

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'T

0	1
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REPORT SOURCE

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60	61	DOCKET NUMBER						68	69	EVENT DATE						74	75	REPORT DATE						80

0 2 | During a post-modification scram test at 50% rod density, two of the
0 3 | four scram instrument volume drain valves failed to close in the speci-
0 4 | fied 30 second time frame. Due to the existence of redundant, inboard
0 5 | drain valves, the effluent from the SIV's was contained and there was
0 6 | no effect on public health or safety. For additional information, see
0 7 | attachment.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The change in timing of the valves involved in this event is attributed
11 to inadvertent contact with the two needle valve hand wheels during the
12 time period between initial adjustment and installation of protective
13 covers. The timing of the air operated valves was readjusted and pro-
14 tective covers reinstalled. For additional information, see attachment.

8 9
FACILITY STATUS (1) (5) (C) (28) % POWER (0) (0) (0) (29) OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY (C) (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) observation by operator
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER (0) (0) (0) (37) TYPE (Z) (38) DESCRIPTION (39) NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER (0) (0) (0) (40) DESCRIPTION (41) NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE (Z) (42) DESCRIPTION (43) NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
PUBLICITY ISSUED (N) (44) DESCRIPTION (45) NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
NRC USE ONLY
68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

PHONE: 342-3840

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-333

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-032

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⑩

During the scheduled scram test at 50% rod density, as specified by the pre-operability test of the newly completed Long Term Scram Discharge System Modification (LTSDSM), two of the four scram instrument volume (SIV) tank drain valves failed to close in the specified 30 second time frame from initiation of full scram.

The 30 second time limit, specified in the Plant Technical Specifications is intended to reduce the outflow of reactor coolant through the CRD seals after a scram.

The design of the LTSDS modification provides for two redundant SIV vent and drain valves in series for each of the two SIV tanks.

During this event, only the outboard SIV drain valves failed to respond as specified. The outboard drain valve on the east SIV, AOV35, took 40 seconds to close from scram initiation while the outboard drain valve on the west SIV, AOV39, failed to respond altogether. The inboard drain valves did close in the specified time frame.

⑪

The SIV drain valves were installed as part of the LTSDS modification during the 1983 refueling outage. The stroke time of the valves was adjusted by the use of generant air flow needle valves provided with the air operated valves in an earlier phase of the pre-operability test. Due to the extreme sensitivity of the timing adjustment, protective covers were fabricated and installed over the needle valves subsequent to the initial adjustment and prior to plant startup.

The change in timing of the two valves involved in this event is attributed to inadvertent contact between the two needle valve hand wheels and some unknown object during the time period between the initial adjustment and the installation of protective covers.

The timing of air operated valves was readjusted and rechecked. The protective covers were then reinstalled.

James A. FitzPatrick
Nuclear Power Plant
P.O. Box 41
Lycoming, New York 13093
315 342.3840



Corbin McNeill
Resident Manager

JAFP 83-0957
September 19, 1983

Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

SUBJECT: DOCKET NO. 50-337
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT: 83-032

Dear Dr. Murley:

We have enclosed the subject Licensee Event Report in accordance with Section 6.0 of Technical Specifications and USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.16.

If there are any questions concerning this report, please contact Mr. Robert Baker at (315) 342-3840, extension 261.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Corbin A. McNeill, Jr.'.

CORBIN A. McNEILL, JR.

CAM:RB:ls
ENCLOSURE

CC: USNRC Document Control Desk (1)
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