

**Florida  
Power**  
CORPORATION

# INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE

Nuclear Engineering  
OFFICE

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SUBJECT: Crystal River Unit No. 3  
Quality Document Transmittal - Analysis/Calculations  
File: CALC

TO: Records Management - NR2A

The following analysis/calculation package is submitted as the QA Record copy:

DOCNO (FPC DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER) <b>M94-0056</b>	REV <b>0</b>	SYSTEM(S) <b>SW/RN</b>	TOTAL PAGES TRANSMITTED <b>11/21/94 32 33</b>
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TITLE  
**ALLOWABLE SWITE TUBE BLOCKAGE VS. UHS  
TEMPERATURE**

KEYWORDS (IDENTIFY KEYWORDS FOR LATER RETRIEVAL)  
**HEAT EXCHANGER, BLOCKAGE, UHS, GULF OF MEXICO**

DXREF (REFERENCES OR FILES - LIST PRIMARY FILE FIRST)  
**EQUIP 5-3B**  
**~~CS94-014~~ HRC 11/30/94**  
**~~CS94-015~~ CLC 11/15/94**

VEND (VENDOR NAME) <b>FPC (CAMPBELL)</b>	VENDOR DOCUMENT NUMBER (DXREF) <b>N/A</b>	SUPERSEDED DOCUMENTS (DXREF) <b>N/A</b>
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TAG		
<b>SWHE-1A</b>		
<b>SWHE-1B</b>		
<b>SWHE-1C</b>		
<b>SWHE-1D</b>		

PART NO.		

COMMENTS (USAGE RESTRICTIONS, PROPRIETARY, ETC.)  
 \* **THIS DATA WILL PROVIDE INPUT TO THE SWHE SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES.**

\* **THIS CALCULATION MAY REQUIRE REVISION FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF M94-0050.**

**NOTE:**

Use Tag number only for valid tag numbers (i.e., RCV-8, SWV-34, DCH-99), otherwise, use Part number field (i.e., CSC14599, AC1459). If more space is required, write "See Attachment" and list on separate sheet.


DESIGN ENGINEER <b>[Signature]</b>	DATE <b>11/21/94</b>	VERIFICATION ENGINEER <b>[Signature]</b>	DATE <b>11/29/94</b>	SUPERVISOR, NUCLEAR ENG. <b>[Signature]</b>	DATE <b>12/6/94</b>
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cc: MAR Office (If MAR Related) ☐ Yes ☒ No  
MAR/Project File  
Mgr., Nucl. Config. Mgt.  
File (CALC) -- FPES - "Original" w/attach  
Mgr., Site Nucl. Eng. Serv. w/attach

Supervisor, Nuclear Document Control w/Plant Doc. Rev.  
Eval. and Analysis / Calc. Summary  
Plant Document Review Required ☒ Yes ☐ No  
A/E ☐ Yes ☒ No  
(If Yes, Transmit w/attach)

9501240389 950118  
PDR ADOCK 05000302  
G PDR

RET: L's of Plant RESP; Nuclear Engineering 900 628



# PLANT DOCUMENT REVIEW EVALUATION

DOCUMENT TYPE / NUMBER TO BE EVALUATED

M94-0056

Rev. 0

## PART I

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Calculations, Document Change Notices, and Plant Equipment Equivalency Replacements have the potential to affect plant documents. The Originator of any of these documents is required to determine which, if any, plant organizations should review the subject document for impact. The Originator should use the best judgment to make this determination based on the nature of the changes. If in doubt as to whether or not a plant organization should review a particular document, it is suggested that the subject organization be contacted.

The Originator is to check the appropriate boxes below and attach to the subject package as follows:

Calculations - Insert behind Analysis/Calculation Transmittal  
DCNs - Insert behind DCN page 1  
PEEREs - Insert behind PEERE page 2  
CIDPs - Insert behind CIDP page 1

The above referenced document must be distributed as follows:

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> No Review Required                   | <input type="checkbox"/> Supervisor, Operations Engineering & Support |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Senior Radiation Protection Engineer | <input type="checkbox"/> Manager, Nuclear Maintenance                 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Manager, Site Nuclear Services       | <input type="checkbox"/> Manager, Nuclear Plant Technical Support     |
|   | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other(s):                         |

BILL BRENER

ORIGINATOR / DATE

K. R. Sell

11/22/94

SUPERVISOR / DATE

Ben [Signature]

11/29/94

Upon completion of Part I, attach to the subject document, check "Plant Document Review Required" block, as applicable, and give to Nuclear Engineering Clerk for distribution.

CIDPs - Distribute with Attachments

Calcs - Distribute with Transmittal Memo, Summary - PEERE - Distribute with Attachments - DCNs - Distribute with Attachments and Drawings

## PART II

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Upon receipt of the subject document, the assigned Reviewer enters the "Reviewing Department" name below, reviews the subject document for impact on plant procedures, and completes the evaluation below.

REVIEWING DEPARTMENT

**PLANT REVIEW IMPACT EVALUATION:** The above referenced document has been reviewed and evaluated as follows:

- ☐ No Action Required
- ☐ Action Required: The below listed document(s) is affected and requires revision and/or other actions as indicated (i.e., generate a new procedure, void a procedure, etc.)

DOCUMENTS / ACTIONS

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

REVIEWER / DATE

SUPERVISOR / DATE

Upon completion, forward evaluation form only to Nuclear Document Control (NR2A)

\* If the Supervisor or designee acts as the Originator or Reviewer, the applicable "Originator/Reviewer" block should be NA'd.



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## ANALYSIS/CALCULATION SUMMARY

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	DISCIPLINE M	CONTROL NO. 94-00 56	REVISION LEVEL 0
TITLE Allowable Tube Blockage vs. UHS Temperature			CLASSIFICATION (CHECK ONE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Safety Related <input type="checkbox"/> Non Safety Related
			WAR/SP NUMBER/FILE EQUIP 5-38
			VENDOR DOCUMENT NUMBER N/A

	REVISION APPROVALS	ITEMS REVISED
Design Engineer	<i>KRC/ell</i>	Initial Issue
Date	11/28/94	
Verification Engineer	<i>Craig Mills</i>	
Date/Method*	11/29/94 R	
Supervisor	<i>Benjamin</i>	
Date	12/6/94	

\*VERIFICATION METHODS: R - Design Review; A - Alternate Calculation; T - Qualification Testing


DESCRIBE BELOW IF METHOD OF VERIFICATION WAS OTHER THAN DESIGN REVIEW

### PURPOSE SUMMARY

The purpose of this calculation is to identify when a second SWHE heat exchanger should be cleaned based upon the amount of blockage that is noted during the cleaning of the first SWHE. This decision is a function of the Gulf of Mexico (UHS) temperature

### RESULTS SUMMARY

A graph of percent of blockage detected vs. UHS temperature is identified in Attachment #6.



# DESIGN ANALYSIS/CALCULATION

## Crystal River Unit 3

Sheet 1 of 4

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

M94-0056

REVISION

0

REV/MAR/SP NUMBER/FILE

equip 5-38

### SECTION 1 - PURPOSE

The purpose of this analysis is to calculate the percent of macrofouling (tube pluggage and blockage) that is acceptable for the SWHE's. If the blockage noted by visual inspection during the weekly cleaning of the first heat SWHE is greater than that allowed per Attachment #6, for the identified UHS temperature, a second SWHE should be cleaned.

### SECTION 2 - DESIGN INPUTS

1. The amount of heat required to be removed from the SW system is 140.38 E6 btu/hr. (Ref. 2)
2. Three (3) heat exchangers are required to be in service. (Ref. 3)

### SECTION 3 - ASSUMPTIONS


1. RW flow rate decreases with an increase in the amount of tube blockage.
2. The RW flow rates for various percentages of inlet side tube blockage are taken from Ref. 1 (preliminary), and are as follows:

Percent Blocked	Total RW Flow Rate (gpm)	Flow per HX (gpm)
0%	13,900	4633
20%	13,600	4533
30%	13,150	4383
40%	12,550	4183
50%	11,700	3900

If the subject calculation is issued with the RW flow rate resulting from blockage being less than that identified above, a revision to this calculation is necessary. This assumes equal flow to each heat exchanger.

3. No "second pass" tubes in any heat exchanger are clogged.
4. Three (3) of the four (4) SWHE's are in service.





# DESIGN ANALYSIS/CALCULATION

## Crystal River Unit 3

Sheet 2 of 4

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

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### SECTION 4 - REFERENCES

1. M94-0050, SWHE Heat Removal Capacity with Partially Clogged Tubes. (preliminary).
2. M94-0052, Post LOCA NSCCC Heat Loads, Rev. 0.
3. CR3 Technical Specification, Section 3.7.7.

### SECTION 5 - DETAILED ANALYSES/CALCULATIONS

The amount of available heat exchanger area can be calculated using the following formula:

$$\text{Available Area (ft}^2\text{)} = 8600 - \{(\text{blockage}(\%))/2\} * (8600)$$

<u>Percent Blocked</u>	<u>Available Area</u>
10%	8170
20%	7740
30%	7310
40%	6880
50%	6450

The maximum UHS temperature which can occur for the defined available area is determined using SWHE.KRC. Validated 11/14/94.


The spreadsheets are attached, as Attachment 1 for 10% blockage through Attachment #5 for 50% blockage.

### SECTION 6 - RESULTS/CONCLUSIONS

The maximum allowable UHS temperatures and allowable percent of clogging are identified in Attachment's 1 through 5.

The graph of allowable UHS temperature vs. allowable blockage is Attachment #6.

It should be noted that in order to make the analysis more conservative, a second plot of UHS temperature vs. percent blockage is included. This plot should be used when deciding whether a second heat exchanger should be cleaned. The 5°F margin was chosen on the basis of engineering judgement to provide additional margin when considering the unknowns associated with SW/RW heat removal capability (e.g. tube and



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## DESIGN ANALYSIS/CALCULATION

Crystal River Unit 3

Sheet 3 of 4

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equip 5-38


shell side fouling, the condition of the other heat exchangers, and the possible temperature changes in the UHS that could occur prior to the next heat exchanger surveillance.)

The graph is used as follows:

1. If the first SWHE was 40% blocked and the Gulf Temperature (UHS) was 93°F (pt. 1), then a second heat exchanger should be cleaned. If the first SWHE was 40% blocked, but the gulf was only 90°F (pt. 2), a second SWHE does not need to be cleaned.
2. If the first SWHE was 50% blocked or greater, the Gulf Temperature (UHS) is insignificant, and the second SWHE should be cleaned because of the likely blockage that has already occurred in the remaining SWHE's.

### SECTION 7 - ATTACHMENTS

- Attachment #1, SWHE performance with 10% Blocked (5 sheets)
- Attachment #2, SWHE performance with 20% Blocked (5 sheets)
- Attachment #3, SWHE performance with 30% Blocked (5 sheets)
- Attachment #4, SWHE performance with 40% Blocked (5 sheets)
- Attachment #5, SWHE performance with 50% Blocked (5 sheets)
- Attachment #6, UHS Temperature vs. Allowable Blockage (1 sheet)



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# DESIGN ANALYSIS/CALCULATION

Crystal River Unit 3

Sheet 4 of 4

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER


M94-0056

REVISION

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RE/MAR/SP NUMBER/FILE

EQUIP 5-38



SWHE FLOW RATE AND TEMPERATURE  
CONFIGURATION


HEAT EXCHANGER THERMAL BALANCING MODEL [SWHE-1A/1B]  
FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION-CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3

OPERATING CONDITIONS

SW System Inlet Temperature (T1)(Deg. F	142.58
SW System Outlet Temperature (T2)(Deg.F	110.00
RW System Inlet Temperature (T3)(Deg.F)	100.10
RW System Outlet Temperature (T4)(Deg.F	120.32
SW Heat Exchanger Heat Load (Q)(Btu/Hr)	4.68E+07
SW Flowrate (GPM)	2800
kW Flowrate (GPM)	4633

HEAT EXCHANGER PHYSICAL PARAMETERS

Number of Tubes (n)	1090
Tube OD (Do)(inches)	0.75
Tube ID (Di)(inches)	0.62
Tube Wall Thickness (tw)(inches)	0.065
Tube Thermal Conductivity (kw)(Btu/Hr-Ft-Deg	30.00
Tube Fluid Density (pt)(lbm/Ft <sup>3</sup> )	64.00
Tube Fluid Heat Capacity (Cpt)(Btu/lbm-DegF)	0.94
Shell Fluid Density (ps)(lbm/Ft <sup>3</sup> )	62.10
Shell Fluid Heat Capacity (Cps)(Btu/lbm-DegF	1.00
Cleanliness Factor (CF)	0.80
Effective Heat Transfer Area (A)(Ft <sup>2</sup> )	8170.00



Q calc	% Diff	Q(Btu/Hr)
4.66E+07	0.4722	4.68E+07
4.67E+07	0.2076	4.68E+07
4.68E+07	-0.0567	4.68E+07
4.70E+07	-0.3207	4.68E+07
4.71E+07	-0.5844	4.68E+07
4.72E+07	-0.8479	4.68E+07
4.73E+07	-1.1111	4.68E+07
4.74E+07	-1.3740	4.68E+07
4.76E+07	-1.6366	4.68E+07
4.77E+07	-1.8990	4.68E+07
4.78E+07	-2.1611	4.68E+07

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION	
DOC ID #	M94-0056 ATT # 1
REV	0 SHEET 2 OF 5



Ms (lbm/Hr)	Mt (lbm/Hr)	delTs	delTt	T1	T2	T3	T4	GTD	LTD
1.44E+06	2.45E+06	32.58	20.32	142.58	110.00	100.10	120.42	22.16	9.90
1.44E+06	2.45E+06	32.58	20.32	142.68	110.00	100.10	120.42	22.26	9.90
1.44E+06	2.45E+06	32.58	20.32	142.78	110.00	100.10	120.42	22.36	9.90
1.44E+06	2.45E+06	32.53	20.32	142.88	110.00	100.10	120.42	22.46	9.90
1.44E+06	2.45E+06	32.58	20.32	142.98	110.00	100.10	120.42	22.56	9.90
1.44E+06	2.45E+06	32.58	20.32	143.08	110.00	100.10	120.42	22.66	9.90
1.44E+06	2.45E+06	32.58	20.32	143.18	110.00	100.10	120.42	22.76	9.90
1.44E+06	2.45E+06	32.58	20.32	143.28	110.00	100.10	120.42	22.86	9.90
1.44E+06	2.45E+06	32.58	20.32	143.38	110.00	100.10	120.42	22.96	9.90
1.44E+06	2.45E+06	32.58	20.32	143.48	110.00	100.10	120.42	23.06	9.90
1.44E+06	2.45E+06	32.58	20.32	143.58	110.00	100.10	120.42	23.16	9.90

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION	
DOC ID #	M94-0056 ATT # 1
REV 0	SHEET 3 OF 5

LMTD	P	R	F	LMTD'	Ttavg	Tsavg	Twavg	tfo	Vmo	ho
15.22	0.48	1.60	0.87	13.24	110.26	126.29	118.28	122.28	2.91	8.61E+02
15.26	0.48	1.61	0.87	13.27	110.26	126.34	118.30	122.32	2.91	8.61E+02
15.29	0.48	1.61	0.87	13.31	110.26	126.39	118.33	122.36	2.91	8.61E+02
15.33	0.48	1.62	0.87	13.34	110.26	126.44	118.35	122.40	2.91	8.61E+02
15.37	0.47	1.62	0.87	13.37	110.26	126.49	118.38	122.43	2.91	8.61E+02
15.41	0.47	1.63	0.87	13.41	110.26	126.54	118.40	122.47	2.91	8.61E+02
15.45	0.47	1.63	0.87	13.44	110.26	126.59	118.43	122.51	2.91	8.61E+02
15.49	0.47	1.64	0.87	13.47	110.26	126.64	118.45	122.55	2.91	8.62E+02
15.53	0.47	1.64	0.87	13.51	110.26	126.69	118.48	122.58	2.91	8.62E+02
15.56	0.47	1.65	0.87	13.54	110.26	126.74	118.50	122.62	2.91	8.62E+02
15.60	0.47	1.65	0.87	13.57	110.26	126.79	118.53	122.66	2.91	8.62E+02

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION  
 DOC ID # M94-0056 ATT # 1  
 REV 0 SHEET 4 OF 5

rw	tfi	Vai	hi	U	Uact	Q calc
1.98E-04	114.27	9.03	2.43E+03	538.33	430.66	4.66E+07
1.98E-04	114.28	9.03	2.43E+03	538.39	430.71	4.67E+07
1.98E-04	114.29	9.03	2.43E+03	538.44	430.75	4.68E+07
1.98E-04	114.31	9.03	2.43E+03	538.50	430.80	4.70E+07
1.98E-04	114.32	9.03	2.43E+03	538.55	430.84	4.71E+07
1.98E-04	114.33	9.03	2.43E+03	538.61	430.89	4.72E+07
1.98E-04	114.34	9.03	2.43E+03	538.66	430.93	4.73E+07
1.98E-04	114.36	9.03	2.43E+03	538.72	430.98	4.74E+07
1.98E-04	114.37	9.03	2.43E+03	538.78	431.02	4.76E+07
1.98E-04	114.38	9.03	2.43E+03	538.83	431.06	4.77E+07
1.98E-04	114.39	9.03	2.43E+03	538.89	431.11	4.78E+07

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION	
DOC ID #	<i>M94-0056</i>
ATT #	<i>1</i>
REV	<i>0</i>
SHEET	<i>5</i>
OF	<i>5</i>

HEAT EXCHANGER THERMAL BALANCING MODEL [SWHE-1A/1B]  
FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION-CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3

OPERATING CONDITIONS  
SW System Inlet Temperature (T1)(Deg. F  
SW System Outlet Temperature (T2)(Deg.F  
RW System Inlet Temperature (T3)(Deg.F)  
RW System Outlet Temperature (T4)(Deg.F  
  
SW Heat Exchanger Heat Load (Q)(Btu/Hr)  
  
SW Flowrate (GPM)  
RW Flowrate (GPM)

HEAT EXCHANGER PHYSICAL PARAMETERS  
Number of Tubes (n) 1090  
Tube OD (Do)(inches) 0.75  
Tube ID (Di)(inches) 0.62  
Tube Wall Thickness (tw)(inches) 0.065  
Tube Thermal Conductivity (kw)(Btu/Hr-Ft-Deg 30.00  
Tube Fluid Density (pt)(lbm/Ft<sup>3</sup>) 64.00  
Tube Fluid Heat Capacity (Cpt)(Btu/lbm-DegF) 0.94  
Shell Fluid Density (ps)(lbm/Ft<sup>3</sup>) 62.10  
Shell Fluid Heat Capacity (Cps)(Btu/lbm-DegF 1.00  
Cleanliness Factor (CF) 0.80  
Effective Heat Transfer Area (A)(Ft<sup>2</sup>) 7740.00

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION	
DOC ID #	1194-0036 ATT # 2
REV	0 SHEET 1 OF 5

Q calc	% Diff	Q(Btu/Hr)
4.67E+07	0.2590	4.68E+07
4.68E+07	0.0038	4.68E+07
4.69E+07	-0.2511	4.68E+07
4.70E+07	-0.5057	4.68E+07
4.72E+07	-0.7600	4.68E+07
4.73E+07	-1.0141	4.68E+07
4.74E+07	-1.2680	4.68E+07
4.75E+07	-1.5216	4.68E+07
4.76E+07	-1.7749	4.68E+07
4.77E+07	-2.0280	4.68E+07
4.79E+07	-2.2808	4.68E+07

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION		
ECC ID # <u>mq4-0056</u> ATT # <u>2</u>		
REV <u>0</u>	SHEET <u>2</u>	OF <u>5</u>



Ms (lbm/Hr)	Mt (lbm/Hr)	delTs	delTt	T1	T2	T3	T4	GTD	LTD
1.44E+06	2.40E+06	32.58	20.77	142.58	110.00	99.00	119.77	22.81	11.00
1.44E+06	2.40E+06	32.58	20.77	142.68	110.00	99.00	119.77	22.91	11.00
1.44E+06	2.40E+06	32.58	20.77	142.78	110.00	99.00	119.77	23.01	11.00
1.44E+06	2.40E+06	32.58	20.77	142.88	110.00	99.00	119.77	23.11	11.00
1.44E+06	2.40E+06	32.58	20.77	142.98	110.00	99.00	119.77	23.21	11.00
1.44E+06	2.40E+06	32.58	20.77	143.08	110.00	99.00	119.77	23.31	11.00
1.44E+06	2.40E+06	32.58	20.77	143.18	110.00	99.00	119.77	23.41	11.00
1.44E+06	2.40E+06	32.58	20.77	143.28	110.00	99.00	119.77	23.51	11.00
1.44E+06	2.40E+06	32.58	20.77	143.38	110.00	99.00	119.77	23.61	11.00
1.44E+06	2.40E+06	32.58	20.77	143.48	110.00	99.00	119.77	23.71	11.00
1.44E+06	2.40E+06	32.58	20.77	143.58	110.00	99.00	119.77	23.81	11.00

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION	
DOC ID #	M94-0056 ATT # 2
REV 0	SHEET 3 OF 5

LMTD	P	R	F	LMTD'	Ttavg	Tsavg	Twavg	tfo	Vmo	ho
16.19	0.48	1.57	0.87	14.09	109.39	126.29	117.84	122.07	2.91	8.60E+02
16.23	0.48	1.57	0.87	14.12	109.39	126.34	117.86	122.10	2.91	8.60E+02
16.27	0.47	1.58	0.87	14.16	109.39	126.39	117.89	122.14	2.91	8.60E+02
16.31	0.47	1.58	0.87	14.19	109.39	126.44	117.91	122.18	2.91	8.60E+02
16.35	0.47	1.59	0.87	14.23	109.39	126.49	117.94	122.22	2.91	8.61E+02
16.39	0.47	1.59	0.87	14.26	109.39	126.54	117.96	122.25	2.91	8.61E+02
16.43	0.47	1.60	0.87	14.30	109.39	126.59	117.99	122.29	2.91	8.61E+02
16.47	0.47	1.60	0.87	14.33	109.39	126.64	118.01	122.33	2.91	8.61E+02
16.51	0.47	1.61	0.87	14.36	109.39	126.69	118.04	122.37	2.91	8.61E+02
16.55	0.47	1.61	0.87	14.40	109.39	126.74	118.06	122.40	2.91	8.61E+02
16.59	0.47	1.62	0.87	14.43	109.39	126.79	118.09	122.44	2.91	8.61E+02

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION	
DOC ID #	M94-0052 ATT # 2
REV	0 SHEET 4 OF 5

rw	tfi	Vai	hi	U	Uact	Q calc
1.98E-04	113.61	8.84	2.38E+03	535.05	428.04	4.67E+07
1.98E-04	113.62	8.84	2.38E+03	535.10	428.08	4.68E+07
1.98E-04	113.64	8.84	2.38E+03	535.16	428.13	4.69E+07
1.98E-04	113.65	8.84	2.38E+03	535.21	428.17	4.70E+07
1.98E-04	113.66	8.84	2.38E+03	535.27	428.21	4.72E+07
1.98E-04	113.67	8.84	2.38E+03	535.32	428.26	4.73E+07
1.98E-04	113.69	8.84	2.38E+03	535.38	428.30	4.74E+07
1.98E-04	113.70	8.84	2.38E+03	535.43	428.35	4.75E+07
1.98E-04	113.71	8.84	2.38E+03	535.49	428.39	4.76E+07
1.98E-04	113.72	8.84	2.38E+03	535.54	428.43	4.77E+07
1.98E-04	113.74	8.84	2.38E+03	535.60	428.48	4.79E+07

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION  
 DOC ID # M94-0052 ATT # 2  
 REV 0 SHEET 5 OF 5

HEAT EXCHANGER THERMAL BALANCING MODEL [SWHE-1A/1B]  
FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION-CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3

OPERATING CONDITIONS		HEAT EXCHANGER PHYSICAL PARAMETERS	
SW System Inlet Temperature (T1)(Deg. F	142.58	Number of Tubes (n)	1090
SW System Outlet Temperature (T2)(Deg.F	110.00	Tube OD (Do)(inches)	0.75
RW System Inlet Temperature (T3)(Deg.F)	97.60	Tube ID (Di)(inches)	0.62
RW System Outlet Temperature (T4)(Deg.F	119.08	Tube Wall Thickness (tw)(inches)	0.065
		Tube Thermal Conductivity (kw)(Btu/Hr-Ft-Deg	30.00
SW Heat Exchanger Heat Load (Q)(Btu/Hr)	4.68E+07	Tube Fluid Density (pt)(lbm/Ft <sup>3</sup> )	64.00
		Tube Fluid Heat Capacity (Cpt)(Btu/lbm-DegF)	0.94
SW Flowrate (GPM)	2800	Shell Fluid Density (ps)(lbm/Ft <sup>3</sup> )	62.10
RW Flowrate (GPM)	4383	Shell Fluid Heat Capacity (Cps)(Btu/lbm-DegF	1.00
		Cleanliness Factor (CF)	0.80
		Effective Heat Transfer Area (A)(Ft <sup>2</sup> )	7310.00

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION	
DOC ID #	M94-0056 ATT # 5
REV	0 SHEET 1 OF 5

Q calc	% Diff	Q(Btu/Hr)
4.68E+07	-0.0827	4.68E+07
4.70E+07	-0.3284	4.68E+07
4.71E+07	-0.5739	4.68E+07
4.72E+07	-0.8190	4.68E+07
4.73E+07	-1.0640	4.68E+07
4.74E+07	-1.3087	4.68E+07
4.75E+07	-1.5531	4.68E+07
4.76E+07	-1.7973	4.68E+07
4.78E+07	-2.0413	4.68E+07
4.79E+07	-2.2850	4.68E+07
4.80E+07	-2.5285	4.68E+07

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION		
DOC ID #	194-0056 ATT # 3	
REV 0	SHEET 2	OF 5



Ms (lbm/Hr)	Mt (lbm/Hr)	delTs	delTt	T1	T2	T3	T4	GTD	LTD
1.44E+06	2.32E+06	32.58	21.48	142.58	110.00	97.60	119.08	23.50	12.40
1.44E+06	2.32E+06	32.58	21.48	142.68	110.00	97.60	119.08	23.60	12.40
1.44E+06	2.32E+06	32.58	21.48	142.78	110.00	97.60	119.08	23.70	12.40
1.44E+06	2.32E+06	32.58	21.48	142.88	110.00	97.60	119.08	23.80	12.40
1.44E+06	2.32E+06	32.58	21.48	142.98	110.00	97.60	119.08	23.90	12.40
1.44E+06	2.32E+06	32.58	21.48	143.08	110.00	97.60	119.08	24.00	12.40
1.44E+06	2.32E+06	32.58	21.48	143.18	110.00	97.60	119.08	24.10	12.40
1.44E+06	2.32E+06	32.58	21.48	143.28	110.00	97.60	119.08	24.20	12.40
1.44E+06	2.32E+06	32.58	21.48	143.38	110.00	97.60	119.08	24.30	12.40
1.44E+06	2.32E+06	32.58	21.48	143.48	110.00	97.60	119.08	24.40	12.40
1.44E+06	2.32E+06	32.58	21.48	143.58	110.00	97.60	119.08	24.50	12.40

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION  
 DOC ID # W94-0056 ATT # 3  
 REV 0 SHEET 3 OF 5

LMTD	P	R	F	LMTD'	Ttavg	Tsavg	Twavg	tfo	Vmo	ho
17.36	0.48	1.52	0.87	15.11	108.34	126.29	117.32	121.80	2.91	8.59E+02
17.40	0.48	1.52	0.87	15.14	108.34	126.34	117.34	121.84	2.91	8.59E+02
17.45	0.48	1.53	0.87	15.18	108.34	126.39	117.37	121.88	2.91	8.59E+02
17.49	0.47	1.53	0.87	15.21	108.34	126.44	117.39	121.92	2.91	8.60E+02
17.53	0.47	1.54	0.87	15.25	108.34	126.49	117.42	121.95	2.91	8.60E+02
17.57	0.47	1.54	0.87	15.28	108.34	126.54	117.44	121.99	2.91	8.60E+02
17.61	0.47	1.54	0.87	15.32	108.34	126.59	117.47	122.03	2.91	8.60E+02
17.65	0.47	1.55	0.87	15.35	108.34	126.64	117.49	122.07	2.91	8.60E+02
17.69	0.47	1.55	0.87	15.39	108.34	126.69	117.52	122.10	2.91	8.60E+02
17.73	0.47	1.56	0.87	15.42	108.34	126.74	117.54	122.14	2.91	8.60E+02
17.77	0.47	1.56	0.87	15.46	108.34	126.79	117.57	122.18	2.91	8.60E+02

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION	
DOC ID #	M94-0056 ATT # 3
REV	0 SHEET 4 OF 5

rw	tfl	Vai	hi	U	Uact	Q calc
1.98E-04	112.83	8.55	2.31E+03	530.20	424.16	4.68E+07
1.98E-04	112.84	8.55	2.31E+03	530.25	424.20	4.70E+07
1.98E-04	112.85	8.55	2.31E+03	530.31	424.25	4.71E+07
1.98E-04	112.87	8.55	2.31E+03	530.36	424.29	4.72E+07
1.98E-04	112.88	8.55	2.31E+03	530.42	424.33	4.73E+07
1.98E-04	112.89	8.55	2.31E+03	530.47	424.38	4.74E+07
1.98E-04	112.90	8.55	2.31E+03	530.53	424.42	4.75E+07
1.98E-04	112.92	8.55	2.31E+03	530.58	424.47	4.76E+07
1.98E-04	112.93	8.55	2.31E+03	530.64	424.51	4.78E+07
1.98E-04	112.94	8.55	2.31E+03	530.69	424.55	4.79E+07
1.98E-04	112.95	8.55	2.31E+03	530.75	424.60	4.80E+07

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION	
DOC ID #	M94-0076 ATT # 3
REV	0
SHEET	5
OF	5

HEAT EXCHANGER THERMAL BALANCING MODEL [SWHE-1A/1B]  
FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION-CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3

OPERATING CONDITIONS

SW System Inlet Temperature (T1)(Deg. F)  
SW System Outlet Temperature (T2)(Deg.F)  
RW System Inlet Temperature (T3)(Deg.F)  
RW System Outlet Temperature (T4)(Deg.F)  
  
SW Heat Exchanger Heat Load (Q)(Btu/Hr)  
  
SW Flowrate (GPM)  
RW Flowrate (GPM)

142.58  
110.00  
96.00  
118.50  
  
4.68E+07  
  
2800  
4183

HEAT EXCHANGER PHYSICAL PARAMETERS

Number of Tubes (n)  
Tube OD (Do)(inches)  
Tube ID (Di)(inches)  
Tube Wall Thickness (tw)(inches)  
Tube Thermal Conductivity (kw)(Btu/Hr-Ft-Deg)  
Tube Fluid Density (pt)(lbm/Ft<sup>3</sup>)  
Tube Fluid Heat Capacity (Cpt)(Btu/lbm-DegF)  
Shell Fluid Density (ps)(lbm/Ft<sup>3</sup>)  
Shell Fluid Heat Capacity (Cps)(Btu/lbm-DegF)  
Cleanliness Factor (CF)  
Effective Heat Transfer Area (A)(Ft<sup>2</sup>)

1090  
0.75  
0.62  
0.065  
30.00  
64.00  
0.94  
62.10  
1.00  
0.80  
6880.00

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION	
DOC ID #	M94-0056 ATT # 4
REV 0	SHEET 1 OF 5

Q calc	% Diff
4.66E+07	0.4170
4.67E+07	0.1814
4.68E+07	-0.0539
4.69E+07	-0.2890
4.70E+07	-0.5238
4.72E+07	-0.7584
4.73E+07	-0.9928
4.74E+07	-1.2270
4.75E+07	-1.4609
4.76E+07	-1.6946
4.77E+07	-1.9281

Q(Btu/Hr)

4.68E+07  
4.68E+07  
4.68E+07  
4.68E+07  
4.68E+07  
4.68E+07  
4.68E+07  
4.68E+07  
4.68E+07  
4.68E+07  
4.68E+07  
4.68E+07

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION	
DOC ID #	<u>M94-006</u> ATT # <u>4</u>
REV	<u>0</u> SHEET <u>2</u> OF <u>5</u>



Ms (lbm/Hr)	Mt (lbm/Hr)	delTs	delTt	T1	T2	T3	T4	GTD	LTD
1.44E+06	2.21E+06	32.58	22.51	142.58	110.00	96.00	118.51	24.07	14.00
1.44E+06	2.21E+06	32.58	22.51	142.68	110.00	96.00	118.51	24.17	14.00
1.44E+06	2.21E+06	32.58	22.51	142.78	110.00	96.00	118.51	24.27	14.00
1.44E+06	2.21E+06	32.58	22.51	142.88	110.00	96.00	118.51	24.37	14.00
1.44E+06	2.21E+06	32.58	22.51	142.98	110.00	96.00	118.51	24.47	14.00
1.44E+06	2.21E+06	32.58	22.51	143.08	110.00	96.00	118.51	24.57	14.00
1.44E+06	2.21E+06	32.58	22.51	143.18	110.00	96.00	118.51	24.67	14.00
1.44E+06	2.21E+06	32.58	22.51	143.28	110.00	96.00	118.51	24.77	14.00
1.44E+06	2.21E+06	32.58	22.51	143.38	110.00	96.00	118.51	24.87	14.00
1.44E+06	2.21E+06	32.58	22.51	143.48	110.00	96.00	118.51	24.97	14.00
1.44E+06	2.21E+06	32.58	22.51	143.58	110.00	96.00	118.51	25.07	14.00

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION	
DOC ID #	1194-0056 ATT # 4
REV 0	SHEET 3 OF 6

LMTD	P	R	F	LMTD'	Ttavg	Tsavg	Twavg	tfo	Vmo	ho
18.58	0.48	1.45	0.87	16.17	107.25	126.29	116.77	121.53	2.91	8.58E+02
18.63	0.48	1.45	0.87	16.21	107.25	126.34	116.80	121.57	2.91	8.58E+02
18.67	0.48	1.46	0.87	16.24	107.25	126.39	116.82	121.61	2.91	8.59E+02
18.71	0.48	1.46	0.87	16.28	107.25	126.44	116.85	121.64	2.91	8.59E+02
18.75	0.48	1.47	0.87	16.31	107.25	126.49	116.87	121.68	2.91	8.59E+02
18.79	0.48	1.47	0.87	16.35	107.25	126.54	116.90	121.72	2.91	8.59E+02
18.84	0.48	1.47	0.87	16.39	107.25	126.59	116.92	121.76	2.91	8.59E+02
18.88	0.48	1.48	0.87	16.42	107.25	126.64	116.95	121.79	2.91	8.59E+02
18.92	0.48	1.48	0.87	16.46	107.25	126.69	116.97	121.83	2.91	8.59E+02
18.96	0.47	1.49	0.87	16.50	107.25	126.74	117.00	121.87	2.91	8.59E+02
19.00	0.47	1.49	0.87	16.53	107.25	126.79	117.02	121.91	2.91	8.60E+02

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION		
DOC ID #	M94-0056 ATT # 4	
REV	0	SHEET 4 OF 5

rw	tfi	Vai	hi	U	Uact	Q calc
1.98E-04	112.01	8.16	2.21E+03	523.70	418.96	4.66E+07
1.98E-04	112.03	8.16	2.21E+03	523.75	419.00	4.67E+07
1.98E-04	112.04	8.16	2.21E+03	523.81	419.05	4.68E+07
1.98E-04	112.05	8.16	2.21E+03	523.86	419.09	4.69E+07
1.98E-04	112.06	8.16	2.21E+03	523.92	419.13	4.70E+07
1.98E-04	112.08	8.16	2.21E+03	523.97	419.18	4.72E+07
1.98E-04	112.09	8.16	2.21E+03	524.02	419.22	4.73E+07
1.98E-04	112.10	8.16	2.21E+03	524.08	419.26	4.74E+07
1.98E-04	112.11	8.16	2.21E+03	524.13	419.30	4.75E+07
1.98E-04	112.13	8.15	2.21E+03	524.18	419.35	4.76E+07
1.98E-04	112.14	8.16	2.21E+03	524.24	419.39	4.77E+07

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION	
DOC ID #	M94-0082
ATT #	4
REV	0
SHEET	5
OF	5

HEAT EXCHANGER THERMAL BALANCING MODEL [SWHE-1A/1B]  
FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION-CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3

OPERATING CONDITIONS		HEAT EXCHANGER PHYSICAL PARAMETERS	
SW System Inlet Temperature (T1)(Deg. F	142.58	Number of Tubes (n)	1090
SW System Outlet Temperature (T2)(Deg.F	110.00	Tube OD (Do)(inches)	0.75
RW System Inlet Temperature (T3)(Deg.F)	93.70	Tube ID (Di)(inches)	0.62
RW System Outlet Temperature (T4)(Deg.F	117.84	Tube Wall Thickness (tw)(inches)	0.065
		Tube Thermal Conductivity (kw)(Btu/Hr-Ft-Deg	30.00
SW Heat Exchanger Heat Load (Q)(Btu/Hr)	4.68E+07	Tube Fluid Density (pt)(lbm/Ft <sup>3</sup> )	64.00
		Tube Fluid Heat Capacity (Cpt)(Btu/lbm-DegF)	0.94
SW Flowrate (GPM)	2800	Shell Fluid Density (ps)(lbm/Ft <sup>3</sup> )	62.10
RW Flowrate (GPM)	3900	Shell Fluid Heat Capacity (Cps)(Btu/lbm-DegF	1.00
		Cleanliness Factor (CF)	0.80
		Effective Heat Transfer Area (A)(Ft <sup>2</sup> )	6450.00

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION	
DOC ID #	M 94-0056 ATT # 5
REV	0
SHEET	1 OF 5

Q calc	% Diff
4.67E+07	0.2878
4.68E+07	0.0622
4.69E+07	-0.1632
4.70E+07	-0.3883
4.71E+07	-0.6133
4.72E+07	-0.8380
4.73E+07	-1.0625
4.74E+07	-1.2867
4.75E+07	-1.5108
4.76E+07	-1.7346
4.77E+07	-1.9583

Q(Btu/Hr)
4.68E+07
4.68E+07
4.68E+07
4.68E+07
4.68E+07
4.68E+07
4.68E+07
4.68E+07
4.68E+07
4.68E+07
4.68E+07

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION	
DOC ID #	<u>1194-0016</u> ATT # <u>5</u>
REV	<u>0</u> SHEET <u>2</u> OF <u>5</u>

Ma (lbm/Hr)	Mt (lbm/Hr)	delTs	delTt	T1	T2	T3	T4	GTD	LTD
1.44E+06	2.06E+06	32.58	24.14	142.58	110.00	93.70	117.84	24.74	16.30
1.44E+06	2.06E+06	32.58	24.14	142.68	110.00	93.70	117.84	24.84	16.30
1.44E+06	2.06E+06	32.58	24.14	142.78	110.00	93.70	117.84	24.94	16.30
1.44E+06	2.06E+06	32.58	24.14	142.88	110.00	93.70	117.84	25.04	16.30
1.44E+06	2.06E+06	32.58	24.14	142.98	110.00	93.70	117.84	25.14	16.30
1.44E+06	2.06E+06	32.58	24.14	143.08	110.00	93.70	117.84	25.24	16.30
1.44E+06	2.06E+06	32.58	24.14	143.18	110.00	93.70	117.84	25.34	16.30
1.44E+06	2.06E+06	32.58	24.14	143.28	110.00	93.70	117.84	25.44	16.30
1.44E+06	2.06E+06	32.58	24.14	143.38	110.00	93.70	117.84	25.54	16.30
1.44E+06	2.06E+06	32.58	24.14	143.48	110.00	93.70	117.84	25.64	16.30
1.44E+06	2.06E+06	32.58	24.14	143.58	110.00	93.70	117.84	25.74	16.30

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION  
 DOC ID # MP-0052 ATT # 5  
 REV 0 SHEET 3 OF 5




LMTD	P	R	F	LMTD'	Ttavg	Tsavg	Twavg	tfo	Vmo	ho
20.23	0.49	1.35	0.87	17.60	105.77	126.29	116.03	121.16	2.91	8.57E+02
20.27	0.49	1.35	0.87	17.64	105.77	126.34	116.06	121.20	2.91	8.57E+02
20.32	0.49	1.36	0.87	17.67	105.77	126.39	116.08	121.24	2.91	8.57E+02
20.36	0.49	1.36	0.87	17.71	105.77	126.44	116.11	121.27	2.91	8.58E+02
20.40	0.49	1.37	0.87	17.75	105.77	126.49	116.13	121.31	2.91	8.58E+02
20.45	0.49	1.37	0.87	17.79	105.77	126.54	116.16	121.35	2.91	8.58E+02
20.49	0.49	1.37	0.87	17.83	105.77	126.59	116.18	121.39	2.91	8.58E+02
20.53	0.49	1.38	0.87	17.86	105.77	126.64	116.21	121.42	2.91	8.58E+02
20.58	0.49	1.38	0.87	17.90	105.77	126.69	116.23	121.46	2.91	8.58E+02
20.62	0.48	1.39	0.87	17.94	105.77	126.74	116.26	121.50	2.91	8.58E+02
20.66	0.48	1.39	0.87	17.98	105.77	126.79	116.28	121.54	2.91	8.58E+02

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION	
DOC ID # <u>mq4-007b</u>	ATT # <u>5</u>
REV <u>0</u>	SHEET <u>4</u> OF <u>5</u>

rw	tfi	Vai	hi	U	Uact	Q calc
1.98E-04	110.90	7.60	2.08E+03	513.90	411.12	4.67E+07
1.98E-04	110.91	7.60	2.08E+03	513.95	411.16	4.68E+07
1.98E-04	110.93	7.60	2.08E+03	514.00	411.20	4.69E+07
1.98E-04	110.94	7.60	2.08E+03	514.05	411.24	4.70E+07
1.98E-04	110.95	7.60	2.08E+03	514.11	411.28	4.71E+07
1.98E-04	110.96	7.60	2.08E+03	514.16	411.33	4.72E+07
1.98E-04	110.98	7.60	2.08E+03	514.21	411.37	4.73E+07
1.98E-04	110.99	7.60	2.08E+03	514.26	411.41	4.74E+07
1.98E-04	111.00	7.60	2.08E+03	514.32	411.45	4.75E+07
1.98E-04	111.01	7.60	2.08E+03	514.37	411.50	4.76E+07
1.98E-04	111.03	7.60	2.08E+03	514.42	411.54	4.77E+07

ANALYSIS/CALCULATION  
 DOC ID # W94-0056 ATT # 5  
 REV 0 SHEET 5 OF 5



Florida  
Power  
CORPORATION

## DESIGN ANALYSIS/CALCULATION

Crystal River Unit 3

Sheet 1 of 1

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER


M94-0056

REVISION


0

REMARKS/SP NUMBER/FILE

EQUIP 5-3B



PRC # 1229

 <b>NUCLEAR OPERATIONS</b>	<b>EVALUATING OPERABILITY AND DETERMINING SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS</b>	<b>NOD-14</b>	<b>ISSUE DATE</b> 12/03/93
		<b>REV. 5</b>	<b>PAGE</b> 15 OF 21

 ATTACHMENT A-3  
 (Page 1 of 3)

OPERABILITY EVALUATION FORM

1. Initiating Individual: W. MARSHALL Date: 12-6-98
2. Initiating Document: NA
3. Affected Item (System, Subsystem or Component)  
SW - Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling System
4. System Designation(s)  
SW
5. Tag Number(s)  
SWHE-1A    SWHE-1B    SWHE-1C  
SWHE-1D
6. Specified Safety Function(s) of Affected Item  
Provide cooling water for removal of heat  
from (sw) supplied loads. Following design  
basis accident



NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

EVALUATING OPERABILITY  
AND  
DETERMINING SAFETY  
FUNCTION STATUS

NOD-14

REV. 5

ISSUE DATE

12/03/93

PAGE  
16 OF 21ATTACHMENT A-3  
(Page 2 of 3)

## 7. Operability Concern

Would the SW system perform its design  
basis function under design accident condition  
With identified fouling of the SWHE-1A  
and SWHE-1D.

## 8. References (List)

PR 94-0322


## 9. Recommendation (Check as Applicable)

☒ Operable

☐ Inoperable

## 10. Basis for Determination (Use Additional Sheets, if Necessary)

Based on unverified eng. calculations the required  
heat removal capacity of the SWHEs was not  
compromised because the cooler gulf water temperature  
increased the heat exchanger effectiveness. The design  
basis assumes a 95°F inlet gulf water temp. The  
recorded gulf water temp. has been in the low 70°F's.  
The effect approximately doubling the heat removal capacity,  
offsetting the fouling of approximately 30%/60% of SWHE-1A  
and SWHE-1D. SEE EREN ATTACHMENT #941322

 <b>NUCLEAR OPERATIONS</b>	<b>EVALUATING OPERABILITY AND DETERMINING SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS</b>	NOD-14	ISSUE DATE 12/03/93
		REV. 5	PAGE 17 OF 21

ATTACHMENT A-3  
(Page 3 of 3)

11. Required Actions:

☐ Execute applicable Action Statement(s)

☐ Establish immediate compensatory measures:

Continue opening and cleaning SWHE's  
until a heat exchanger reveals less than  
25% blockage.

☐ Not Applicable

12. Develop basis for continued operation:

☐ Internal Position for Continued Operation

☐ Discretionary Enforcement (Relief from TS)

☒ Not Applicable

13. List of participants:

Ken Wilson

Paul Fleming

Jerry Campbell

Scott Stewart

Mike Donovan

Carl Bergstrom

Ed McLeod

Richard Jackson

Bruce Hickie

Chair: W. Marshall

Date: 12/6/94

SSOD: [Signature]

Date: 12-6-94

NOTE: Attach copy to associated Problem Report.

PRC mtg. # 94-49  
Kim Vogel  
12/8/94



# REQUEST FOR ENGINEERING ASSISTANCE(REA)

\*\*\*\*\* EMERGENCY REA \*\*\*\*\*

ORIGINATING DEPARTMENT/ORGANIZATION <b>SITE NUCLEAR ENGINEERING</b>		REA NUMBER <b>941322</b>	Page: <b>1</b>
Part 1 TO BE COMPLETED BY THE ORIGINATING DEPARTMENT / ORGANIZATION			
THIS IS A REQUEST FOR			
<input type="checkbox"/> PLANT ENHANCEMENT		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER	
SYSTEM		EQUIPMENT TAG NO <b>SWHE-1A</b>	
REFERENCES / ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS			
Prob Rpt# _____	MAR Number _____	Vendor Manual No. _____	
REA Number _____	PCN Number _____	PEERE No. _____	
Procedure No. _____	WR Number <b>NA</b>	IOC Number _____	
Calibration Data Sheet No. _____		Instrument Data Sheet No. _____	
OTHERS NOD-14 ASSESSMENT			
DESCRIPTION OF REQUEST			
<p>DETERMINE IF THE SHWE'S WERE ABLE TO REMOVE THE DESIGN BASIS            ACCIDENT HEAT LOAD WHEN SWHE-1A WAS APPROXIMATELY 60%            CLOGGED, SWHE-1B WAS 30% CLOGGED, AND SWHE-1C WAS ONLY IN            SERVICE ONE WEEK.</p> <div style="margin-left: 200px;">             ID              GRS              12/6/94           </div>			
<input type="checkbox"/> Continued			
ATTACHMENTS			
FOR REQUESTS FOR PLANT ENHANCEMENTS PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING(Optional for "OTHER" Requests)			
PROPOSED SOLUTION			
<input type="checkbox"/> Continued			
REASONS AND BENEFITS		PROJECT EVALUATION	
<p>THIS EVALUATION WILL BE ADDED TO THE NOD-14 OPERABILITY            ASSESSMENT OF THE HEAT EXCHANGERS.</p>		<p>Public Relat. _____ Pers. Perf. _____            Reg. Issues _____ Reliability _____            Nuc. Safety _____ Support _____            Pers. Safety _____</p>	
<input type="checkbox"/> Continued			
ORIGINATOR <b>JACKSON, G.RICHARD</b>	PHONE <b>240-3448</b>	DATE <b>12/06/94</b>	
SUPERVISOR/MANAGER <b>GUTHERMAN, BRIAN</b>	PHONE <b>231-4440</b>	DATE <b>12/06/94</b>	
FORWARD THE REA TO THE "ENGINEERING CLERK" NUCLEAR ADMIN BLDG (NA-1E)			

# REQUEST FOR ENGINEERING ASSISTANCE(REA)

SITE NUCLEAR ENGINEERING	REA NUMBER 941322	Page: 2
<b>Part 2 -- ENGINEERING RESOLUTION</b>		
Does this REA Appear to Document a "PROBLEM" as Defined in CP-111		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO - Continue to Process as an REA <input type="checkbox"/> YES - Either Return the REA to the Originating Dept/Org for the Generation of a Problem Report, OR Generate a Problem Report. Record the Number of the PR in the RESPONSE Block, and Return the REA to the Originating Dept/Org.		
This REA is ASSIGNED TO: G.R. JACKSON <span style="float: right;"><input type="checkbox"/> REJECTED BY Engineering;</span>		
TOTAL WEIGHTED PRIORITY: _____ (For Plant Enhancement only)		
SUPERVISOR/MANAGER AUSTIN, TERRY V	PHONE 240-3660	DATE 12/06/94
RESPONSE  THE GOVERNING EQUATION FOR THE HEAT EXCHANGER IS: $Q = U * A * LMTD$  THE HEAT ABSORBED (Q) BY THE SW THAT MUST BE REJECTED TO THE RW SYSTEM DURING A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT IS 140.38E6 BTU/HR.  THE AVAILABLE SURFACE AREA (A) OF THE HEAT EXCHANGER IS REDUCED FROM 8600 SQ FEET TO 6450 SQ FEET PER HEAT EXCHANGER FOR A TWO PASS SPLIT FLOW HEAT EXCHANGER WITH 50% OF THE FIRST PASS TUBES COMPLETELY CLOGGED. (50% IS USED SINCE THE ONE HX ONLY HAS A FEW DAYS OF SERVICE, ONE IS APPR. 30% CLOGGED, AND THE THIRD IS APPR. 60% CLOGGED. ALSO, THE TUBES ARE ASSUMED TO BE COMPLETELY CLOGGED EVEN THOUGH ONLY A PORTION OF THEIR FLOW PATH MAY BE COVERED. IN REALITY, THE PERCENT OF CLOGGING IS PROBABLY MUCH LESS.)		
NPRDS REVIEWED: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NOT APPLICABLE		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Continued
<b>If the above Response/Disposition Requires a MAR to be issued - An REA Part 3 is Required</b>		
DISPOSITIONING DOCUMENTS		
PR Number _____	MAR Number _____	Vendor Manual No. _____
REA Number _____	FCN Number _____	PEERE No. _____
Procedure No. _____	WR Number _____	IOC Number _____
Calibration Data Sheet No. _____	Instrument Data Sheet No. _____	
OTHERS _____		
ATTACHMENTS		
<input type="checkbox"/> Continued		
Dispositioning Organization: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SNES: <input type="checkbox"/> NPSE: <input type="checkbox"/> NOE: <input type="checkbox"/> NCM: <input type="checkbox"/> Other		
ENGINEER JACKSON, G. RICHARD	PHONE 240-3448	DATE 12/06/94
SUPERVISOR/MANAGER GUTHERMAN, BRIAN	PHONE 231-4440	DATE 12/06/94
<b>UPON RESPONSE APPROVAL -- RETURN THE REA TO THE ORIGINATING DEPT/ORG</b>		

SITE NUCLEAR ENGINEERING

REA NUMBER

941322

Page: 3

CONTINUATION SHEET Identify the BLOCK being Continued and Record the Information & Data

## CONTINUATION FOR REA PART 2 RESPONSE:

BASED ON ENGINEERING JUDGEMENT AND PRESENTLY UNVERIFIED CALCULATIONS, WITH THE REPORTED SHELL CLOGGING, THE RW FLOW WILL BE APPROXIMATELY 12,000 GPM. (THE DESIGN POINT RW FLOW IS 14,100 GPM BUT IT HAS BEEN MEASURED TO BE 15,900 GPM WITH AN EXCEPTIONALLY CLEAN HEAT EXCHANGER).

THE RECENT GULF WATER TEMPERATURE HAS BEEN RECORDED IN THE LOW 70'S. THUS, THE RW INLET TEMPERATURE TO THE HX CAN BE CONSERVATIVELY CALLED 80 F. BASED ON THE RW FLOW, THE RW INLET TEMPERATURE AND THE SYSTEM Q, ANALYSIS SHOWS THE RW OUTLET TEMPERATURE SHOULD BE APPROXIMATELY 104 F. THROUGH A SIMILAR APPROACH, THE SW TEMPERATURES WOULD BE ON THE ORDER OF 144 F IN AND 110 F OUT (LIMITING CONDITION). THE CORRESPONDING LMTD WOULD BE 34.8 F. APPLYING A CORRECTION FACTOR FOR A TWO PASS SPLIT FLOW HEAT EXCHANGER (0.965) REDUCES THE LMTD TO 33.6 F.

TAKING THE ABOVE INFORMATION AND SUBSTITUTING IT BACK INTO FIRST EQUATION, THE MINIMUM REQUIRED OVERALL HEAT TRANSFER COEFFICIENT U CAN BE CALCULATED:

$$\begin{aligned} U &= Q / (A * LMTD) \\ &= (140.38E6 \text{ BTU/HR}) / (6450 \text{ SQ FT} * 3 \text{ EACH} * 33.6 \text{ F}) \\ &= 216 \text{ BTU/HR FT SQ F} \end{aligned}$$

PER RECENT SINGLE TUBE TESTING PERFORMED ON SITE, REFERENCE MOLLERUS ENGR CORP REPORT DATED 11/17/94, CR-3'S EFFECTIVE OVER LL HEAT TRANSFER COEFFICIENT WAS MEASURED TO BE AROUND 275 BTU/HR-FT SQ-F (HIGHER THAN THE MIN. REQ'D) WHILE THE TESTING FLOW RATE WAS ONLY 3.44 FT PER SECOND RATHER THAN 9.15 FT PER SECOND AT THE DESIGN POINT. (HIGHER FLOW RATES RESULT IN HIGHER HEAT TRANSFER COEFFICIENTS. THIS IS CONSERVATIVE.)

THEREFORE, IT CAN REASONABLY BE ASSUMED THAT THE AS-FOUND CLOGGED CONDITION WOULD NOT HAVE PREVENTED THE SW HEAT EXCHANGERS FROM PERFORMING THEIR REQUIRED SAFETY FUNCTION DURING A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT.

THIS CONCLUSION IS VERY CONSERVATIVE SINCE IT DOES NOT CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING:

- 1) RW TEMPERATURE IS ~10 F LOWER THAN ASSUMED
- 2) RWP-1 DISCHARGE PRESSURE DATA INDICATES LITTLE, IF ANY REAL DECREASE IN FLOW

SITE NUCLEAR ENGINEERING

REA NUMBER

941322


Page: 4

CONTINUATION SHEET - Identify the BLOCK being Continued and Record the Information / Data

## CONTINUATION FOR REA PART 2 RESPONSE:

3) THE AVAILABLE HEAT TRANSFER SURFACE AREA IS ACTUALLY HIGHER, SINCE ALL TUBES ARE NOT 100% BLOCKED OFF.

BG NOTE: INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION OF THE ADEQUACY OF HEAT TRANSFER ASSUMING THE SUBJECT CONDITIONS WAS PERFORMED BY A SECOND ENGINEER PRIOR TO APPROVING THIS REA. REF: SOFTWARE CS 94-015, M94-0056.

 NUCLEAR OPERATIONS	EVALUATING OPERABILITY AND DETERMINING SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS	NCD-14	ISSUE DATE 12/03/93
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PRC#1102

ATTACHMENT A-3  
(Page 1 of 3)

OPERABILITY EVALUATION FORM

- Initiating Individual: Scot A. Stewart Date: 11/7/94
- Initiating Document: PR-94-0268, RW System Piping Urethane Liner Failures
- Affected Item (System, Subsystem or Component)  
RW Piping
- System Designation(s)  
RW SW DC
- Tag Number(s)  
SWHE-1A/1B/1C/1D DCHE-1A/1B RW-26, RW 28  
RW-33, RW-70
- Specified Safety Function(s) of Affected Item

Provide cooling water to the SW and DC  
systems for removal of heat following  
a design basis accident.

 <b>Florida Power</b> <small>and Light</small> <b>OPERATIONS</b>	<b>EVALUATING OPERABILITY AND DETERMINING SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS</b>	NOD-14	ISSUE DATE 12/03/93
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ATTACHMENT A-3  
(Page 2 of 3)

7. Operability Concern

Problem Report 94-0268 describes the occasional  
degradation of the urethane liner. The lining  
may come off and block RW flow to the DC  
or SW heat exchangers. Delamination of lining  
may result in corrosion of piping.

8. References (List)

PM-164      MAR 83-01-27-01  
 \_\_\_\_\_

9. Recommendation (Check as Applicable)

☒ Operable  
☐ Inoperable

10. Basis for Determination (Use Additional Sheets, if Necessary)

See Attached  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_



NOD-14, Evaluating Operability and Determining  
Safety Function Status

10. Basis for Determination

During the normal performance of PM-112 (DC, SW and SC Heat Exchanger Maintenance Inspection/Cleaning/Shooting) Mechanics remove any debris found in a heat exchanger and document the initial "as-found" conditions. If liner material is found, Engineering would be notified per step 4.2.1 of PM-112. If it is confirmed that a particular spool piece has lost the liner material, follow-up visual or UT thickness inspections are performed. The urethane liner is applied in various colors to help identify the location of an affected piping section if liner material is discovered. Since 1992, only a few small pieces of loose urethane have been found in a heat exchanger. No piece of the urethane was larger than approximately 4" x 6". The urethane pieces found were from spool pieces RW-26 and RW-28. The number of tubes that would have flow restricted was minimal. PR-94-0269 will determine allowable blocked tubes by shell, plugs, lining, etc.

The MAR that justified the application of the urethane coating was 83-06-27-01, Urethane Lining and Access Modifications for RW System. Design Input Record Item No. 8 states "Urethane has far superior bonding characteristics to steel than PVC has. It is highly abrasion resistant and therefore well suited for service in the RW system. Urethane has low water permeability which is needed to prevent corrosion of the pipe wall". The minimal number of lining failures since 1983 help confirm that the urethane is well suited for use in RW system and that it adheres well to pipe surface. In addition, there have not been any reports of large pieces of liner ending up in a heat exchanger. Due to the quality control of the urethane lining application, it is expected that any failure would be localized and would not result in full scale delamination. In the event of localized delamination, it is likely that the rubber would separate from the pipe wall and then tear off in small pieces from the surrounding material due to the water flow. Only minimal flow blockage would occur and that would be removed during the normal inspection & cleaning of the heat exchanger.

A complete internal inspection of the lined piping was performed during 1990. Only one of the urethane coated pieces was discovered to have a torn liner. The liner had delaminated in several areas, but had not come loose. It was replaced during the same outage. The remaining spool pieces were in good condition and provide confidence that the coating can remain intact on the pipe wall.


202  
11/10/94

The liner degradation of the four RW spool pieces addressed by Problem Report 94-0268 has not resulted in a loss of any RW cooling flow path. Periodic visual inspections of lined piping have identified most liner deficiencies.

Spool pieces RW-26 and RW-28 are on the inlet on SWHE-1C and SWHE-1D. Both 12" spool pieces were discovered with delaminated urethane at the elbow. The loose section were removed to prevent potential flow blockage. Both pipe sections are inspected monthly. New coated spool pieces are being fabricated to replace the existing ones.

RW-33 is a 24" 90 Deg elbow on the discharge side of RWP-2B. A 2" stub-out developed a pin-hole leak during May 1994. The leak and repair was handled in accordance with the guidance in Generic Letter 90-05. The root cause of the leak was embrittlement of the lining in only the small stub-out section. There was no delamination or loose material associated with this piece.

RW-70 is located on the discharge of DCHE-1B heat exchanger. Any loose piece as a result of the localized delamination, can not impact heat exchanger flow. UT thickness monitoring of the affected areas will be performed. Replacement will occur as required.

 <b>Florida Power</b> <small>COMPANY</small> <b>NUCLEAR OPERATIONS</b>	<b>EVALUATING OPERABILITY AND DETERMINING SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS</b>	NOD-14	ISSUE DATE 12/03/93
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ATTACHMENT A-3  
(Page 3 of 3)

11. Required Actions:

☐ Execute applicable Action Statement(s)

☐ Establish immediate compensatory measures:

☒ Not Applicable

12. Develop basis for continued operation:

☐ Internal Position for Continued Operation

☐ Discretionary Enforcement (Relief from TS)

☒ Not Applicable

13. List of participants:

B. P. Winderly \_\_\_\_\_  
D. P. Jones \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

Chair: [Signature] Date: 11/10/94  
 SSOD: [Signature] Date: 11/10/94

NOTE: Attach copy to associated Problem Report.

PRC mtg. # 94-46  
[Signature]  
 11/14/94

# PROBLEM REPORT

PR 94 - 0268

Page: 1

## PART 1: INITIATION, REVIEW, AND ISSUANCE OF THE PROBLEM REPORT BY THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION

(1) Title: RW System Piping Urethane Liner Failures

### SUPPORTING INFORMATION

(2a) Discovery Method: Preparation for SWSOP

(2b) Plant Condition: Normal Operation

(2c) Occurrence Date: 9/14/94 Time: 0800

(2d) Plant Location: Building: Auxiliary Bldg Elevation: 95 Area/Room: Seawater Room

(2e) Equipment Tag Number(s): RW-26, RW-28, RW-70, RW-33 (2f) Vendor Name: Urethane Technologies Inc. (Application) & Technical Urethane Inc. (Manufacture)

(3) Description of the Condition/Event:

The RW system piping is coated with an urethane material called Techthane 90SS. The use of urethane as an acceptable RW pipe liner was provided in MAR-83-06-27-01 and the original coating was applied by Juno Industries (now known as Urethane Technologies Inc.).

Procedure PM-164 is currently in place and provides for the inspection of the RW piping. Visual inspection per PM-164 as well as video taping of the piping has shown liner degradation of various forms (e.g., bubbling, erosion, tears, missing pieces, delamination). Also, some leaks in the system piping have occurred due to failure of the urethane coating. Failure could be due either to improper urethane application or failure of the Techthane itself.

The RW piping inspection program needs tighter controls to be implemented, via revision of PM-164, for the inspection, and subsequent monitoring of degraded sections, of RW piping.

Cause of liner failures and adequacy of urethane coatings needs to be determined.

(4) Is this problem a Radiological Safety Concern?

☒ NO

☐ YES Immediately contact HP Supervisor for proper documentation.

(5) Requirement(s) Violated: NONE

(6) Associated/Related Documents: PM-164, MAR-83-06-27-01

(7) Immediate Actions Taken:

Contacted Urethane Vendors

### Recommendations for Resolving the Problem:

- 1) Contact vendor to determine if failure due to application errors
- 2) Contact urethane manufacture to determine causes of urethane failures versus currently exhibited signs
- 3) Contact other utilities who may be using urethane liners in similar applications and discuss problems they may be encountering
- 4) Based on above determine whether urethane is appropriate for application
- 5) Ensure adequate inspections and subsequent monitoring is in place along with appropriate corrective actions should liner fail

(9) Originator (print name): Lee Harris

Date: 9/15/94

### Originating Department Supervisor/Manager Review, DBI Review and PR CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION:

(10) PR is:

☐ a KNOWN Design Basis Issue

☐ SUSPECTED Design Basis Issue

☒ Not a Design Basis Issue

(11) Recommended

Responsible

Organization:

NPTS

Accepted By: J.W. Campbell Date: 9/15/94

Responsible Manager:

J.W. Campbell

CAP Assignment (if applicable): JELIAS

(12) Originating Supv/Mgr (print & sign):

C.A. Lee / C.O. Lee for JEL

(13) PR Issue Date:

9/15/94

(14) ☐ SOTA review required

(Deliver to SOTA and notify SSOD)

☒ SOTA review NOT required.

(Send to Director, Quality Programs)

(15) DIRECTOR, QUALITY PROGRAMS:

P.J. McNeil

Date: 9/15/94

PROBLEM REPORT TRANSMITTED TO THE RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION ☐ By: Date/Time:

Rev. 3/94

RET: Life of Plant RESP: Quality Programs 9/0 973



## PROBLEM REPORT

PR 94 - 0268

Page: \_\_\_\_\_

## PART 3 - SECTION A: PROBLEM INVESTIGATION AND CAUSE ANALYSIS

(1) Method of Performing Cause Analysis: ☐ Structured Analysis ☒ Deductive Logic

(2) CHECK ALL CAUSES THAT APPLY:

## Human Performance

☐ Verbal Communication      ☐ Work Schedule      ☐ Supervisory Methods      ☐ Environmental Conditions  
☒ Written Communication      ☐ Work Organization/Planning      ☒ Managerial Methods      ☐ Interface Design or Equipment Condition  
☐ Training/Qualification      ☐ Work Practices      ☐ Change Management      ☐ Resource Management

## Equipment Performance

☒ Plant/System Operation      ☒ Maintenance/Testing      ☐ External      ☐ Design Configuration/Analysis  
☒ Equipment Spec/Mfg/Construction

(3a) Primary Cause(s): There are three possible causes associated with the failure of the Techthane 90SS coatings in the RW piping; improper application, material failure and normal service. The 2" stub out on spool RW-33 has failed before. The vendor stated that they have had problems in the past with application of the urethane specifically on the 2" stub outs. The bubbling and wear of the liner are both normal service life conditions. The manufacturer of Techthane (Technical Urethanes) was contacted to discuss the various liner conditions. The vendor stated that bubbling of the urethane was caused by water permeation and that it was a normal occurrence with urethane liners. The vendor said that urethane does have a defined life in this application and it depends on the fluid being piped and the conditions (temperature, pressure, etc.). The wearing as well as the bubbling are part of that defined life. In addition, any tears that are identified are due to sharp objects (i.e. shells) that may be in the water. The delamination of the urethane liner is being investigated as part of the corrective action plan and the appropriate steps will be taken following the determination of cause.

(3b) Secondary Cause(s):

(3c) Contributing Factor(s): There are two contributing factors associated with the leaking spool piece RW-33. Inadequate resolution or failure to identify a problem (thereby having no resolution) contributed to the failure as no actions to identify and correct the problem were taken. Also, due to inadequate liner inspections (PM) urethane degradation was not identified until a leak had occurred. Also, there is not a program in place to more closely monitor the condition of the piping as well as the liner if a degraded condition is identified, thus allowing it to continue until failure.

(4) SUPPORTING INFORMATION (IF APPLICABLE):

LER No:	PROCEDURE No:	PM-164	WR No:	NRC VIOLATION No:
OTHER: MAR-89-07-01-01, Juno Ind PO F770532V				

(5) Nuclear Safety Consequences Analysis: N/A

(6) Previous Similar Events/Conditions: N/A

(7) Manufacturer/Nameplate Data: N/A

(8) Nonconforming Equipment/Material Disposition:

☐ N/A (no nonconforming equipment or material involved)      ☐ Accept-As-Is\*      ☐ Repair\*      ☐ Rework  
☐ Other (describe): \_\_\_\_\_  
 \* Engineering Justification and Approval Required for these Dispositions (obtain documentation and attach)

(9) Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure (MPFF):

☒ No      ☐ INITIAL      ☐ REPETITIVE

## PART 3 - SECTION 8: Corrective Action Plan (CAP)

## (1) Corrective Action Plan:

ACTIONS	SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE	ASSIGNED ORGANIZATION/INDIVIDUAL
Contact urethane coating supplier (Technical Urethane Inc.) to determine if coating failure can occur, life of coatings, recommendations for alternatives.	Completed	NPTS, Les Harris
2. Contact urethane application vendor (Urethane Technologies Inc.) and arrange for vendor to inspect spool RW-33 and determine cause of failure. Discuss other urethane liner failures (delamination). Obtain vendor evaluate recommendations for corrective actions.	11/29/94 SC, 4/74	NPTS, Scot Stewart
3. Based on the vendor recommendations obtained in step 3, review for impact on QA inspection and acceptance procedures for urethane lined piping.	01/31/95	SNES J. E. Colby, per phone conversation 9/28
4. Perform a failure analysis of spool piece RW-33.	1/31/95	SNES, J. E. Colby, per phone conversation 9/28
5. Recommend needed revisions to PM-164 considering the following: adequacy of acceptance criteria; revised spool piece drawings; response to degraded or failed liners, initiate WR to monitor (UT) spools with liner failure; periodically reinspect (UT) spool; typos; enclosure; documentation.	04/30/95	NPTS, Scot Stewart
6. Revise PM-164 to incorporate CAP #5	07/30/95	Planning, C. H. Long
7. Have replacement spool pieces for RW-26 and RW-28 fabricated (WR# 321596 & WR 318869)	3/1/95	Scheduling, B. Moore, per conversation 9/28
8. Replace spool pieces RW-26 & RW-28 (WR# 319963 & WR# to be planned)	3/1/95	Scheduling, B. Moore, per conversation 9/28
9. Perform initial UT of RW-70 elbow (WR# 321598) and periodic UT inspections (90 days interval). Provide results to System Engineer.	11/30/94	Scheduling, B. Moore
10. Evaluate alternative material (i.e., Techthane products (98SS), flame pray, etc.) for pipe lining. (REA 94-1107)	3/1/95	SNES, T. Petrowsky, per phone conversation 9/28
Write RPA to fund inspection of RW piping ("A" DC, "B" DC, SW/RW) (See CS 977, Control Sheet 949)	03/31/95	NPTS, Scot Stewart
12. Review appropriate documentation and plant configuration and issue CIDPs & DCNs as necessary to have all RW spool pieces included in CMIS and to revise incorrect data for existing spools.	6/1/95	NOE, B. Gutherman, per conversation 9/29
13. Evaluate results of CAP and develop additional steps if necessary.	9/30/95	NPTS, Scot Stewart

## (2) ADDITIONAL CAP INFORMATION:

In a discussion with Jose Gines at BG&E the subject of urethane liner failures (delamination) was raised. He stated BG&E failure analysis of the same problem concluded that delamination as seen on the inner portion of elbows was due to unstable flow conditions. At this point in the piping the flow is going through a cyclic action; it attaches in laminar flow to the pipe wall then breaks free in turbulent flow and then reattaches. This cyclic action over time causes the layer of urethane to break loose eventually tearing in a sheet.

(3) Developed by (print &amp; sign): Les Harris

*Les Harris*

Date: 09/29/94

(4) Responsible Organization Approval by (print &amp; sign):

*CS 977**Jerry W. Campbell**[Signature]*

Date:

*9/30/94*

IF THE PROBLEM IS CLASSIFIED AS REPORTABLE OR A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION, THEN OBTAIN THE FOLLOWING APPROVALS

(5) PRC:

MTG No:

(6) DMPO:

Date:

WHEN COMPLETE, TRANSMIT TO SUPERVISOR, QUALITY SYSTEMS.

Rev: 3/94

RET: Life of Plant RESP: Quality Programs 901 215 (2 of 2)

PART 4: EVALUATION OF CAUSE, CAP, AND COMPLETION SCHEDULE BY THE QUALITY PROGRAMS TECHNICAL REVIEWER

Comments:

- 0 CLOSED M.W. DOMOVAN SUPVR, SITE NUCL ENGINEERING SVCS (NPSE PRI ME  
PERFORM PROBLEM INVESTIGATION, CAUSE ANALYSIS, AND CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN (CAP) DEVELOPMENT
- 1 CLOSED J. W. CAMPBELL MGR, NUCL PLANT TECHNICAL SUPPORT  
CONTACT URETHANE COATING SUPPLIER (TECHNICAL URETHANE INC.) TO DETERMINE HOW COATING FAILURE CAN OCCUR, LIFE OF COATINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ALTERNATIVES
- 2 OPEN J. W. CAMPBELL MGR, NUCL PLANT TECHNICAL SUPPORT  
CONTACT URETHANE APPLICATION VENDOR (URETHANE TECHNOLOGIES INC.) AND ARRANGE FOR VENDOR TO INSPECT SPOOL RW-33 AND DETERMINE CAUSE OF FAILURE. DISCUSS OTHER URETHANE LINER FAILURES (DELAMINATION). OBTAIN VENDOR EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.
- 3 OPEN J. E. COLBY MGR, NUCL PROCUREMENT ENGINEERING SERVICES  
BASED ON THE VENDOR RECOMMENDATIONS OBTAINED IN STEP 3, REVIEW FOR IMPACT ON QA INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURES FOR URETHANE LINED PIPING.
- 4 OPEN J. E. COLBY MGR, NUCL PROCUREMENT ENGINEERING SERVICES  
PERFORM A FAILURE ANALYSIS OF SPOOL PIECE RW-33.
- 5 OPEN J. W. CAMPBELL MGR, NUCL PLANT TECHNICAL SUPPORT  
RECOMMEND NEEDED REVISIONS TO PM-164 CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING: ADEQUACY OF ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA; REVISED SPOOL PIECE DRAWINGS; RESPONSE TO DEGRADED OR FAILED LINERS, INITIATE WR TO MONITOR (UT) SPOOLS WITH LINER FAILURE; PERIODICALLY REINSPECT (UT) SPOOL; TYPOS; ENCLOSURE; DOCUMENTATION.
- 6 OPEN C. H. LONG NUCL MAINTENANCE WORK CONTROLS MGR  
REVISE PM-164 TO INCORPORATE CAP #5.
- 7 OPEN B. C. MOORE MGR, NUCL INTEGRATED SCHEDULING  
HAVE REPLACEMENT SPOOL PIECES FOR RW-36 AND RW-28 FABRICATED (WR 321596 & WR 318869).
- 8 OPEN B. C. MOORE MGR, NUCL INTEGRATED SCHEDULING  
REPLACE SPOOL PIECES RW-26 & RW-28 (WR 319963 & WR TO BE PLANNED).
- 9 OPEN B. C. MOORE MGR, NUCL INTEGRATED SCHEDULING  
PERFORM INITIAL UT OF RW-70 ELBOW (WR 321598) AND PERIODIC UT INSPECTIONS (90 DAY INTERVALS). PROVIDE RESULTS TO SYSTEM ENGINEER.
- 10 OPEN A. PETROWSKY SUPERVISOR, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL  
EVALUATE ALTERNATIVE MATERIAL (I. E., TECHTHANE PRODUCTS (98SS), FLAME SPRAY, ETC.) FOR PIPE LINING. (REA 94-1107)
- 11 OPEN J. W. CAMPBELL MGR, NUCL PLANT TECHNICAL SUPPORT  
WRITE RPA TO FUND INSPECTION OF RW PIPING ("A" DC, "B" DC, SW/RW) (SEE NOCS 977, CONTROL SHEET 949)
- 12 OPEN B. GUTHERMAN NUCL ENGINEERING SUPERVISOR (MECH/STRUCT)  
REVIEW APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTATION AND PLANT CONFIGURATION AND ISSUE CIDPs & DCNs AS NECESSARY TO HAVE ALL RW SPOOL PIECES INCLUDED IN CMIS AND TO REVISE IN CORRECT DATA FOR EXISTING SPOOLS.
- 13 OPEN J. W. CAMPBELL MGR, NUCL PLANT TECHNICAL SUPPORT  
EVALUATE RESULTS OF CAP AND DEVELOP ADDITIONAL STEPS IF NECESSARY.

(1) Quality Programs Review (print & sign):

Date:

R. Nicholas

10/04/94





NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

EVALUATING OPERABILITY  
AND  
DETERMINING SAFETY  
FUNCTION STATUS

NOD-14

REV. 5

ISSUE DATE

12/03/93

PAGE  
15 OF 21

PRC# 1103

ATTACHMENT A-3  
(Page 1 of 3)

## OPERABILITY EVALUATION FORM

1. Initiating Individual: B. P. Wunderly Date: 11/9/94
2. Initiating Document: PR 94-032C
3. Affected Item (System, Subsystem or Component)  
CONTROL COMPLEX CHILLER, PASS SAMPLE COOLERS,  
NORMAL DUTY SW PUMP, NORMAL DUTY RW PUMP
4. System Designation(s)  
SW/RW CH CA
5. Tag Number(s)  
CHHE-1A CHHE-1B CAHE-8  
CAHE-5 CAHE-6 SWP-1C & RWP-1
6. Specified Safety Function(s) of Affected Item  
CHHE: Remove heat from control complex to  
support personnel habitability and functionality  
of safety-related equipment.  
PASS Sample Cooler: Only safety function is <sup>pass</sup> SW  
pressure boundary



NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

EVALUATING OPERABILITY  
AND  
DETERMINING SAFETY  
FUNCTION STATUS

NOD-14

REV. 5

ISSUE DATE

12/03/93

PAGE  
16 OF 21

ATTACHMENT A-3  
(Page 2 of 3)

7. Operability Concern

SW flow to subject components may be inadequate  
for components to perform safety function. This  
condition potentially impacts Operability requirements  
for Technical Specification equipment

8. References (List)

ED31D 6/22(CA) EDBD 6/11(SW) PT-136 (Working copy from ER)  
NRC Letter 3N1293-30 SP-459

9. Recommendation (Check as Applicable)

☒ Operable  
☐ Inoperable

10. Basis for Determination (Use Additional Sheets, if Necessary)

CHHE: ITS LCO 3.7.12 "CREVs" does not address the  
temperature control function of system (Ref. NRC  
letter 3N1293-30 and 'LCO' Section of Bases). Temperature  
in control room monitored on shift basis with no  
observed degradation in system performance. Thus,

(continued)


## Continuation of #10 from NOD-14

equipment (RPS, ES, VBITs) supported by chiller operation continues to be OPERABLE. NPTS installed ~~flow~~<sup>pressure</sup> gauges and temporary ultrasonic flow meter to confirm present flow. Measured flow provides high confidence flow to chillers would be adequate following an ES actuation.

PASS Sample Coolers: No applicable ITS LCO. ITS 5.6.2.6 requires administrative controls to ensure the capability to obtain and analyze post-accident samples. Sample coolers are continuously on line with SW supplied. Actual data on sample cooler outlet temperature was obtained as part of this evaluation for CAHE-8 (first, hottest cooler). Results indicate entire heat load being removed by SW thus affirming adequate SW flow.

Normal duty SW/RW pumps: Non safety related pumps - not addressed by Technical Specifications.

- Based upon results of evaluation, Task Force recommends revising PR design basis issue determination to be "Suspected design basis issue" to allow for further evaluation of discrepancies between measured flow and assumed flow.

 <b>NUCLEAR OPERATIONS</b>	<b>EVALUATING OPERABILITY AND DETERMINING SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS</b>	NOD-14	ISSUE DATE 12/03/93
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ATTACHMENT A-3  
(Page 3 of 3)

11. Required Actions:

☐ Execute applicable Action Statement(s)

☐ Establish immediate compensatory measures:

☒ Not Applicable

12. Develop basis for continued operation:

☐ Internal Position for Continued Operation

☐ Discretionary Enforcement (Relief from TS)

☒ Not Applicable

13. List of participants:

S. Stewart

J. Lane

D.M. Porter

B. Wunderly

B. Gottherman

J. Maseda

Chair:

B. Wunderly

Date:

11/9/94

SSOD:

Date:

NOV - 9 1994

NOTE: Attach copy to associated Problem Report.

PRC mtg. # 94-46  
Ken Vogel  
11/14/94



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

December 20, 1993

J. ALLEN	NA2C
N.W. AYERETT	C2H
M.P. BALEY	DUES
F.M. BEARD, JR.	A7E
J.L. BLUFÉ	NA2I
DOCKET FILE	C2M
J.P. GIBSON	NA2B
W.E. GRAY	BWVS
D. HASSLER	CPUN
D. JAMES	AND
F. KENNEDY	TE
L.C. KELLY	NAK7
L.W. MORFATT	NA2C
NGRC SUBCOM. (4)	Q&RV
C. OBBENDORFER	SAJD
RECORDS MGMT	NR2A
P.R. TANGUAY	C2I
S.R. WILSON	NA2J
S.P. WUNDERLY	NA2I

Docket No. 50-302

Mr. Percy M. Beard, Jr.  
Senior Vice President,  
Nuclear Operations  
Florida Power Corporation  
ATTN: Manager, Nuclear  
Licensing (NA2I)  
Crystal River Energy Complex  
15760 W Power Line Street  
Crystal River, Florida 34428-6708

ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT 171  
SUBJECT: (TSCRA 171)  
FILE NO.: 3A12.93-30  
RECEIVED: 12/21/93  
ACTION BY: B.P. WUNDERLY  
DUE DATE: EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY  
IMPLEMENTATION - 4/13/94

Dear Mr. Beard:

SUBJECT: CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE: IMPROVED  
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TAC NO. M74563)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 149 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-72 for the Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant (CR-3). This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated August 25, 1989.


This amendment replaces in its entirety the current Technical Specifications (TS) with a set of TS based on the new Babcock & Wilcox Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1430.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Also enclosed is the Notice of Issuance which has been forwarded to the Office of the Federal Register for publication.

As noted in the Safety Evaluation, an audit will be performed following implementation to ensure that you have established effective controls for the requirements that are being relocated from the existing TS to other licensee-

controlled documents. We suggest that you perform your own audit to ensure that the commitments in your letter dated November 23, 1993 have been fully accomplished.

Sincerely,



Harley Silver, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate II-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 149 to DPR-72
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Federal Register notice

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page



within the response time credited in the MFW line break analysis. Two valves are provided for isolation, to provide redundant isolation devices.

The staff has evaluated the above LCO additions and concludes that they comply with the existing Crystal River licensing basis and are therefore acceptable.

FPC has proposed not to add NUREG-1430 Specifications 3.7.11, "Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System;" 3.7.12, "Emergency Ventilation System;" and 3.7.13, "Fuel Storage Pool Ventilation System," to the improved Crystal River TS. The reasons are as follows:

1. Specification 3.7.11 - The temperature in the Control Complex/Control Room is maintained at a pre-determined setpoint (~70°F) during normal operations. The Chilled Water System is relied upon to accomplish this function and also fulfills this function post-accident (same system configuration in both cases). A heat balance analysis was performed which showed that Control Complex heat loads are approximately the same during normal and accident operations, so that the difference between the two conditions is negligible. Based upon this line of reasoning, if the Chilled Water System is capable of maintaining temperature during steady-state operations, it is considered capable of controlling temperature post-accident. Any significant increase in Control Complex temperature will be detected by the Control Room operators well in advance of approaching any real operational limit, be it equipment operability or operator habitability.
2. Specifications 3.7.12 and 3.7.13 - The Auxiliary Building Ventilation System provides the temperature maintenance function of these systems at Crystal River. For Crystal River, the ventilation filtration aspect of these systems is not credited as part of any accident analysis.

Based on the licensing basis, the accident analysis, and/or determination of an adequate level of safety, and the above discussion, the staff accepts the deletion of NUREG-1430 specifications 3.7.11, 3.7.12 and 3.7.13 for the improved Crystal River TS.

### 2.3.8 Electrical (Section 3.8)

The licensee did not include some of the requirements of NUREG-1430, Section 3.8 related to certain diesel generator surveillance tests. The staff concludes that these specifications are outside of the Crystal River licensing basis, are not in the existing Crystal River TS, and that an adequate level of safety is ensured by the existing electrical systems surveillances which are included in the improved Crystal River TS. The staff concludes that these differences do not warrant backfitting of the NUREG-1430 surveillance provisions. Therefore, not including these items in the Crystal River

## PART 1: INITIATION, REVIEW, AND ISSUANCE OF THE PROBLEM REPORT BY THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION

(1) Title: PT-136 Flow Balance Inconsistencies

## SUPPORTING INFORMATION

(2a) Discovery Method: SWSOP Assessment

(2b) Plant Conditions: Normal Operation

(2c) Occurrence Date: 11/4/94 Time: 0900

(2d) Plant Location: Building: NA Elevation: NA Area/Room: NA

(2e) Equipment Tag Number(s): NA (2f) Vendor Name: NA

## (3) Description of the Condition/Event:

The purpose of PT-136 is to verify that KW loading of the emergency pump motors are within acceptable values for the diesel generators. The procedure also verifies that adequate cooling water from the SW and DC systems will be available to designated safety related components following an accident. There is no set frequency for the procedure and it is performed whenever there is a change in the post accident system line-up or thermal hydraulic analysis indicate a change is required. The procedure was last performed in June of 1992 and was performed on only the SW system. Review of the test results as part of the SWSOP Assessment has identified several areas of concern including final system flow balance, procedure assumptions, utilization of results and instrument accuracies. The following outlines the various areas of concern:

- 1) Temporary procedural changes made during performance of procedure are confusing, making results difficult to determine.
- 2) Some of the flows are not measured but are assumed not to have been affected since last balancing. This may lead to some flow being below the required limit (CHNE-1A, 1B).
- 3) The procedure does not account for reduced flow due to pump degradation.
- 4) Non-ES flows that receive SW flow following an accident were not balanced. Included is uncertainty whether SW-12 flow should be considered. Also, flow to the RCPs was not balanced.
- 5) Instrumentation accuracy is not directly determined, rather an assumed value is used with no justification.
- 6) Flow balancing results were not factored into affected calculations.

(4) Is this problem a Radiological Safety Concern?

[ X ] NO

[ ] YES Immediately contact HP Supervisor for proper documentation.

(5) Requirement(s) Violated: None identified at this time.

(6) Associated/Related Documents: PT-136, "DC and SW Flow Measurements and EGDC-1A KW Loading Due to ES Pumps"

(7) Immediate Actions Taken:

None

(8) Recommendations for Resolving the Problem:

- 1) Requested MOE to perform operability review of current SW system lineup and expected post accident flow rates.
- 2) Further detailed review of PT-136 test results to identify all missing and suspect flow rates.
- 3) Determine actual system flow rates.
- 4) Factor actual system flow rates into corresponding calculations.
- 5) Revise PT-136 to incorporate resolution of above concerns (validate assumptions, develop instrument accuracies, clarify confusing steps, evaluate on-line testing using flow model, etc.).
- 6) Perform PT-136 during Refuel 10 and reevaluate for Design Basis Issue.
- 7) Reevaluate diesel generator KW loading.

(9) Originator (print name): Les Harris

Date: 11/4/94

Originating Department Supervisor/Manager Review, DBI Review and PR CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION:

(10) PR is:

[ ] a KNOWN Design Basis Issue \* ☒ SUSPECTED Design Basis Issue ☒ Not a Design Basis Issue

(11) Recommended Responsible Organization: Nuclear Plant Technical Support

Accepted By: M.J. Fitzgerald for T.W. Campbell Date: 11/4/94

Responsible Manager: J.W. Campbell

CAP Assignment (if applicable): MWD/JEL

(12) Originating Supv/Mgr (print &amp; sign):

James E. Lane

James E. Lane

(13) PR Issue Date:

11/4/94

(14) [X] SOTA review required

(Deliver to SOTA and notify SSCD)

[ ] SOTA review NOT required.

(Send to Director, Quality Programs)

(15) DIRECTOR QUALITY PROGRAMS:

P.F. 945 900

Date: 11/7/94

PROBLEM REPORT TRANSMITTED TO THE RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION [ ] By:

Date/Time:

Rev. 3/94

NET Life of Plant RESP Quality Programs 900 977

\* Changed PR Classification to Suspected Design Basis Issue after some questions were discussed during NOD-14 evaluation on 11/9/94.

# PROBLEM REPORT

Ph 4 - 0320

Page 1

## PART 2 - SECTION A1: REVIEW BY THE SOTA

(1) This Problem Report is:

REPORTABLE:

A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION:

AN UNPLANNED RELEASE:

☒ YES ☐ NO  
☒ YES ☐ NO  
☒ YES ☐ NO

(Section 8 of this attachment is required if YES)

SOTA (print & sign): *R. G. Sweeney*

Date/Time: 11/9/94 1700

IF REPORTABLE, THEN COMPLETE PART 2, SECTION B. *R. G. Sweeney 11/9/94*

## PART 2 - SECTION A2: PLANT CONDITIONS AND IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATIONS BY THE SOTA (if required)

(1) Plant Conditions:

Mode: \_\_\_\_\_ RX PWR: \_\_\_\_\_ MWe: \_\_\_\_\_ RCS Temperature: \_\_\_\_\_ Pressure: \_\_\_\_\_

Occurrence Date: \_\_\_\_\_ Occurrence Time: \_\_\_\_\_ Identified Date/Time: \_\_\_\_\_

Other (describe): \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Redundant Equip Available: \_\_\_\_\_

(3) SP/Maint: \_\_\_\_\_

(4) Tech Spec Affected: \_\_\_\_\_

(5) Action Statement Summary: \_\_\_\_\_

(6) Action Entry Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Time: \_\_\_\_\_

(7) Evaluate Immediate Notification (use EM-202 if Emergency Declared)

Emergency Plan Implemented: NO \_\_\_\_\_ YES \_\_\_\_\_ Classification \_\_\_\_\_

	Phone Call Required		Time Limit	Organization
	YES	NO		
CP-111 Reference				
a. 10CFR50.72	_____	_____	1 HOUR OR 4 HOUR	NRC OPERATIONS CENTER
b. 10CFR20.1906	_____	_____	IMMEDIATE	NRC REGION II
c. 10CFR20.2201	_____	_____	IMMEDIATE	NRC OPERATIONS CENTER
d. 10CFR20.2202	_____	_____	IMMEDIATE OR 24 HOUR	NRC OPS CENTER/DHRS
e. 10CFR50.36	_____	_____	1 HOUR	NRC OPS CENTER
f. NPDES PERMIT	_____	_____	IMMEDIATE	FPC SUPERVISOR, WATER PROGRAMS
g. TS 2.2.5	_____	_____	24 HOUR	NRC OPS CENTER/FPC SR.VP/NGRC
h. EPP	_____	_____	24 HOUR	NRC REGION II/FPC ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
i. ANI/FPC RISK	_____	_____	IMMEDIATE	NRC OPERATIONS CENTER/ANI/FPC RISK
j. 10CFR70.52a	_____	_____	1 HOUR	NRC OPERATION CENTER
k. 29CFR1904.8	_____	_____	IMMEDIATE	FPC NUCLEAR SAFETY SPECIALIST
CP-141 Reference				
a. 10CFR73.71	_____	_____	1 HOUR	NRC OPERATIONS CENTER

(8) NOTIFICATIONS:

NAME

TITLE

DATE/TIME

EVENT #

a. SSOD	_____	_____	_____	_____
b. STATE	_____	_____	_____	_____
c. NRC(ENS)	_____	_____	_____	_____
d. NRC (REG II)	_____	_____	_____	_____
e. FPC	_____	_____	_____	_____
f. DHRS	_____	_____	_____	_____
g. OTHER	_____	_____	_____	_____

(10) NOTIFICATION OF THE DNPO COMPLETED: [ ] YES [ ] NO Performed by (initial): \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_


(11) SOTA (print & sign): \_\_\_\_\_

Date & Time: \_\_\_\_\_

## PART 2 - SECTION B NSM Comments/Recommendations

(1) Nuclear Shift Manager (print & sign): *R. G. Sweeney* Date/Time: *11/9/94 1830*

FORWARD THIS SECTION TO THE DIRECTOR, QUALITY PROGRAMS

 <b>FLORIDA POWER &amp; LIGHT</b> <b>NUCLEAR OPERATIONS</b>	<b>EVALUATING OPERABILITY AND DETERMINING SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS</b>	NOD-14	ISSUE DATE 12/03/93
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PRC# 1101

ATTACHMENT A-3  
(Page 1 of 3)

OPERABILITY EVALUATION FORM

1. Initiating Individual: Brian Gutterman Date: 11/10/94
2. Initiating Document: PR 94-0269, PR 94-322
3. Affected Item (System, Subsystem or Component)  
Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Water  
Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water  
Nuclear Services/Decay Heat Seawater
4. System Designation(s)  
SW      DC      RW
5. Tag Number(s)  
SWHE-1A      SWHE-1B      SWHE-1C  
SWHE-1D      DCHE-1A      DCHE-1B
6. Specified Safety Function(s) of Affected Item  
Remove containment heat, decay heat,  
and component heat loads and  
transfer to the ultimate heat sink,  
during a design basis accident  
Decay Heat Removal for normal  
shutdown



 <b>FLORIDA POWER &amp; LIGHT</b> <b>NUCLEAR OPERATIONS</b>	<b>EVALUATING OPERABILITY AND DETERMINING SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS</b>	NOD-14	ISSUE DATE 12/03/93
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ATTACHMENT A-3  
(Page 2 of 3)

7. Operability Concern

The ability of the heat exchangers  
to remove design basis heat loads  
considering blocked tubes (shell, plugs  
and other debris)

8. References (List)


PR 94-0269      PM-112      SP-300 Logs  
PR 94-0322      MP-299      SP-340 A/B  
SP-344 A/B

9. Recommendation (Check as Applicable)

☒ Operable  
☐ Inoperable

10. Basis for Determination (Use Additional Sheets, if Necessary)

See Attached

 <b>NUCLEAR OPERATIONS</b>	<b>EVALUATING OPERABILITY AND DETERMINING SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS</b>	NOD-14	ISSUE DATE 12/03/93
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ATTACHMENT A-3  
(Page 3 of 3)

11. Required Actions:

☐ Execute applicable Action Statement(s)

\_\_\_\_\_

☐ Establish immediate compensatory measures:

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

☒ Not Applicable

12. Develop basis for continued operation:

☐ Internal Position for Continued Operation

☐ Discretionary Enforcement (Relief from TS)

☒ Not Applicable

13. List of participants:

See Attached. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Chair: *W. Sweeney* Date: 11/10/94

SSOD: *W. Hallin* Date: 11-10-94

NOTE: Attach copy to associated Problem Report.

PRC mtg. # 94-46  
*Ken Vogel*  
11/14/94



Design Basis UHS Temperature = 950 F  
Current UHS Temperature = 750 F

CALCULATION (UNVERIFIED) SHOWS SWHEs CAN REMOVE DESIGN BASIS HEAT LOAD WITH 25% FIRST PASS TUBE COMPLETELY BLOCKED AND 950 F UHS TEMP.

AS FOUND HX CONDITION HAS GIVEN CONSISTENT RESULTS  $\leq 25\%$  (ON AVERAGE) TUBES BLOCKED. (SEE ATTACHED)

CONTINUED SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF RWP-2A/B AND RWP-3A/B (DURING SPs)

FOR RWP-2A/B, RWP-1 DISCHARGE PRESSURE POST SP RUN RETURNS TO PRE-SP PRESSURE PER ATTACHED FIGURES.

RATE OF RWP-1 DISCHARGE PRESSURE INCREASE IS SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED SINCE QR PIT CLEANING


RWP-3A/B: NO LESS THROTTLED VIA VALVE TO ACHIEVE SP REFERENCE FLOW (INDICATES NO INCREASE IN BACKPRESSURE DUE TO HX BLOCKAGE).

CLEANED RW FLUMES AND PITS 7 MONTHS AGO.


NOTE: MONITORING PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE IS ~~NOT~~ USED TO IDENTIFY TRENDS IN HX BLOCKAGE.

11/10/94  
BT  
RGS

# RWP-1 DISCHARGE PRESSURE




# AUX\_BLDG TOUR




STA. NO.	DESCRIPTION	UNITS	MIN	MAX
101	RWP-2A DISCHARGE PRESSURE	PSIG	48	58
102	RWP-1 DISCHARGE PRESSURE	PSIG	25	40
103	RWP-2B DISCHARGE PRESSURE	PSIG	48	58

# RWP-1 DISCHARGE PRESSURE



# RWP-1 DISCHARGE PRESSURE



322149  
SW HE-1A  
10-3-94

ENCLOSURE 5

"AS-FOUND"

HEAT EXCHANGER CONDITION

Record the initial "as-found" conditions of the heat exchanger from Step 4.2.1

1 What type of debris was found: (ie) barnacles, oysters, grass, etc. \_\_\_\_\_

BARNACLES, RUBBER

2 Estimate percent of tubes blocked by debris ie: 10%, 25%, 50% etc. 20%

3 Estimate amount of debris: (ie) handfull, 1/2 gallon etc. 1/2 GAL

4 Inspect the expansion joints for cracks, breaks, or bulges. \_\_\_\_\_

Looked Good From INSIDE ONLY. CANNOT INSPECT OUTSIDE

5 Visually check access door, channel head, tubes, tube sheet and channel divider for deterioration. Conditions: NO abnormal conditions  
were found.

6 Note any other problem area(s): NONE



WR# 322069

SWHE-ID

9/19/94

"AS-FOUND"

HEAT EXCHANGER CONDITION

ENCLOSURE 5

Record the initial "as-found" conditions of the heat exchanger from Step 4.2.1

1

What type of debris was found: (ie) barnacles, oysters, grass, etc. 21.7.94  
72 GAT.

BARNACLES, SHELL, OYSTERS.

2

Estimate percent of tubes blocked by debris ie: 10%, 25%, 50% etc. 15%

3

Estimate amount of debris: (ie) handfull, 1/2 gallon etc. 1/2 GAL.

4

Inspect the expansion joints for cracks, breaks, or bulges.

APPEARS SATISFACTORY AT THIS TIME.

5

Visually check access door, channel head, tubes, tube sheet, and channel divider for deterioration. Conditions: APPEARS SATISFACTORY

AT THIS TIME.

6

No'e any other problem area(s): NONE

SWHE-1C

322066

9-19-94 ENCLOSURE 5

"AS-FOUND"

HEAT EXCHANGER CONDITION

Record the initial "as-found" conditions of the heat exchanger from Step 4.2.1

1 What type of debris was found: (ie) barnacles, oysters, grass, etc. \_\_\_\_\_

BARNACLES + SCALE

2 Estimate percent of tubes blocked by debris ie: 10%, 25%, 50% etc. 40%

3 Estimate amount of debris: (ie) handfull, 1/2 gallon etc. 1 GAL.

4 Inspect the expansion joints for cracks, breaks, or bulges. \_\_\_\_\_

NONE AT THIS TIME.

5 Visually check access door, channel head, tubes, tube sheet, and channel divider for deterioration. Conditions: ARE SATISFACTORY

AT THIS TIME.

6 Note any other problem area(s): NONE

SWHE-1A

321496

9-6-94

ENCLOSURE 5

"AS-FOUND"

HEAT EXCHANGER CONDITION

Record the initial "as-found" conditions of the heat exchanger from Step 4.2.1

1 What type of debris was found: (ie) barnacles, oysters, grass, etc. BARNACLES

SHELL

2 Estimate percent of tubes blocked by debris ie: 10%, 25%, 50% etc. 10%

3 Estimate amount of debris: (ie) handfull, 1/2 gallon etc. PIST

4 Inspect the expansion joints for cracks, breaks, or bulges. \_\_\_\_\_

5 Visually check access door, channel head, tubes, tube sheet, and channel divider for deterioration. Conditions: EVERYTHING ACCEPTABLE.

EXCEPT 13ACK Bell PLASTIC LINER

COMING OFF we cut it off Per

RAIIEgh SMITH

6 Note any other problem area(s): WHEN OPENING WEST END FOUND

WHAT LOOKED LIKE OIL INSIDE.

SW HE-1B  
321586  
9-6-94

ENCLOSURE 5

"AS-FOUND"

HEAT EXCHANGER CONDITION

Record the initial "as-found" conditions of the heat exchanger from Step 4.2.1

1 What type of debris was found: (ie) barnacles, oysters, grass, etc. \_\_\_\_\_

barnacles

2 Estimate percent of tubes blocked by debris ie 10%, 25%, 50% etc. 10% - 15%

3 Estimate amount of debris: (ie) handfull, 1/2 gallon etc. 1/2 gal

4 Inspect the expansion joints for cracks, breaks, or bulges. O.K.

5 Visually check access door, channel head, tubes, tube sheet, and channel divider for deterioration. Conditions: O.K.

6 Note any other problem area(s): None

320360  
DCHE-1B  
9-7-94

ENCLOSURE 5

"AS-FOUND"

HEAT EXCHANGER CONDITION

Record the initial "as-found" conditions of the heat exchanger from Step 4.2.1

1 What type of debris was found: (ie) barnacles, oysters, grass, etc. \_\_\_\_\_

OYSTER SHELL

2 Estimate percent of tubes blocked by debris ie: 10%, 25%, 50% etc. 10%

3 Estimate amount of debris: (ie) handfull, 1/2 gallon etc. 1/4 GALLON

4 Inspect the expansion joints for cracks, breaks, or bulges. OK

5 Visually check access door, channel head, tubes, tube sheet, and channel divider for deterioration. Conditions: FAIR

6 Note any other problem area(s): NEED NEW PLUGS

PLUGS WORN OUT

WR 321434  
SWHE-1D  
8-22-94

ENCLOSURE 5

"AS-FOUND"

HEAT EXCHANGER CONDITION

Record the initial "as-found" conditions of the heat exchanger from Step 4.2.1

1 What type of debris was found: (ie) barnacles, oysters, grass, etc. \_\_\_\_\_

Very little

2 Estimate percent of tubes blocked by debris ie: 10%, 25%, 50% etc. Less than 10%

3 Estimate amount of debris: (ie) handfull, 1/2 gallon etc. \_\_\_\_\_

4 Inspect the expansion joints for cracks, breaks, or bulges. OK

5 Visually check access door, channel head, tubes, tube sheet, and channel divider for deterioration. Conditions: OK

6 Note any other problem area(s): \_\_\_\_\_



11/10/94

NOD-14 for PR 94-0269

ATTENDEES

PAUL TANGUAY

JIM LANE

JACK TUNSTILL

W. BREWER

SCOTT STEWART

R. W. KNOLL

KEVIN CAMPBELL

JOE MASEDA

BRIAN GUTHERMAN

TERRY AUSTIN

MIKE DONOVAN

RICH IWACHOW

DON SHOOK

D. B. BLACK

## PROBLEM REPORT PR 94 - 0269

Page:

PART 1: INITIATION, REVIEW, AND ISSUANCE OF THE PROBLEM REPORT BY THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION

(1) Title: Recurring Raw Water Heat Exchanger Fouling

## SUPPORTING INFORMATION

(2a) Discovery Method:	Preparation for SWSOP		
(2b) Plant Conditions:	Normal Operation		
(2c) Occurrence Date:	9/13/94	Time:	1400
(2d) Plant Location:	Building: Auxiliary Bldg	Bay/Room: 99	Arsenal Room: Seawater Room
(2e) Equipment Tag Number(s):	SWHE-1A, 1B, 1C, 1D & DCHE-1A, 1B	(2f) Vendor Name:	Struthers Wells

## (3) Description of the Condition/Event:

FPC currently has a program of frequent regular heat exchanger maintenance in place to combat the problem of heat exchanger fouling and flow blockage in the RW system. This program includes cleaning and inspecting the intake canal and RW pits; cleaning and shooting of each SW heat exchanger every 28 days; cleaning and shooting a DC heat exchanger every ECCS system outage. These are adequate means of reducing heat exchanger fouling after fouling has occurred, but do not provide a method to reduce the level of fouling.

The concern arises with the fact that frequently the fourth SW heat exchanger (clean one in standby) must be placed in service in order for the RW pumps to pass their flow surveillance. Also, at times the DC heat exchanger must be cleaned for the RWDC pumps to pass their required flow. The purpose of the pump flow surveillances are to verify the capability of the pump to pass the required flow and not necessarily whether the system can pass the flow. However, when the above steps must be performed so the pumps can pass the required flow, it serves as an indicator that inadequate preventive maintenance (with specific regard to heat exchanger fouling) is in place to provide the necessary assurance that these safety related pumps will be able to provide design flow.

Based on system performance and maintenance there is inadequate control of the level of heat exchanger fouling.

## (4) Is this problem a Radiological Safety Concern?

[X] NO

[ ] YES Immediately contact NP Supervisor for proper documentation.

## (5) Requirement(s) Violated: NA

## (6) Associated/Related Documents: PR-92-0122, PM-112, NOCS #40438, PR-93-0114, PR-92-0169

## (7) Immediate Actions Taken:

NONE

## (8) Recommendations for Resolving the Problem:

- 1) Re-evaluate chlorination of RW supply
- 2) Utilize "clam-tron" to control growth
- 3) Increase frequency of RW pit cleaning
- 4) Install strainers/filters on pump discharge
- 5) Identify appropriate parameters to monitor and collect data correlating it to heat exchanger fouling rates
- 6) Perform an engineering study to evaluate all options and generate a recommendation
- 7) Establish criteria for acceptable level of heat exchanger fouling and subsequent flow blockage
- 8) Implement a program to monitor the effectiveness of any potential solution and revise the program as necessary

## (9) Originator (print name): Les W. Harris

Date: 9/14/94

## Originating Department Supervisor/Manager Review, DBI Review and PR CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION:

## (10) PR is:

[ ] a KNOWN Design Basis Issue

[ ] SUSPECTED Design Basis Issue

[X] Not a Design Basis Issue

## (11) Recommended Responsible Organization:

NPTS

Accounted By: J.W. Campbell

Date: 9/14/95

## Responsible Manager:

J.W. Campbell

CAP Assignment (if applicable): JEL/SAS

## (12) Originating Supv/Mgr (print &amp; sign):

C.A. Lee / C.A. Lee for JEL

## (13) PR Issue Date:

9/15/94

## (14) [X] SOTA review required

(Deliver to SOTA and notify SSOP)

[ ] SOTA review NOT required.

(Send to Director, Quality Programs)

## (15) DIRECTOR, QUALITY PROGRAMS:

R.J. Jones JCR

Date:

9/16/94

PROBLEM REPORT TRANSMITTED TO THE RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION [ ] By:

Date/Time:

## PROBLEM REPORT

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## PART 2 - SECTION A1: REVIEW BY THE SOTA

(1) This Problem Report is:

REPORTABLE:

A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION:

AN UNPLANNED RELEASE:

☒ NO  
☒ NO  
☒ NO

☐ YES  
☐ YES  
☐ YES

(Section B of this attachment is required if YES)

SOTA (print & sign): Harvey H. Liles Harry White Date/Time: 9/15/94 14:10

IF REPORTABLE, THEN COMPLETE PART 2 - SECTION B.

## PART 2 - SECTION A2: PLANT CONDITIONS AND IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATIONS BY THE SOTA (if required)

(1) Plant Conditions:

Mode: \_\_\_\_\_

RX PMR: \_\_\_\_\_

MWe: \_\_\_\_\_

RCS Temperature: \_\_\_\_\_

Pressure: \_\_\_\_\_

Occurrence Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Occurrence Time: \_\_\_\_\_

Identified Date/Time: \_\_\_\_\_

Other (describe): \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Redundant Equip Available: \_\_\_\_\_

(3) SP/Maint: \_\_\_\_\_

(4) Tech Spec Affected: \_\_\_\_\_

(5) Action Statement Summary: \_\_\_\_\_

(6) Action Entry Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Time: \_\_\_\_\_

(7) Evaluate Immediate Notification (use EM-202 if Emergency Declared)

Emergency Plan Implemented: NO \_\_\_\_\_

YES \_\_\_\_\_

Classification \_\_\_\_\_

(8)

Phone Call Required

CP-111 Reference

YES NO

Time Limit

Organization

a. 10CFR50.72

\_\_\_\_\_

1 HOUR OR 4 HOUR

NRC OPERATIONS CENTER

b. 10CFR20.1906

\_\_\_\_\_

IMMEDIATE

NRC REGION II

c. 10CFR20.2201

\_\_\_\_\_

IMMEDIATE

NRC OPERATIONS CENTER

d. 10CFR20.2202

\_\_\_\_\_

IMMEDIATE OR 24 HOUR

NRC OPS CENTER/DHRS

e. 10CFR50.36

\_\_\_\_\_

1 HOUR

NRC OPS CENTER

f. NPDES PERMIT

\_\_\_\_\_

IMMEDIATE

FPC SUPERVISOR, WATER PROGRAMS

g. TS 2.2.5

\_\_\_\_\_

24 HOUR

NRC OPS CENTER/FPC SR.VP/NGRC

h. EPP

\_\_\_\_\_

24 HOUR

NRC REGION II/FPC ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES

i. ANI/FPC RISK

\_\_\_\_\_

IMMEDIATE

NRC OPERATIONS CENTER/ANI/FPC RISK

j. 10CFR70.52a

\_\_\_\_\_

1 HOUR

NRC OPERATION CENTER

k. 29CFR1904.8

\_\_\_\_\_

IMMEDIATE

FPC NUCLEAR SAFETY SPECIALIST

CP-141 Reference

a. 10CFR73.71

\_\_\_\_\_

1 HOUR

NRC OPERATIONS CENTER

(9) NOTIFICATIONS:

NAME

TITLE

DATE/TIME

EVENT #

a. SSOD

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

b. STATE

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

c. NRC(ENS)

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

d. NRC (REG II)

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

e. FPC

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

f. DHRS

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

g. OTHER

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

(10) NOTIFICATION OF THE DNPO COMPLETED: ☐ YES ☐ NO Performed by (Initial): \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

(11) SOTA (print &amp; sign): \_\_\_\_\_

Date &amp; Time: \_\_\_\_\_

## PART 2 - SECTION B NSR Comments/Recommendations

(1) Nuclear Shift Manager (print &amp; sign): \_\_\_\_\_

Date/Time: \_\_\_\_\_

FORWARD THIS SECTION TO THE DIRECTOR, QUALITY PROGRAMS

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## PROBLEM REPORT

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## PART 3 - SECTION A: PROBLEM INVESTIGATION AND CAUSE ANALYSIS

(1) Method of Performing Cause Analysis: ☐ Structured Analysis ☒ Deductive Logic

## (2) CHECK ALL CAUSES THAT APPLY:

## Human Performance

<input type="checkbox"/> Verbal Communication	<input type="checkbox"/> Work Schedule	<input type="checkbox"/> Supervisory Methods	<input type="checkbox"/> Environmental Conditions
<input type="checkbox"/> Written Communication	<input type="checkbox"/> Work Organization/Planning	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Managerial Methods	<input type="checkbox"/> Interface Design or Equipment Condition
<input type="checkbox"/> Training/Qualification	<input type="checkbox"/> Work Practices	<input type="checkbox"/> Change Management	
		<input type="checkbox"/> Resource Management	

## Equipment Performance

<input type="checkbox"/> Plant/System Operation	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Maintenance/Testing	<input type="checkbox"/> External	<input type="checkbox"/> Design Configuration/Analysis
<input type="checkbox"/> Equipment Spec/Mfg/Construction			

(3a) Primary Cause(s): The primary cause of heat exchanger fouling is due to marine growth in the intake, flumes and RW pits. This problem has been previously identified and some effort to reduce the amount of fouling has been undertaken via implementation of a program of regular cleaning and inspection of the RW pump intake and suction pit. However, as the problem report states, this cleaning and inspecting along with HX PM's attempts to control the problem after growth and fouling have occurred. In addition, the programs in place may be insufficient to ensure that the level of fouling is maintained within acceptable margins to ensure system operability. An area of concern that has not been fully addressed is the RW pit itself. Fouling of a DC heat exchanger has been documented in the past. Of concern is that this HX does not normally have flow and after being shot and cleaned per PM-112 is left in wet layup with demin water. As such, any blockage that prevents sufficient pump flow from being obtained is introduced at the time the surveillance is performed. Since the flow rate of the DC/RW pump is less than RWP-1, complete HX fouling due to additional debris coming off the walls is unlikely. Therefore, it is concluded that this sudden surge of debris resulting in heat exchanger fouling must also be coming from the loose debris in the RW pit floor. This validates the conclusion that HX fouling is due to marine growth coming loose from the walls of the intake system and illustrates the complexity of the problem associated with HX fouling. The concern over HX fouling and flow blockage within the RW system is a well recognized problem by both the industry and the NRC, and additional work needs to be done in this area to ensure the our commitment to Generic Letter 89-13 is adequately met.

(3b) Secondary Cause(s): A secondary cause to heat exchanger fouling is that elimination of the source has not occurred. Rather all the steps implemented thus far are an attempt to control the problem once it has already occurred. Therefore, an adequate solution to correct the "root cause" of the SW and DC HX fouling problems has not been developed. There are numerous possible solutions to the problem and it may be that the most appropriate solution, due to the various factors surrounding the problem, is a combination of several control and elimination techniques.

(3c) Contributing Factor(s):

## (4) SUPPORTING INFORMATION (IF APPLICABLE):

LER No:	PROCEDURE No:	MR No:	NRC VIOLATION No:
OTHER:			

(5) Nuclear Safety Consequences Analysis: N/A

(6) Previous Similar Events/Conditions: N/A

(7) Manufacturer/Nameplate Data: N/A

## (8) Nonconforming Equipment/Material Disposition:

<input type="checkbox"/> N/A (no nonconforming equipment or material involved)	<input type="checkbox"/> Accept-As-Is*	<input type="checkbox"/> Repair*	<input type="checkbox"/> Rework
<input type="checkbox"/> Other (describe):			

\* Engineering Justification and Approval Required for these Dispositions (obtain documentation and attach)

## (9) Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure (MPFF):

<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> INITIAL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REPETITIVE
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## PROBLEM REPORT

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## PART 3 - SECTION B: Corrective Action Plan (CAP)

## (1) Corrective Action Plan:

ACTIONS	SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE	ASSIGNED ORGANIZATION/INDIVIDUAL
1. Include the RW System in the existing biofouling study (90-07-07-00), which is evaluating methods for controlling marine biofouling (i.e., thermal, chemical, protective coatings, chlorine, filter/strainer at pump discharge, Clam-trol etc.)	6/1/95	NOE, B. Gutherman, per phone conversation 9/28
2. Develop a RW system operability curve that will allow HX operability (as determined by its ability to dissipate heat) to be determined based on a actual UHS temperature, RW system flow, and HX delta P. (See CAA N 90-024-43)	5/31/95	NOE, B. Gutherman, per phone conversation 9/28
3. Review SP-300 RWP discharge pump pressure acceptance range as indication of heat exchanger fouling and subsequent action in the event the range is exceeded. (REA 94-1093)	1/30/95	NPTS, Scot Stewart
4. Contact Seaward Marine Services to determine the buildup of marine growth in the RW pits from 8M to 9R.	Completed	NPTS, Les Harris
5. Review WR history to determine the number of HX fouling events that have occurred between the May 1993 (8M) recirc line fouling PR and the 4/94 (9R) flume cleaning.	3/15/95	NPTS, Scot Stewart
6. Revise SP-300 RWP-1 discharge pressure band to reduce fouling accumulation between weekly cleanings, per CAP #3.	4/15/95	Operations, Greg Hainon, per telecon 9/28
7. Have Divers inspect the condition of the "B" RW pit based on results of CAP #5 and #3.	8/15/95	Scheduling, B. Moore, per conversation 9/29
8. Obtain SWHE delta-P data for trending.	11/30/95	NPTS, Scot Stewart
9. Send IOC to operations requesting notification of the system engineer in the event the DC heat exchanger must be cleaned and/or the clean SW heat exchanger is placed in service before RW pumps can achieve the required flow.	11/31/94	NPTS, Scot Stewart
10. Perform a calculation to determine the number of HX tubes that may be plugged or partially blocked and the HX still be capable of removing the necessary heat.	4/30/95	NOE, B. Gutherman, per phone conversation 9/29
11. Evaluate the over-all adequacy of the HX flow blockage prevention and steps within this CAP for acceptability in controlling HX fouling and flow blockage. Establish additional Corrective Actions as necessary.	10/1/93	NPTS, Scot Stewart

## (2) ADDITIONAL CAP INFORMATION:

(3) Developed by (print &amp; sign): Les Harris

Date: 9/29/94

(4) Responsible Organization Approval by (print &amp; sign):

Date:

IF THE PROBLEM IS CLASSIFIED AS REPORTABLE OR A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION, THEN OBTAIN THE FOLLOWING APPROVALS

(5) PRC:

NTG No:

(6) DMPO:

Date:

WHEN COMPLETE, TRANSMIT TO SUPERVISOR, QUALITY SYSTEMS.

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# PROBLEM REPORT

PR 94 - 0322

Page: 1

## PART 1: INITIATION, REVIEW, AND ISSUANCE OF THE PROBLEM REPORT BY THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION

(1) Title: Lack of Proper Operability Assessment

### SUPPORTING INFORMATION

(2a) Discovery Method: SW/RW/DC Self Assessment

(2b) Plant Condition: Power Operation

(2c) Occurrence Date: 11/09/94 Time: 1300

(2d) Plant Location: Building: NA Elevation: NA Area/Room: NA

(2e) Equipment Tag Number(s): NA (2f) Vendor Name: NA

(3) Description of the Condition/Event:

During the course of the SW/RW/DC Self Assessment it was discovered that conditions exist or have existed for which an operability assessment should have been performed, and was not documented. Examples of this can be found in PR-92-0122, "Fouling of DC Heat Exchanger with Marine Organisms", PR-93-0114 "High Pressure Discharge on RWP-3B Renders the B DHR System Inoperable", PR-94-0269 "Recurring RW Heat Exchanger Fouling", PR-94-0320 "PT-136 Flow Balance Inconsistencies for KW Loading of the Emergency Diesel Generators."

(4) Is this problem a Radiological Safety Concern?

☒ NO

☐ YES Immediately contact HP Supervisor for proper documentation.

(5) Requirement(s) Violated: CP-111, NOD-14

(6) Associated/Related Documents: NA

(7) Immediate Actions Taken:

Operability Assessment of PR-94-0320 was performed IAW NOD-14

(8) Recommendations for Resolving the Problem:

Ensure responsible personnel are knowledgeable of the requirements of CP-111 and NOD-14.

(9) Originator (print name): R.A. Grimes/

Date:

Originating Department Supervisor/Manager Review, DBI Review and PR CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION:

(10) PR is:

☐ a KNOWN Design Basis Issue

☐ SUSPECTED Design Basis Issue

☒ Not a Design Basis Issue

(11) Recommended Responsible Organization:

NPTS

Accepted By: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Responsible Manager: J.W.Campbell

CAP Assignment (if applicable): \_\_\_\_\_

(12) Originating Supv/Mgr (print & sign):

(13) PR Issue Date:

(14) ☐ SOTA review required

(Deliver to SOTA and notify SSCD)

☐ SOTA review NOT required.

(Send to Director, Quality Programs)

(15) DIRECTOR, QUALITY PROGRAMS:

Date:

PROBLEM REPORT TRANSMITTED TO THE RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION ☐ By: \_\_\_\_\_ Date/Time: \_\_\_\_\_

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