

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 F L C R P 3 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 LICENSE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T
01 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 - 0 3 0 2 7 0 9 2 2 8 3 8 1 0 9 6 8 3 9
7 8 9 DOCKET NUMBER 60 61 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
02 Follow-up investigation on 9/22/83 of a Florida Power quality audit find-
03 ing uncovered the existence of a procedural inadequacy which allowed the
04 requirement for surveillance of certain fire barrier penetration seals to
05 be overlooked, contrary to T.S. 3.7.12, and reportable under
06 T.S. 6.9.1.8.f.
07
08

09
7 8 9

SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
A B 11 D 12 Z 13 Z Z Z Z Z 14 Z 15 Z 16
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 18 8 19 3 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.
8 3 0 3 8 0 1 T 0

ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
X 18 G 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 Y 23 N 24 Z 25 Z 9 9 9 26
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
10 The cause of this event was due to inadequate procedures. Upon discovery,
11 the seals were immediately inspected and determined to be functional.
12 Surveillance procedure SP-407, Fire Barrier Penetration Seals, will be
13 revised to assure all applicable fire barrier penetration seals are in-
14 cluded in the scheduled surveillance.
7 8 9

15 FACILITY STATUS 16 7 17 3 18 29 N/A 19 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY 31 A 32 In-house audit follow-up
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

16 RELEASED OF RELEASE 17 33 18 34 N/A 19 35 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 20 36 LOCATION OF RELEASE 37 38
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 18 37 19 38 N/A 20 39 DESCRIPTION 40 41
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

18 PERSONNEL INJURIES 19 40 20 41 N/A 21 42 DESCRIPTION 43 44
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 20 42 21 43 N/A 22 44 DESCRIPTION 45 46
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

20 PUBLICITY 21 44 22 45 N/A 23 46 DESCRIPTION 47 48
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

NAME OF PREPARER J.L. Bufe' PHONE (904) 795-6486

8310140123 831006
PDR ADOCK 05000302
S PDR

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

REPORT NO.: 50-302/83-038/01T-0

FACILITY: Crystal River Unit 3

REPORT DATE: October 6, 1983

OCCURRENCE DATE: September 22, 1983

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

On September 22, 1983, it was discovered that certain fire barrier penetration seals had not been inspected contrary to the requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.12.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On August 5, 1983 a Florida Power Corporation (FPC) Quality Programs audit of fire protection features at Crystal River Unit 3 was completed. The audit identified that the surveillance procedure for inspection of fire barrier penetration seals did not include the requirement to inspect the fire barrier seals associated with the diesel generator rooms and diesel generator control rooms.

Upon notification of the audit finding an inspection was made of the fire barrier penetration seals and all were determined to be intact and functional. The affected walls (fire barriers) were as follows:

- The wall between 3A and 3B diesel generator
- The wall between 3A and 3B diesel generator control room
- The wall between 3A diesel generator and its control room
- The wall between 3B diesel generator and its control room

A Nonconforming Operations Report (NCOR) was initiated on August 5, 1983. Initial review of the NCOR found it to be not reportable. A re-evaluation of the NCOR on September 22, 1983, determined it reportable under Technical Specification 6.9.1.8.f.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE:

Omission of this surveillance requirement is due to a failure to recognize the diesel generator rooms and the diesel generator control rooms as separate fire areas as identified in the "Fire Protection Program Review". As a result, they were not included in the Surveillance Procedure.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The four affected rooms each have automatic thermal detectors installed, which alarm in the plant control room. The two diesel generator rooms are protected by automatic sprinklers and the maximum fire severity rating for in situ combustibles is less than 1 hour.

The fire barriers between these rooms contain very few penetrations. For example, one wall contains two single cable tray penetrations and one conduit penetration. Two walls contain a single cable tray penetration, two ventilation penetrations, and five conduit penetrations. One wall contains a single cable tray penetration and five conduit penetrations. The rooms have very high ceilings, and the penetrations are widely dispersed over the wall surfaces.

Considering these factors, FPC is confident that the three hour barriers separating these rooms would have fulfilled their intended safety function even if the barrier seals were in a degraded mode.


- CORRECTIVE ACTION:

A complete review of all fire barriers was conducted to assure all other barrier seals were included. No additional barriers were found which had been omitted from the Surveillance Procedure. A revision to Surveillance Procedure, SP-407, "Fire Barrier Penetration Seals," which implements Technical Specification 3/4.7.12, has been initiated.

All fire barrier penetration seals in the plant will be inspected during the maintenance outage which began on October 1, 1983.

FAILURE DATA:

This is the fourth event reported under Technical Specification 3.7.12.



83 OCT 11 P 1:39

**Florida
Power**
CORPORATION

October 6, 1983
3F-1083-06

Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Regional Administrator, Region II
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, GA 30303

Subject: Crystal River Unit 3
Docket No. 50-302
Operating License No. DPR-72
Licensee Event Report No. 83-038

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report No. 83-038 and the attached supplementary information sheet, which are submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.8(f).

Should there be any questions, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

E.C. Simpson
Director
Nuclear Operations Engineering and Licensing

AEF:jcf

Enclosure

cc: Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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