



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038  
Hope Creek Generating Station

October 14, 1994

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION  
DOCKET NO. 50-354  
UNIT NO. 1  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 94-013-00

This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to  
the requirements of 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "R.J. Hovey", written over the typed name.

R.J. Hovey  
General Manager -  
Hope Creek Operations

LAA/

Attachment  
SORC Mtg. 94-073  
C Distribution

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PDR ADOCK 05000354  
S PDR

The Energy People

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT																																										
FACILITY NAME (1) HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION															DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 5 4										PAGE (3) 1 OF 6																	
TITLE (4): Condition Prohibited by the Plant Technical Specifications - Non compliance with the shift manning requirement of technical specification 6.2.2.a, shift manning requirements																																										
EVENT DATE (5)					LER NUMBER (6)										REPORT DATE (7)					OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	*	NUMBER	*	REV	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME(S)					DOCKET NUMBER(S)																										
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OPERATING (9) MODE			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR: (CHECK ONE OR MORE BELOW) (11)																																							
POWER LEVEL % 1 0 0			20.402(b)										20.405(c)										50.73(a)(2)(iv)										73.71(b)									
			20.405(a)(1)(i)										50.36(c)(1)										50.73(a)(2)(v)										73.71(c)									
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)										50.36(c)(2)										50.73(a)(2)(vii)										OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)									
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)										50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)										50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)																			
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)										50.73(a)(2)(ii)										50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)																			
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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																																										
NAME Lou Aversa, Senior Staff Engineer - Technical															TELEPHONE NUMBER 6 0 9 3 3 9 3 3 8 6																											
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE NOTED IN THIS REPORT (13)																																										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRPDS?	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRPDS?																																	
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED? (14) YES					NO x					DATE EXPECTED (15)					MONTH DAY YEAR																											
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### ABSTRACT (16)

This LER is being submitted due to three occurrences of not meeting the requirements of technical specification 6.2.2.a, Control Room Shift Manning Requirements. The events of June 3, 1992 and September 28, 1994, were a result of the Nuclear Shift Supervisors, who had assumed command and control, leaving the control room area for a period of some 3 minutes for the first event, and approximately 18 seconds in the second event. The third event, of 9/15/94, resulted from the command and control function being turned over to a SRO who did not meet the proficiency requirements described in NUREG 1262. The root cause of two events was attributed to personnel error as the NSS's involved allowed themselves to become distracted by other activities and inadvertently left the control room area. The remaining event was attributed to less than adequate administration of the guidelines contained in NUREG 1262. Corrective actions for these events include administrative procedure changes regarding proficiency requirements, a review of the NUREG with appropriate personnel, and inclusion of the requirements in operators requalification training. A mechanical restraint is currently being placed over a watchstander's security badge to prevent personnel who are meeting the control room manning requirements from carding out of the area. The Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor and NSS's involved in these events have also been counseled and disciplined as appropriate.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION													
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)								PAGE (3)			
HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION	05000354	YEAR	*	NUMBER			*	REV	0 2 of 0 6				
		9	4	-	0	1	3	-					

### PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4)  
No system applicable

### IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

TITLE (4): Condition prohibited by Plant Technical Specification - non compliance with the requirements of technical specification 6.2.2.a, shift manning requirements

Event Dates: 6/3/92, 9/15/94 & 9/28/94

Event Discovery 9/16/94, 9/19/94 & 9/28/94

Event Time: 1338, several periods during shift & 1301

This LER was initiated by Incident Report No. 94-153, 94-154 & 94-162

### CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Plant in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 (Power Operation)  
Reactor Power 100% of rated, 1085 MWe

### DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On September 15, 1994, during a regualification training classroom session, a discussion regarding the proficiency requirements of 10CFR 55.53 was being conducted with shift personnel. As the requirements were being discussed a Nuclear Control Operator (NCO) who had obtained his Senior Reactor Operators (SRO) license stated that he was never made aware that the SRO portion of his license would not be active unless he stood the specified number of shifts in that role during any calendar quarter. The Nuclear Control Operators are typically licensed as Reactor Operators (RO) only, and as members of the bargaining unit, do not act in a supervisory or "command and control" role in the control room. The instructor immediately notified his supervisor of the discussion who also reviewed the requirements of 10CFR 55.53 and NUREG 1262. Following the review of the documents, which continued into the following day, training center personnel notified the Operations Department Engineer (OE) that NCO's who had not stood proficiency watches, under the guidelines of NUREG 1262, could not assume the command and control position in the control room. Upon being notified, the OE informed all the Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisors (SNSS -SRO licensed) of the proficiency requirements and directed a review of the watchstanding history for their respective shifts. The review revealed that on the evening of 9/15/94, a SRO licensed NCO, who had been upgraded to NSS, had been designated as the command and control SRO for several short time periods when the SNSS left the control room to perform other duties such as plant rounds. This incident created a heightened awareness of the requirements for a valid SRO to be present in the control room as delineated by T.S. 6.2.2.a. The turnover process of designating a SRO as command and control when the SNSS leaves the control room was also re-emphasized via the night orders.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION																
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)				LER NUMBER (6)						PAGE (3)					
HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION	05000354				YEAR	*	NUMBER			*	REV		0   3   of   0   6			
					9   4	-	0   1   3	-	0   0							

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

Despite these measures a similar event occurred on 9/28/94, when a Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS - SRO licensed), who was designated as the command and control SRO, inadvertently walked out of the control room area to the adjacent work control center for approximately 18 seconds. At the time, a SRO licensed NCO was in the control room performing the NSS duties under direction of this NSS to regain his proficiency. The NCO had completed 38 hours of the required 40 under the direction of an SRO to regain his proficiency.

One additional event, which resulted from an allegation presented in a meeting with the Chief Nuclear Officer, was investigated which occurred some two years prior to the events described above. On June 3, 1992, at 1338 hours, the NSS who had assumed the command and control role inadvertently left the control room. The SNSS had turned over to the NSS to attend a department staff meeting. Some time after the SNSS had left the control room a problem was brought to the attention of the NSS regarding control room chillers. The NSS decided to go to the chillers, and contacted the STA (SRO licensed) to discuss the problem and be relieved. Following this discussion, the NSS walked into the rear of the control room area to get his hard hat and safety gear while the STA returned to the work control office. Both individuals believed the other was to remain in the control room; the NSS believed he had turned over command and control while the STA believed the turnover was yet to occur. The two individuals left from different doors that are not visible from each other. The on duty NCO and a Quality Assurance (QA) engineer who were in the control room realized no SRO was present and paged the STA. The STA returned to the control room within three minutes of the time he exited.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

The Hope Creek Technical Specifications requires that a Senior Reactor Operator shall be in the control room during OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3. It also requires that when the Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor is absent from the control room in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3, that an individual with a valid SRO license is designated to assume the command and control function in the control room. The term valid SRO requires that personnel meet the requirements of 10 CFR 55.53 as clarified in NUREG 1262.

The three events being reported all relate to not meeting the proper manning requirements of the above specification. The first event was related to proficiency, while the remaining two events involve the failure to maintain a SRO present in the control room.

Hope Creek had previously established a program to maintain proficiency for individuals who are licensed, but are assigned to non-shift duties. Staff personnel were required to stand the required number of shifts to maintain their proficiency or perform the 40 hours of parallel duties to regain their proficiency if it had expired. Typically, all staff



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION												
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)								PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	*	NUMBER			*	REV				
HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION	05000354	9	4	-	0	1	3	-	0	0	0	4 of 0 6

#### ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE (Con't)

personnel are supervisory positions and were licensed as SRO's. To perform their proficiency watches they are assigned to a technical specification required SRO position. Due to constraints placed on management via the collective bargaining agreement, supervisors cannot routinely fill the position of a nuclear control operator, hence the situation of standing watches in a position other than that for which an individual was licensed did not occur.

A program to upgrade reactor operators to senior reactor operators was established to ensure an adequate number of qualified individuals are available for promotion when needed. The reactor operators are typically bargaining unit personnel who, under the constraints of the collective bargaining agreement, cannot be placed in a supervisory role on a day to day basis. Likewise, additional reactor operator licenses are maintained, above the technical specification minimum, to ensure an adequate pool of individuals exists to man the control room.

In the past some NCO's who received SRO's were promoted to NSS within 90 days of receipt of their SRO licenses, and thus, were considered current. When other SRO licensed NCO's were promoted to shift supervisor, they were required to stand the proficiency watches prior to assuming the duties of the new position. This was directed by the previous Operating Engineer who was aware of the proficiency requirements. The individual who was assigned command and control function, prior to re-establishing his proficiency, in this event had been promoted, however, the current Operations Department Engineer was not aware of the proficiency requirements for the position change. The individual had performed some of the shift supervisor functions under the direction of his SNSS who was attempting to orient the individual to assume the NSS duties. This orientation is common at Hope Creek and is above and beyond all formal requirements for newly licensed individuals.

As a result of the initial event, the Operating Engineer notified all SNSS's to perform a review of the watchstanding log to determine if any other similar situations existed. Additionally, the turnover process for assuring the transfer of command and control was re-emphasized. All Senior and Nuclear Shift Supervisors reviewed the proficiency requirements and understood who was qualified to assume the command and control role.

The second occurrence (event of 9/28/94) being reported was due to an individual leaving the control room after assuming the command and control role. The SNSS had formally turned over the command and control to his shift supervisor, who was also directing an individual performing his proficiency watches. The NSS was standing in the control room near the viewing windows that separate the control room from the equipment operators (EO) ready room area. The NSS was curious about the EO's moving new equipment into an adjacent room. He

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION													
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)								PAGE (3)			
HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION	05000354	YEAR		*	NUMBER			*	REV	0   5   of   0   6			
		9	4	-	0	1	3	-	0				

#### ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE (Con't)

stepped out of the control room into the control room viewing area to question the EO's as to the source of the new equipment. As he stepped out, he realized his mistake and returned to the control room.

The third occurrence (event of July 3, 1992) being reported was again due to not having a SRO in the control room. The investigation determined that in addition to the control room manning deficiency, the personnel involved did not comply with station administrative requirements to prepare an incident report. When the SNSS returned to the control room, following a staff meeting, the NSS and STA discussed the occurrence with the SNSS. The NSS described the occurrence and attributed the event to miscommunication between himself and the STA. The NSS believed the STA understood he was about to leave the control room area. The STA could not recall any transfer of command and control from the NSS. The group discussed the fact that for a period of approximately three minutes (2 minutes 56 seconds) no SRO was in the control room and recognized a technical specification violation had occurred. The individuals evaluated whether or not the reporting requirements of Hope Creek Administrative procedure governing reportable events had been met. They believed that due to the short period of time involved that the severity of the event did not warrant the incident report. The SNSS was also informed by the NSS that a quality assurance engineer had been present during the period and was aware that no SRO was in the control room. The SNSS contacted the QA engineer and discussed the event with him. The SNSS solicited the input of the QA engineer as to the reportability of the event. The QA engineer did not state that an incident report was required and that it was up to the SNSS to handle the situation. The SNSS inappropriately rationalized that due to the time period involved, the lack of any definitive recommendation by anyone to prepare an incident report, that the persons involved understood why the event occurred and actions could be taken within the shift to prevent recurrence of a similar event, that an incident report was not required. Reportability to the NRC was not considered or discussed.

#### SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

These incidents posed minimal safety significance. In the first two cases an individual with a SRO license, who was a integral part of the shift manning, had participated in the shift turnover and was current in respects to requalification training, was present in the control room. In all three events, proficient SRO's were within minutes, if not seconds, of the control room at all times.

#### PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

There have been no previous events of this nature at Hope Creek.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION															
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)								PAGE (3)					
		YEAR	*	NUMBER			*	REV							
HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION	05000354	9	4	-	0	1	3	-	0	0	0	6	of	0	6

#### APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The root cause of the initial event was a misunderstanding of the requirements for standing proficiency watches. The individuals were not aware of the interpretation of proficiency requirements described in NUREG 1262. The second event was due to personnel error. The NSS who left the control room was distracted by activities visible through the control room viewing window directly adjacent to the control room. The event of June 3, 1992, was also attributed to personnel error on the part of the NSS who left the control room after assuming command and control. Personnel errors on the part of the SNSS, NSS, STA, and the QA engineer all of whom concluded that an incident report was not warranted resulted in a missed LER.

#### CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The proficiency requirements specified in NUREG 1262 have been reviewed with appropriate personnel.

Training Department will include training on the requirements of 10CFR55.53 and NUREG 1262 in requal and initial license training.

Operations Department Administrative Procedure for Personnel Qualification and Training have been revised to incorporate the proficiency requirements. The revised procedure is being routed to all licensed individuals with a clarification of their responsibilities.

Licensed individuals involved in all events and the QA engineer have been counseled and/or disciplined as appropriate.


The individuals involved in not writing an incident report are designing an intervention method to preclude similar events.

An appropriate barrier, such as a restraining clip, that fits over an individuals security badge, is being used to prevent the command and control individual, and other required watchstanders, from carding out of the control room.

Additional training will be provided to appropriate personnel on the reporting requirements of 10CFR 50.73 and NUREG 1022.

A letter expressing managements expectations for proper conduct will be issued to appropriate personnel.

Sincerely,



R.J. Hovey  
General Manager -  
Hope Creek Operations