperable fire barriers. These fire barriers were located in the lube oil tank room, lube oil reservoir room, both battery rooms, and the control room. Work required to restore the barriers to an operable status had not been completed. Premature release of the fire watches was caused by inadequate documentation on the fire watch request forms concerning posting requirements. During the period without fire watch coverage, smoke or sprinkler pressure switch alarms were available in the control room for the affected areas. Fire watch posting was reestablished after the error was discovered. The total time without fire watch coverage was approximately thirty-four hours. The fire watch request forms for the affected barriers were revised to prevent recurrence of this event by specifically stating that the barriers have been inspected and are inoperable. Approval by Fire Protection personnel will be required before future release of fire watches at these barriers.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

| FACILITY NAME (1) | DOCKET NUMBER (2) | LER NUMBER (6) | | | | | | PAGE (3) |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|----|----|----|----------|
| | | Year | Sequential Number | Revision Number | | | | |
| Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit Two | 05000368 | 91 | 013 | 00 | -- | 00 | 02 | 03 |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

A. Plant Status

At the time of this event, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit Two (ANO-2) was operating at 100% power (Mode 1) with Reactor Coolant System (RCS) [AB] temperature at 580 degrees and pressure 2250 psia.

B. Event Description

On May 12, 1991, fire watches posted at inoperable fire barriers were released due to inadequate documentation concerning posting requirements.

An amendment to Technical Specifications (TS) issued in September 1989 resulted in some fire barriers having their classification changed from insurance barriers to TS barriers. These barriers are located in the lube oil tank room, lube oil reservoir room, both battery rooms, and the control room. Fire watches were posted prior to the effective date of the TS amendment as required by the TS action statement until the barriers could be inspected and modified as necessary to comply with requirements for three hour barriers. Subsequent inspection by Fire Protection personnel confirmed that modifications were required before the barriers could be declared operable. Paperwork for appropriate modifications was initiated. At the time of posting the fire watches, the fire watch request form stated, "fire barrier [xxxx-x] to be upgraded to Tech Spec barrier. Fire watch posting required until barrier is determined to be operable". The form also listed Operations as the organization responsible for posting the fire watches. Subsequent to the posting, fire protection drawings were revised to identify these barriers as TS barriers. The drawing revision was intended to prevent improper release of fire watches based upon drawings which showed fire watches not to be required because the barriers were identified as insurance barriers.

On May 12, 1991, the backshift fire watch supervisor requested that fire watches at certain barriers be released. The shift supervisor evaluated the need for having these fire watches posted. He noted that drawings had been updated for certain fire barriers for which he had no knowledge of pending modification work packages. It was his experience that fire protection drawings are not normally updated until after modification work has been completed and the barrier is then declared operable. This led him to conclude that fire watches were no longer required at barriers with revised drawings. Since Operations was listed as the responsible organization on the fire watch request forms, he did not feel that approval or concurrence was required from other organizations prior to releasing fire watches from what he thought were operable barriers. At approximately 0100 hours on May 12, 1991, he began to authorize release of fire watches. Release authorization continued over the next few hours. When the status of fire watch posting was reviewed by the fire watch supervisor on May 13, 1991, the basis for releasing the fire watches was questioned. Fire Protection personnel were contacted. They confirmed that the barriers were still inoperable and that the requirement for fire watches still existed. Fire watches were established to provide inspection of the inoperable barriers at approximately 1100 hours on May 13, 1991.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

| FACILITY NAME (1) | DOCKET NUMBER (2) | LER NUMBER (6) | | | | | | PAGE (3) |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|----|----|--|----------|
| | | Year | Sequential Number | Revision Number | | | | |
| Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit Two | 050J0368 | 91 | -- | 013 | -- | 00 | | 03OF03 |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

C. Root Cause

The root cause of this event is a failure to properly document on the fire watch request form the specific requirement for the fire watch posting.

D. Corrective Action

Since this event was evaluated to be an isolated occurrence and not indicative of a generic problem, corrective action was limited to the forms associated with the particular fire barriers.

Fire watch request forms for these barriers were revised to adequately address the degraded fire barriers by specifically stating that they have been inspected and are inoperable. In addition, the responsible organization was changed to the Fire Protection section, who will be required to inspect the barriers and establish operability before future release of fire watches.

E. Safety Significance

The safety significance of this event is reduced by the control room having been continuously manned, the availability of smoke detectors with control room alarms monitoring the battery rooms, a sprinkler system with control room alarm on pressure switch actuation available for the lube oil rooms, and the availability of trained fire brigade personnel capable of responding in a short time if a fire had been initiated in one of the affected areas. Therefore, there are no significant safety concerns related to this event.

F. Basis for Reportability

Not having a fire watch posted at inoperable fire barriers for a period greater than one hour is a condition prohibited by Technical Specification 3.7.11 and is therefore reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

G. Additional Information

There have been no previous events of this nature related to inadequate documentation on the fire watch request form reported as Licensee Event Reports at ANO.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].