



Commonwealth Edison
LaSalle County Nuclear Station
2601 N. 21st Road
Marseilles, Illinois 61341
Telephone 815/357-6761

February 3, 1995

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report #95-001-00, Docket #050-373 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

D. J. Ray
Station Manager
LaSalle County Station

DJR/MJE/lja

Enclosure

cc: NRC Region III Administrator
NRC Senior Resident Inspector
INPO - Records Center
IDNS Resident Inspector
IDNS Senior Reactor Analyst
Nuclear Licensing Administrator

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)															Form Rev 3.0												
Facility Name (1) LaSalle County Station Unit 1										Docket Number (2) 0 5 0 0 6 7 3 1 of 0 3																	
Title (4) Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Instrument Root Valve Found Closed																											
Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)				Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)																	
Month	Day	Year	Year	///	Sequential	///	Revision	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names		Docket Number(s)														
0	1	0	6	9	5	9	5	---	0	0	1	---	0	0	0	2	0	3	9	5							
OPERATING MODE (9)			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)																								
POWER LEVEL (10)			1			20.402(b)			20.405(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)												
						20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(c)												
						20.405(a)(1)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)			Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)												
						20.405(a)(1)(iii)			X 50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)															
						20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)															
			20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(x)																		
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																											
Name Mike Ellsworth, Instrument Maintenance Staff, Extension 2278										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 8 1 5 3 5 7 - 6 7 6 1																	
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- TURER			REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- TURER			REPORTABLE TO NPRDS													
X	B	O	R	T	V		N																				
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										Expected Submission Date (15)		Month	Day	Year													
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO																	
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e, approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)																											

On January 6, 1995, at 1500 hours, the instrument stop valve for the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump 1A High Pressure Switch (1E12-N022A) was found unexpectedly in the closed position. The 1E12-N022A pressure switch provides local pressure indication for the 1A RHR Pump discharge piping and input to the "1A RHR Pump Discharge Pressure High" alarm in the Main Control Room. This valving discrepancy was discovered by an Instrument Maintenance Department (IMD) Technician during the performance of LaSalle Instrument Surveillance LIS-RH-316A, "Unit 1 RHR Pump 1A Discharge High/Low Pressure Monthly Functional Test". At the time of this event, Unit 1 was in Operating Condition 1 (Run) at 100% power.

The Functional Test was satisfactorily completed, and the switch was restored to the proper unisolated condition. The instruments on all of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR System local instrument racks were verified to be in the proper position.

This event is being reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a License Event Report in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) due to a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION															Form Rev 3.0							
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)							LER NUMBER (6)														
								Year	///	Sequential Number	///	Revision Number										
LaSalle County Station Unit 1	0	5	0	0	0	3	7	3	9	5	-	0	0	1	-	0	0	0	2	OF	0	3
TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]																						

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

A. CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT

Unit(s): 1 Event Date: 01/06/95 Event Time: 1500 Hours
 Reactor Mode(s): 1 Modes(s) Name: RUN Power Level(s): 100%

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On January 6, 1995, at 1500 hours, the Instrument Stop Valve for the Residual Heat Removal (RHR, PH)[BO] Pump 1A High Pressure Switch (1E12-N022A) was found in the closed position. The 1E12-N022A Pressure Switch provides local pressure indication for the 1A RHR Pump discharge piping and inputs to the "1A RHR Pump Discharge Pressure High" alarm in the Main Control Room. This alarm must be assumed to be inoperable back to the last functional test on December 7, 1994. This valving discrepancy was discovered by an Instrument Maintenance Department (IMD) Technician while performing Step F.2.a.3) of LIS-RH-316A, "Unit 1 RHR Pump 1A Discharge High/Low Pressure Monthly Functional Test", where the "As Found" condition of the switch is verified.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT

No specific cause could be determined for this valving discrepancy. Functional Test LIS-RH-316A was last performed on December 7, 1994. The IMD Technicians who performed this surveillance were questioned and confirmed that the instrument stop for 1E12-N022A was left open and independently verified. On January 6, 1995, the Instrument Stop Valve for 1E12-N022A was found closed with normal system pressure indicated.

A thorough search was conducted for activities performed in the 1A RHR Pump Room where the 1E12-N022A switch is located. Sources of information gathered were Unit 1 Alarm History, Security Computer Door Tracking History, Electronic Work Control System History (EWCS), Shift Engineers' Log, and Unit 1 Operators' Log. These were used as the means to identify work requests, surveillances, and tests that were performed in this area. Copies of these documents provided names of personnel to

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LaSalle County Station Unit 1	0	5	0	0	0	3	7	3	9	5	-	0	0	1	-	0	0	0	3	OF	0	3
TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]																						

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT (Continued)

interview. Statements in the interviews were verified to the extent possible. No weaknesses in procedures were identified. No one expressed any doubts or confusion as to what actions they performed or verified. A time line study was conducted to validate all statements and activities.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The consequences of this event were minimal. The 1A RHR System was maintained filled and vented as determined by the operation of the system on January 6, 1995, at 0900 hours. The pressure switch which provides the 1A RHR Pump Discharge Pressure Low Alarm (1E12-N512A) was functional during the entire time period as evidenced by spurious alarms. The 1E12-N022A high pressure switch performs no safety protective function relative to RHR and only provides an alarm function.

All RHR Valves that connect low pressure to high pressure piping are leak rate tested and have been verified to leak less than one gallon per minute. The relief valves on the A RHR Loop are capable of relieving in excess of one gallon per minute. With the high pressure alarm function disabled, Operations could determine an intersystem leak using RHR Heat Exchanger pressure indication in the Control Room, Suppression Pool level or temperature increases, or system piping temperature increases. Therefore, adequate protection existed to prevent overpressure of the piping in the 1A RHR Loop.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The Functional Test was satisfactorily completed, and the switch was restored to the proper unisolated condition. The instruments on all of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR System local instrument racks were verified to be in the proper position.

This event will be tailgated with all Station Departments stressing the importance of verifying that all valves are returned to the proper position following manipulation.

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS

The PIF/DVR/LER data bases were searched back to 1990. No previous events of finding Instrument Stop valves closed without proper cause could be identified.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

None.