

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

17	LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR			SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.				OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE			REVISION NO.	
		8	3	—	0	8	7	/	0	3	L	—		0	
		21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31		32	
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	
X	X			Z	Z			0	0	0	Y	N	N		
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER	OTHER STATUS	(30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	(32)
8	9					80

ISSUED		DESCRIPTION		NAC USE ONLY	
2	0	N	44	NA	

PHONE: (912) 367-7851

NARRATIVE REPORT
FOR LER 50-366/1983-087

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-366

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

This 30-day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.d due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.6.3 and Table 3.6.3-1.

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

This event occurred on 08/22/83 with the reactor mode switch in the start and hot standby position and reactor power at 0 MWt.

Detailed description of the event(s):

On 08/22/83, it was discovered that 2B21-F016 (main steam line primary containment isolation valve) would not close fully with the control switch.

Consequences of the event(s):

Plant operation was not affected by this event. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

The 2B21-F019 (main steam drain primary containment isolation valve) was operable.

Justification for continued operation:

Unit 2 was placed in a LCO as required by Tech. Specs. section 3.6.3, ACTION a.2.

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

The failure of the 2B21-F016 valve is a repetitive event as last reported on LER 50-366/1983-016.

Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

This event had no impact on any other Unit 2 systems or on Unit 1.

Cause(s) of the event(s):

The cause of this event is unknown at this time.

Immediate Corrective Action:

When it was discovered that the 2B21-F016 valve would not close with the control switch, the affected penetration was isolated within 4 hours by the use of one deactivated automatic valve (2B21-F019) secured in the isolated position as required by Tech. Specs. section 3.6.3, ACTION a.2.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

See scheduled (future) corrective action.

Scheduled (future) corrective action:

A maintenance request has been written to repair the 2B21-F016 valve. This valve is located inside primary containment and is not accessible during reactor operation. This M.R. has been placed in the outage status file and will be worked when access to the drywell can be made. An update to this LER will be provided at that time.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

Engineering is reviewing the problem in order to provide corrective action.

Georgia Power Company
Post Office Box 439
Baxley, Georgia 31513
Telephone 912 367-7781
912 537-9444

83 SEP 20 All : 26



Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant


September 15, 1983
GM-83-904

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-366

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

ATTENTION: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-366/1983-087. This report is required by Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.1.9.d.


H. C. Nix
General Manager

sc
HCN/SBT/djs

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