CP&L

Brunswick Nuclear Plant
P.O. Box 10429
Southport, NC 28461-0429

FEB 02 1995

SERIAL: BSEP-95-0059
10CFR50.73

U.S. Nuciear Regulatory Commission
A1TN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1
DOCKET NO. 50-325/LICENSE NO. DRP-71
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1-95-001

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.73, Carolina Power & Light Company submits the enclosed Licensee Event Report. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is submitted in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.

Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. M. A. Turkal at (910) 457-3066.

Very truly yours,

Clay Warren for JPC

J. Cowan, Director-Site Operations
Brunswick Nuclear Plant

jfm/

Enclosures
1. Licensee Event Report
2. Summary of Commitments

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II
Mr. D. C. Trimble, Acting NRR Project Manager - Brunswick Units 1 and 2
Mr. C. A. Patterson, Brunswick NRC Senior Resident Inspector
The Honorable H. Wells, Chairman - North Carolina Utilities Commission

IE22
1/1

NRC FORM 366 (5/92) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 5/31/95

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 1	05000325	1 of 3

TITLE (4)
TWO INOPERABLE CONTROL ROD ACCUMULATORS RESULT IN ENTRY INTO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
01	06	95	95	- 01 -	00	02	02	95		05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	1
POWER LEVEL (10)	100

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following)(11)

	20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)
	20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		(Specify in Abstract and Text)
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
	20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Jeanne P. McGowan, Regulatory Affairs Specialist	(910) 457-2136

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
X	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)		NO		06	30	95

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On January 6, 1995, Unit 1 was operating at 100% power. At 0126 hours, a Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) accumulator alarm was received on HCU 06-39 due to low nitrogen pressure. A previous alarm had been received on HCU 18-23 due to low nitrogen pressure. Both accumulators had previously been recharged and Work Requests/Job Orders were initiated to replace the C11-111, HCU Accumulator Gas Side Isolation Valves. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered due to two HCU accumulators being out of service simultaneously. The C11-111 valves were replaced on both HCUs and at 0352 hours the HCUs were declared operable and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited. The cause of the event is under investigation. Preliminary results indicate a potential problem with the valve body O-rings. Corrective actions included replacing the C11-111 valves on the HCUs. The safety significance is minimal. With the reactor at rated pressure, the scram requirements are met without assistance from the HCUs.

The cause classification for this event per the criteria of NUREG-1022 is Design, Manufacturing, Construction/Installation.

TITLE

TWO INOPERABLE CONTROL ROD ACCUMULATORS RESULT IN ENTRY INTO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3.

INITIAL CONDITIONS

On January 6, 1995, Unit 1 was operating at 100% power. The Control Rod Drive (CRD) System was operable with one Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) out of service for maintenance.

EVENT NARRATIVE

On January 5, 1995, at 2352 hours, a CRD accumulator alarm was received on HCU 18-23. The HCU had previously been recharged twice that day due to low nitrogen pressure and a WR/JO had been initiated to replace the HCU Scram Accumulator Gas Side Isolation Valve, C11-111. A LCO was entered on TS 3.1.3.5.

On January 6, 1995, at 0126 hours, an accumulator alarm was received on HCU 06-39 due to low nitrogen pressure. The HCU was declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered due to two HCUs being inoperable. Technical Specification 3.1.3.5 addresses the CRD HCUs and provides action statements for one HCU being inoperable. Upon confirmation of the second accumulator low pressure alarm, Technical specification 3.0.3 was entered. The HCU was recharged and immediately began losing pressure. A WR/JO was initiated to replace the HCU Scram Accumulator Gas Side Isolation Valve, C11-111. The valves were replaced on both HCU's (18-23 and 06-39) and the HCUs were returned to service. The HCUs were declared operable and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited on January 6, 1995, at 0352 hours. An investigation was initiated to determine the cause of the apparent repetitive failure of the C11-111 valves.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of the event is being investigated. The C11-111 valves were disassembled and the O-rings were shipped to the vendor for evaluation. The results of the failure evaluation will be used to develop any additional corrective actions needed.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. The C11-111 valves for the two HCUs were replaced.

2. An investigation is underway to address the C11-111 valve failures. The investigation is scheduled for completion on May 31, 1995. This Licensee Event Report will be supplemented by June 30, 1995 addressing the results of the examination and any additional corrective actions.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

The safety significance is minimal based on the ability of reactor pressure to scram the control rods. With the reactor at rated pressure, the scram time requirements are met without assistance from the accumulators. The Control Rod Drive System remained available throughout the event, and the rods could have been driven in, if necessary, as a backup.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

Previous events involving entry into TS 3.0.3 due to inoperable HCUs were reported in Licensee Event Reports 1-91-015 and 1-91-027.

EIIS COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION

System/Component	EIIS Code
Control Rod Drive System	AA
Hydraulic Control Unit	AA/HCU
Accumulator	AA/HCU/ACC

Enclosure
List of Regulatory Commitments

The following table identifies those actions committed to by Carolina Power & Light Company in this document. Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by Carolina Power & Light Company. They are described to the NRC for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments. Please notify the Manager-Regulatory Affairs at the Brunswick Nuclear Plant of any questions regarding this document or any associated regulatory commitments.

	Commitment	Committed date or outage
1.	Supplement LER 1-95-001 with the results of the C11-111 investigation and any additional corrective actions.	06/30/95