



Pennsylvania Power & Light Company

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October 7, 1983

Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 83-129/01P-0
ER 100450 FILE 841-23
PLA-1898

Docket No. 50-387
License No. NPF-14

Dear Dr. Murley:

This transmission confirms the verbal report of October 7, 1983, by L.A. Kuczynski to G.G. Rhoads of your staff, in that it has been determined that the present thermal overload bypass circuit design for certain motor operated valves (MOV) could prevent Control Room indication of thermal overload actuation.

On September 27, 1983, operations personnel attempted to operate HV-156F059 from the Control Room following a preventive maintenance activity on the HPCI turbine exhaust pressure switches. When HV-156F059 would not operate, an investigation commenced which yielded the following conclusions:

- 1) The torque switch spring pack failed to open at the specified torque. This caused the valve operating motor to burn up on over-torque with a locked rotor. This will be discussed further in LER 83-140/03L-0.
- 2) The thermal overload bypass circuit design could give erroneous indication of valve electrical operability in the Control Room. This indication would arise if a valve's MOV test/bypass switch were to be returned to the normal 'bypass' position prior to actuation of the thermal overload heater coils.


An inspection to verify the integrity of other DC MOV thermal overload heater coils was immediately performed. All checked coils were in satisfactory condition. Plans have been made to check the coils on the appropriate AC valve motors. Shift supervision have been notified through the Night Orders book that MOV test switches should remain in the 'test' position for at least thirty seconds following a valve closing operation prior to the MOV test switch being placed back to the normal 'bypass' position. This action would assure Control Room indication if the overload relays actuate to protect the MOV motor against a thermal

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overload condition. An engineering evaluation of the thermal overload bypass circuit design is underway.

This condition is considered reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.8.I, and additional information regarding circumstances of the incident and corrective actions to be taken will be provided in the fourteen day follow-up report.



H.W. Keiser
Superintendent of Plant-Susquehanna

LAK:pjg

cc: G.G. Rhoads
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