

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

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September 22, 1983

Docket No. 50-278

Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report Narrative Description

Dear Dr. Murley:

The following occurrence was reported to Mr. A. R. Blough of Region I, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, on September 8, 1983.

Reference:	Docket No. 50-278
Report Number:	3-83-09/1T
Event Date:	September 8, 1983
Report Date:	September 22, 1983
Facility:	Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station RD 1, Delta, PA 17314

Technical Specification Reference:

Technical Specification 6.9.2.a(5) requires prompt notification with written follow-up in the event that a "Failure or malfunction of one or more components which prevents or could prevent, by itself, the fulfillment of the functional requirements of system(s) used to cope with accidents analyzed in the SAR" occurs.

Technical Specification 3.9.B.3 states, "From and after the date that one of the diesel generators or associated emergency bus is made or found to be inoperable for any reasons, continued reactor operation is permissible in accordance with Specification 3.5.F if Specification 3.9.A.1 is satisfied."

Technical Specification 3.5.F.1 states, "During any period when one diesel generator is inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days unless such diesel generator is sooner made operable, provided that all of

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the low pressure core and containment cooling subsystems and the remaining diesel generators shall be operable. If this requirement cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be placed in the Cold Shutdown Condition within 24 hours."

Technical Specification 3.9.A.1 states, "Both off-site sources and the startup transformers and emergency transformers are available and capable of automatically supplying power to the 4kV emergency buses."

Description of the Event:

With Unit 2 shutdown and Unit 3 operating under Technical Specification 3.9.B.3 with one diesel generator inoperable and conducting surveillance testing of the remaining diesel generators as required by Technical Specification 4.5.F.1, the breaker between the E-1 diesel generator and the E-13 emergency bus failed to close when manually requested. The failure of this breaker placed Unit 3 under the action statement of Technical Specification 3.5.F.1 which required the reactor to be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours since more than one diesel generator had to be declared inoperable. Unit 3 was at low power and in the process of being removed from service for other reasons at the time of the breaker failure.

The breaker was immediately removed from the compartment, and tested satisfactorily several times. The breaker was then returned to the compartment, the E-1 diesel generator was synchronized to the emergency bus, and the breaker was successfully closed. The surveillance test was satisfactorily completed. At the end of the test, the breaker was again opened and closed successfully to verify its operability.

Probable Consequences of the Event:

In accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.F.1, failure of more than one diesel generator requires the plant to be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours. The plant was operated within the requirements of the license since Unit 2 had been in the cold shutdown condition since July 4, 1983, and Unit 3 was in the cold shutdown condition within the 24-hour period. This was due to the fact that Unit 3 was at low power and in the process of being removed from service for other reasons at the time of the failure.

Additionally, the breaker was tested for operability and the breaker and diesel generator were returned to service in less than 30 minutes. Likewise, the breaker was again successfully

verified to be operable following completion of the surveillance test.


Cause of the Event:

Immediate testing of the breaker failed to disclose the cause and the failure could not be repeated.

Corrective Actions:

The breaker was repeatedly tested resulting in multiple successful operations. The breaker and the diesel generator were returned to service within 30 minutes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "M. J. Cooney / MJC".

M. J. Cooney
Superintendent
Nuclear Generation Division

GHS:vdw

cc: A. R. Blough, Site Inspector
NRC Document Control Desk