



Commonwealth Edison
LaSalle County Nuclear Station
2601 N. 21st Road
Marseilles, Illinois 61341
Telephone 815/357-6761

January 19, 1995

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report #94-012-00, Docket #050-374 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v).

D. J. Ray
Station Manager
LaSalle County Station

DJR/CTK/lja

Enclosure

cc: NRC Region III Administrator
NRC Senior Resident Inspector
INPO - Records Center
IDNS Resident Inspector
IDNS Senior Reactor Analyst
Nuclear Licensing Administrator

270044

9501270359 950119
PDR ADDCK 05000374
S PDR

1E22
111

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)																		Form Rev 3.0								
Facility Name (1) LaSalle County Station Unit 2												Docket Number (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 7 4 1 of 0 3														
Title (4) High Pressure Core Spray Declared Inoperable Due to 2B Diesel Generator Exceeding Its 72 Hour Technical Specification																										
Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)				Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)																
Month	Day	Year	Year	///	Sequential Number	///	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names			Docket Number(s)												
1	2	2	1	9	4	9	4	---	0	1	2	---	0	0	0	1	1	9	9	5						
OPERATING MODE (9)		1		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)																						
POWER LEVEL (10)	1		0		0		20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)													
							20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		X 50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)													
							20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)													
							20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)															
							20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)															
						20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)																
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																										
Name Todd Kollross, System Engineer, Extension 2704												TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 8 1 5 3 5 7 - 6 7 6 1														
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS																	
E				No																						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										Expected Submission Date (15)	Month	Day	Year													
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X	NO															
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e, approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)																										

On December 18, 1994, at 2120 hours, the Unit 2 High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Diesel Generator (DG) B was declared inoperable and taken out of service for planned maintenance to install a shutdown solenoid and replace the DG synchronizing motor. This placed the HPCS DG in a 72 hour Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO).

On December 21, 1994, at 1830 hours during the post maintenance test (PMT) run of the 2B DG, it was discovered that the replacement synchronizing motor was wired such that the speed of the governor reacted in the reverse direction of the Control Room switch indication. Troubleshooting and subsequent repair of the synchronizing motor caused the 72 hour timeclock to be exceeded. The Technical Specification LCO Action Statement was met in that the HPCS System was declared inoperable at the time that 72 hours had elapsed.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v), any event that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to remove residual heat.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION														Form Rev 3.0								
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)										LER NUMBER (6)											
											Year		Sequential Number		Revision Number							
	LaSalle County Station	0	5	0	0	0	3	7	4	9	4	-	0	1	2	-	0	0	0	2	OF	0
TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]																						

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

A. CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT

Unit(s): 2 Event Date: 12/21/94 Event Time: 2120 Hours
 Reactor Mode(s): 1 Modes(s) Name: Run Power Level(s): 100%

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On December 21, 1994, at approximately 1830 hours with Unit 2 in operational condition 1 (Run) at 100% power, the 2B Diesel Generator (DG) was started for post maintenance testing (PMT) to determine operability per LaSalle Operating Surveillance LOS-DG-M3, "1B(2B) Diesel Generator Operability Test". The PMT followed planned maintenance to install a shutdown solenoid and replacement of the DG synchronizing motor. The 2B DG had been taken out of service and declared inoperable at 2121 hours on December 18, 1994. At approximately 1835 hours, the 2B DG had reached its rated operating speed (900 rpm). The Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) began to adjust the speed of the DG using the governor as directed in surveillance. During the initial adjustments, the NSO noted that the speed of the DG reacted in the reverse direction of the handswitch indication in the Control Room. The 2B DG was shutdown at 1850 hours for further troubleshooting and repair of the DG synchronizing motor. At 2120 hours, the HPCS System was declared inoperable per Technical Specification 3.8.1 due to its associated 2B DG exceeding the 72 hour timeclock associated with its inoperable status.

The abnormal operation of the 2B DG governor was caused by a design error made on the governor synchronizing motor during the engine construction period. The investigation of this event revealed that the synchronizing motor for the 2B DG Governor was incorrectly wired during original installation in the 1980's. The wiring problem was corrected at that time by reversing leads in the connector, and the appropriate drawings were revised. This wiring change allowed the synchronizing motor to operate properly.

In December 1994, the synchronizing motor was replaced for the first time since original installation. There was no documentation available to alert the station to the fact that a wiring change would be needed during replacement of the synchronizing motor. The synchronizing motor external circuit has now been modified and drawings are being updated accordingly. On December 22, 1994, the 2B DG was successfully operated in accordance with LOS-DG-M3 and declared operable.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION														Form Rev 3.0	
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)													
		Year	///	Sequential	///	Revision									
				Number		Number									
LaSalle County Station	0 5 0 0 0 5 7 4	9	4	-	0	1	2	-	0	0	0	3	OF	0	3
TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]															

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT ((Continued))

The HPCS System itself was not impaired and was available for automatic and manual initiation for coolant injection into the reactor.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT

This report is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v), which requires reporting of any event that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to remove residual heat. The root cause of the HPCS System inoperability on December 21, 1994, was exceeding the 72 hour timeclock associated with its emergency power source (2B DG) because of equipment problems on the 2B DG governor synchronizing motor. The end of the 72 hour timeclock was near when the synchronizing motor problem was discovered, and there was insufficient time to troubleshoot and repair it prior to exceeding the timeclock.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT

All Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) were available at the time of the event, as were the other two DGs associated with Unit 2. In the event of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), with offsite power available, the HPCS System was available for automatic initiation. Based on the above, the overall safety significance of this event is minimal.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The 2B DG was repaired and declared operable on December 22, 1994. No corrective actions were deemed applicable to the Unit 2 HPCS System.

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS

None.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

None.