



NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION / 300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202 / TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

August 31, 1983
(7292)

Mr. R. W. Starostecki, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
Division of Project and Resident Programs
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2
Docket No. 50-410

Dear Mr. Starostecki:

Enclosed is a final report in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) for the problem concerning uncertified field quality control (FQC) inspectors. This condition was reported via telecon to Mr. H. Kister of your staff on June 20, 1983 and followed by an interim report on July 21, 1983.

Very truly yours,

D. P. Dise
Vice President
Quality Assurance

DPD/TL:ja
Enclosure

xc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Mr. R. Gramm, Resident Inspector

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NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION
NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2
DOCKET NO. 50-410

Final Report for a Problem
Concerning Uncertified Field
Quality Control Inspectors

The problem pertains to six Field Quality Control inspectors who were believed to have performed inspections for which they were not certified. This problem was identified in a followup Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation investigation conducted in response to the findings identified in Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection Report 82-13. The investigation involved a review of certifications of Stone & Webster field quality control inspectors. This problem was reported via telephone to Mr. H. Kister (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I) by Mr. T. Loomis (Nine Mile Point Unit 2, Licensing) on June 20, 1983. A detailed investigation provided the following information:

1. Description of the Problem

It was reported to Mr. H. Kister that three Stone & Webster preventive maintenance inspectors performed inspections for which they were not certified.

The detailed investigation has concluded that the inspections performed by the three inspectors (K. M. Kennedy, R. C. Hodom and J. L. Vogel) did not constitute preventive maintenance inspections required by the specifications. The inspections performed by these individuals were baseline inspections, conducted to determine the status of the equipment and were necessitated due to the transfer of site preventive maintenance responsibility from ITT Grinnell Corporation to Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation.

Analysis of Safety Implications

The inspections performed by K. Kennedy, R. Hodom and J. Vogel were conducted only to determine the status of the equipment and were not required by any specifications; therefore, no deficiency exists.

2. Description of the Problem

It was reported to Mr. Kister that one HVAC inspector (M. Pacer) performed inspections for which he was not certified.

A SWEC initiative was established to place drilled-in anchors as a specific certification rather than being included in each particular discipline. This initiative was merely a program adjustment and was not intended to decertify or terminate inspector certifications.

M. Pacer's documentation was not updated in the general timetable of other inspectors and, therefore, became suspect. M. Pacer did receive certification specifically for drilled-in anchors which completed his program adjustment.

Analysis of Safety Implications

As stated above, M. Pacer was fully qualified and certified for the inspections he performed; therefore, no deficiency exists.

3. It was reported to Mr. Kister that two civil/structural inspectors performed inspections for which they were not certified.

3A. Description of the Problem

The detailed investigation of one inspector, P. W. Lavallee, has concluded that he had performed visual welding inspections (Inspection Report No. S2021252) prior to certification. The welds in question are in safety related areas. These welds were made to provide temporary support for the plates during concrete placement and do not have any permanent plant application. These welds could not be reinspected due to inaccessibility.

Analysis of Safety Implications

Inspections for work in safety related areas performed by P. Lavallee were only for temporary supports; therefore, if this problem were to have remained uncorrected, it could not have adversely affected the safe operation of the plant.

3B. Description of the Problem

The detailed investigation of the other civil/structural inspector, B. A. DeWind, has concluded that the inspector performed verification of concrete curing inspections prior to being certified. (Inspection Reports Nos. S3025857, S3026428 and S3026429 documenting inspections involving safety related concrete pours.)

B. DeWind reported to work in the civil discipline in February 1982. During the period of February 1982 to December 1982, she received 822 hours of on-the-job training in the concrete effort, which included approximately 30 hours for concrete curing verification. In December 1982, she filled out the Training/Proficiency Progress Report for concrete placement only; however, at that time, curing required a separate certification. This documentation problem resulted in the identified deficiency.

The Field Quality Control program requires that two inspections be made during the curing cycle. The concrete pours in which B. DeWind performed curing verification were also found to be satisfactory during the second inspection, which were performed by properly certified inspectors.

In addition to the curing verifications performed by Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation Field Quality Control, the Construction Department performs curing checks during the curing cycle and records the results on the curing record. The Construction Department records indicate that no adverse conditions were identified on these pours.

The concrete curing inspections in question have been addressed in N&D No. 4798.