

ATTACHMENT 3 to TXX-94242

AFFECTED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES  
(NUREG-1468)

(Pages 3/4 2-5, 3/4 2-6, 6-20 & 6-21)

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

## SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.2.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.2.2.  $F_0(Z)$  shall be evaluated to determine if it is within its limit by:

a. Using the movable incore detectors to obtain a power distribution map at any THERMAL POWER greater than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

b. Determining the computed heat flux hot channel factor,  $F_0^C(Z)$ , as follows:

Increase the measured  $F_0(Z)$  obtained from the power distribution map by 3% to account for manufacturing tolerances and further increase the value by 5% to account for measurement uncertainties.

c. Verifying that  $F_0^C(Z)$ , obtained in Specification 4.2.2.2b. above, satisfies the relationship in Specification 3.2.2.

d. The  $F_0^C(Z)$  obtained in 4.2.2.2b above shall satisfy the following relationship at the time of the target flux determination:

$$F_0^C(Z) \leq \frac{F_0^{RTP} \times K(Z)}{P \times W(Z)} \quad \text{for } P > 0.5$$

$$F_0^C(Z) \leq \frac{F_0^{RTP} \times K(Z)}{0.5 \times W(Z)} \quad \text{for } P \leq 0.5$$

where  $F_0^C(Z)$  is obtained in Specification 4.2.2.2b. above,  $F_0^{RTP}$  is the  $F_0$  limit,  $K(Z)$  is the normalized  $F_0(Z)$  as a function of core height,  $P$  is the fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER, and  $W(Z)$  is the cycle dependent function that accounts for power distribution transients encountered during normal operation.  $F_0^{RTP}$ ,  $K(Z)$  and  $W(Z)$  are specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT as per Specification 6.9.1.6.

e. Measuring  $F_0(Z)$  according to the following schedule:

1. Upon achieving equilibrium condition after exceeding by 20% or more of RATED THERMAL POWER, the THERMAL POWER at which  $F_0(Z)$  was last determined\*, or
2. At least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days, whichever occurs first.

\*Power level may be increased until the THERMAL POWER for extended operation has been achieved.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

f. With measurements indicating

$$\text{maximum over } Z \left( \frac{F_0^C(Z)}{K(Z)} \right)$$

has increased since the previous determination of  $F_0^C(Z)$  either of the following actions shall be taken:

an allowance  
of 2% as  
specified in  
the COLR

- 1) Increase  $F_0^C(Z)$  by 2% and verify that this value satisfies the relationship in Specification 4.2.2.2d, or
- 2)  $F_0^C(Z)$  shall be measured at least once per 7 Effective Full Power Days until two successive maps indicate that

$$\text{maximum over } Z \left( \frac{F_0^C(Z)}{K(Z)} \right) \text{ is not increasing.}$$

g. With the relationships specified in Specification 4.2.2.2d above not being satisfied:

- 1) Calculate the percent that  $F_0(Z)$  exceeds its limits by the following expression:

$$\left\{ \left( \frac{\text{maximum over } Z \left[ \frac{F_0^C(Z) \times W(Z)}{E_0^{RTP} \times K(Z)} \right] - 1}{P} \right) \times 100 \text{ for } P > 0.5 \right.$$

$$\left. \left( \frac{\text{maximum over } Z \left[ \frac{F_0^C(Z) \times W(Z)}{E_0^{RTP} \times K(Z)} \right] - 1}{0.5} \right) \times 100 \text{ for } P \leq 0.5, \text{ and} \right.$$

- 2) The following action shall be taken:

Within 15 minutes, control the AFD to within new AFD limits which are determined by reducing the AFD limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT by 1% AFD for each percent  $F_0(Z)$  exceeds its limits as determined in Specification 4.2.2.2g.1. Within 8 hours, reset the AFD alarm setpoints to these modified limits.

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### MONTHLY OPERATING REPORTS (Continued)

shall be submitted on a monthly basis to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator of the Regional Office of the NRC, no later than the 15th of each month following the calendar month covered by the report.

### CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

6.9.1.6a Core operating limits shall be established and documented in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR) before each reload cycle or any remaining part of a reload cycle for the following:

- 1). Moderator temperature coefficient BOL and EOL limits and 300 ppm surveillance limit for Specification 3/4.1.1.3,
- 2). Shutdown Rod Insertion Limit for Specification 3/4.1.3.5,
- 3). Control Rod Insertion Limits for Specification 3/4.1.3.6,
- 4). AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE Limits and target band for Specification 3/4.2.1.,
- 5). Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor,  $K(Z)$ ,  $W(Z)$ , and  $F_Q^{RTP}$  for Specification 3/4.2.2,
- 6). Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor Limit and the Power Factor Multiplier for Specification 3/4.2.3.

and the  $F_Q^c(z)$  allowances

6.9.1.6b The following analytical methods used to determine the core operating limits are for Units 1 and 2, unless otherwise stated, and shall be those previously approved by the NRC in:

- 1). WCAP-9272-P-A, "WESTINGHOUSE RELOAD SAFETY EVALUATION METHODOLOGY," July 1985 (X Proprietary). (Methodology for Specifications 3.1.1.3 - Moderator Temperature Coefficient, 3.1.3.5 - Shutdown Bank Insertion Limit, 3.1.3.6 - Control Bank Insertion Limits, 3.2.1 - Axial Flux Difference, 3.2.2 - Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, and 3.2.3 - Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor.)
- 2). WCAP-8385, "POWER DISTRIBUTION CONTROL AND LOAD FOLLOWING PROCEDURES - TOPICAL REPORT," September 1974 (X Proprietary). (Methodology for Specification 3.2.1 - Axial Flux Difference [Constant Axial Offset Control].)
- 3). T. M. Anderson to K. Kniel (Chief of Core Performance Branch, NRC January 31, 1980--Attachment: Operation and Safety Analysis Aspects of an Improved Load Follow Package. (Methodology for Specification 3.2.1 - Axial Flux Difference [Constant Axial Offset Control].)
- 4). NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Section 4.3, Nuclear Design, July 1981. Branch Technical Position CPB 4.3-1, Westinghouse Constant Axial Offset Control (CAOC), Rev. 2, July 1981. (Methodology for Specification 3.2.1 - Axial Flux Difference [Constant Axial Offset Control].)

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (Continued)

February 1994

Revision 1A

- 5). WCAP-10216-P-A, "RELAXATION OF CONSTANT AXIAL OFFSET CONTROL  $F_0$  SURVEILLANCE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION," ~~June 1983~~ (W Proprietary).  
(Methodology for Specification 3.2.2 - Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (W(z) surveillance requirements for  $F_0$  Methodology).)
- 6). WCAP-10079-P-A, "NOTRUMP, A NODAL TRANSIENT SMALL BREAK AND GENERAL NETWORK CODE," August 1985, (W Proprietary).
- 7). WCAP-10054-P-A, "WESTINGHOUSE SMALL BREAK ECCS EVALUATION MODEL USING THE NOTRUMP CODE", August 1985, (W Proprietary).
- 8). WCAP-11145-P-A, "WESTINGHOUSE SMALL BREAK LOCA ECCS EVALUATION MODEL GENERIC STUDY WITH THE NOTRUMP CODE", October 1986, (W Proprietary).
- 9). RXE-90-006-P, "Power Distribution Control Analysis and Overtemperature N-16 and Overpower N-16 Trip Setpoint Methodology," February 1991.  
(Methodology for Specification 3.2.1 - Axial Flux Difference, 3.2.2 - Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor.)
- 10). RXE-88-102-P, "TUE-1 Departure from Nucleate Boiling Correlation", January 1989.
- 11). RXE-88-102-P, Sup. 1, "TUE-1 DNB Correlation - Supplement 1", December 1990.
- 12). RXE-89-002, "VIPRE-01 Core Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Methods for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Licensing Applications", June 1989.
- 13). RXE-91-001, "Transient Analysis Methods for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Licensing Applications", February 1991.
- 14). RXE-91-002, "Reactivity Anomaly Events Methodology", May 1991.  
(Methodology for Specification 3.1.1.3 - Moderator Temperature Coefficient, 3.1.3.5 - Shutdown Bank Insertion Limit, 3.1.3.6 - Control Bank Insertion Limits, 3.2.1 - Axial Flux Difference, 3.2.2 - Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, 3.2.3 - Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor.)
- 15). RXE-90-007, "Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident Analysis Methodology", December 1990.
- 16). TXX-88306, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis", March 15, 1988.
- 17). RXE-91-005, "Methodology for Reactor Core Response to Steamline Break Events," May, 1991.