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WRITER'S DIRECT DIAL NUMBER

822-1090

September 8, 1983

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk
Secretary
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

In the Matter of
Metropolitan Edison Company
(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1)
Docket No. 50-289 (Restart)

Dear Mr. Chilk:

It has recently come to Licensee's attention that the Appeal Board, in ALAB-729, may have misunderstood the nature of Licensee's plans for installing backup incore thermocouple displays. As the Appeal Board notes, Licensee had committed to install a backup incore thermocouple display system meeting the criteria of Item II.F.2 of NUREG-0737. The Appeal Board further assumes that this system is fully safety-grade, except for environmental qualification. See ALAB-729, slip op. at 146-147, 176. This assumption is based upon Licensee's response to the Appeal Board's Order of July 14, 1982, which requested a brief status report on Licensee's progress in implementing certain modifications. Id.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk

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The use of the term "(safety-grade)" in Licensee's response was meant simply to distinguish the system mandated by NUREG-0737 from the existing control-grade backup incore thermocouple display system,^{1/} which is a subsystem of the installed primary incore thermocouple display system. However, the Licensee is uncertain of the import of the Appeal Board's words "fully safety-grade except for environmental qualification". The purpose of this notification is to inform the Commission that to the extent the Appeal Board assumed the backup incore thermocouple display system to be seismically qualified at this time, the assumption is incorrect.

By letter dated February 2, 1982, Licensee submitted to the Staff its plans for complying with the incore thermocouple display requirements of NUREG-0737, Item II.F.2. See Attachment A.

In sum, TMI-1 presently has in place two separate incore thermocouple display systems: (1) a two-part control-grade primary display system meeting the criteria required by the Staff and the Licensing Board that grew out of the Control Room Human Factors Review;^{2/} and (2) a backup system meeting the criteria of NUREG-0737, Item II.F.2., with the exception of environmental and seismic qualification. As Licensee noted in

^{1/} The requirement for a control-grade backup display system grew out of a recommendation from the Staff's control room design review (NUREG-0752) of TMI-1 and was subsequently adopted as a restart requirement by the Licensing Board. See LBP-81-59, 14 N.R.C. 1211, 1306, 1325 (¶¶ 867, 913, 914). Licensee's response to NUREG-0752, dated August 28, 1981, described the control-grade display installed at TMI-1. This control-grade system remains in place at TMI-1, in addition to the NUREG-0737 backup display system.

^{2/} This display system consists of an input multiplexer which feeds (a) the Mod Comp computer and associated printer and CRT display as the principal subsystem and (b) the Bailey 855 computer and associated printer as the backup subsystem.

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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk
September 8, 1983
Page Three

the attached letter, a program to seismically and environmentally^{3/}
qualify the backup display system is to be completed by the
Cycle 6 refueling outage.


Respectfully submitted,

Thomas A. Baxter

Thomas A. Baxter
Counsel for Licensee

cc: Service List attached

^{3/} The description of the environmental qualification of the
NUREG-0737 incore thermocouple system was submitted to the
Staff for review by letter dated May 16, 1983.



GPU Nuclear
 P.O. Box 480
 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057
 717-944-7621
 Writer's Direct Dial Number:

February 2, 1982

82 007

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 Attn: John F. Stolz, Chief
 Division of Licensing
 Operating Reactors Branch No. 4
 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 Washington, D.C. 20555




Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1)
 Operating License No. DPR-50
 Docket No. 50-289
 Incore Thermocouple Display (NUREG II.F.2)

In accordance with Item II.F.2(4) enclosed please find our evaluation on the conformance of the Incore Thermocouples with NUREG 0737. This evaluation is supplemented by information contained in the TMI-1 Restart Report (2.1.1.6, Supp. 1 Part 1, questions 17, 39, 39a, 39b, Part 2 questions 93, 95) ASLB Hearing Record on Inadequate Core Cooling, Mat 1d letters dated August 17, 1981 (LIL 246) and December 16, 1981 (LIL 348).

Sincerely,


 H. D. Hickill
 Director, TMI-1

HDR:LWE:vjf

cc: R. C. Haynes
 L. Barrett
 R. Jacobs

11.F.2. DESIGN AND QUALIFICATION CRITERIA FOR TMI-1 INCORE THERMOCOUPLES

(1) Thermocouples located at the core exit for each core quadrant, in conjunction with core inlet temperature data, shall be of sufficient number to provide indication of radial distribution of the coolant enthalpy (temperature) rise across representative regions of the core. Power distribution symmetry should be considered when determining the specific number and location of thermocouples to be provided for diagnosis of local core problems.

Response See TMI-1 Restart Report 2.1.1.6 and SER (NUREG 0580 of June 16, 1980 Section 2.1.3b).

(2) There should be a primary operator display (or displays) having the capabilities which follow:

- (a) A spatially oriented core map available on demand indicating the temperature or temperature difference across the core at each core exit thermocouple location.
- (b) A selective reading of core exit temperature, continuous on demand, which is consistent with parameters pertinent to operator actions in connecting with plant-specific inadequate core-cooling procedures. For example, the action requirement and the displayed temperature might be either the highest of all operable thermocouples or the average of five highest thermocouples.
- (c) Direct readout and hard-copy capability should be available for all thermocouple temperatures. The range should extend from 200 F (or less) to 1800 F (or more).
- (d) Trend capability showing the temperature-time history of representative core exit temperature values should be available on demand.
- (e) Appropriate alarm capability should be provided consistent with operator procedure requirements.
- (f) The operator-display device interface shall be human-factor designed to provide rapid access to requested displays.

Response Attachment 2 provides the computer functions involving the incore thermocouples.

(3) A backup display (or displays) should be provided with the capability for selective reading of a minimum of 16 operable thermocouples, 4 from each core quadrant, all within a time interval no greater than 6 minutes. The range should extend from 200 F (or less) to 2300 F (or more).

Response

The Backup Incore Readout system is composed of 16 selected incore thermocouples comprised of 4 in each core quadrant capable of being read in 6 minutes or less by an operator. The range monitored will be from 200°F to 2300°F. (See Figure 2)

Item (4)

The types and locations of displays and alarms should be determined by performing a human-factors analysis taking into consideration:

- (a) the use of this information by an operator during both normal and abnormal plant conditions,
- (b) integration into emergency procedures,
- (c) integration into operator training, and
- (d) other alarms during emergency and need for prioritizations of alarms.

Response

A human factor engineering review has been performed for the incore thermocouple display system. Procedural integration and training is discussed in the DMI-1 Restart Report Supplement 1 Part 1 Question 18, 39 a & b, and Part 2 Question 93.

Item (5)

The instrumentation must be evaluated for conformance to Appendix B, "Design and Qualification Criteria for Accident Monitoring Instrumentation", as modified by the provisions of Items 6 through 9 which follow.

Response

See items 6 through 9.

Item (6)

The primary and backup display channels should be electrically independent, energized from independent station Class 1E power sources, and physically separated in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75 up to and including any isolation device. The primary display and associated hardware beyond the isolation device need not be Class 1E, but should be energized from a high-reliability power source, battery backed, where momentary interruption is not tolerable. The backup display and associated hardware should be Class 1E.

Response

The primary and back-up display channels are electrically independent, separated (1E portion) are energized from independent power supplies. The primary display channel utilizes the plant redundant computers, one of which is supplied from an on-site battery backed power source and the other from a source backed by the diesel generator but which is not a qualified 1E source. The back-up display channel is energized from an on-site, 1E power source. The back-up display and associated hardware will be comprised ultimately of qualified 1E equipment, or electrically isolated. The diesel generator supplies back-up power for the mod comp. During a loss of power, the calculations performed by the ModComp are not available until the diesel restores power. This will be a relative short period of time and incore thermocouple readings may be obtained from the Bailey 855 during this period.

Item (7)

The instrumentation should be environmentally qualified as described in Appendix B, Item 1, except that seismic qualification is not required for the primary and associated hardware beyond the isolator/input buffer at a location accessible for maintenance following an accident.

Response

The difficulty in meeting this requirement is only for that portion of the system that is inside the containment (sensors cabling) in that it has to be qualified to temperature, pressures, radiation (normally expected over the equipment qualified life plus most severe DBA) and for the effects of chemical spray system. We are currently planning through analysis and testing to qualify the complete instrumentation channel from the sensor up to and including the R. C. pressure boundary termination and the electrical connectors (Bendix). Discussions with B&W indicate that this portion of the system is qualifiable except that the plant installed Bendix connector may have to be replaced by a comparable connector which will meet the qualification requirement.

The electrical cabling beyond the electrical connector up to the electrical penetration is outside the B&W scope of work and will have to be qualified separately. The cabling we have used is an alumal/chromel conductors insulated with teflon with an outer jacket of hyplon. The teflon insulation may lose its mechanical integrity at 10^7 rads but should retain its insulation properties up to 10^7 rads. It should be noted that the cabling within the incore instrument guide tube (B&W scope of supply) is different than the remaining cabling inside the containment as ceramic oxide is used as the primary insulator instead of teflon. The incore instrument channel from the reactor vessel to the R. C. pressure boundary is enclosed within Nuclear Class 1 and Seismic 2 tubing. The cables inside the containment are laid in seismically qualified cable trays.

Outside of containment, all cabling and hardware associated with the Backup system will be environmentally and seismic qualified. Electrical isolation devices are provided at all interfaces between the Backup system and the nonqualified portions of primary (plant computer) system. The qualification program is expected to be completed by Cycle 6 refueling.

The thermocouples of TMI-1 are of similar design and materials as to those used in TMI-2 which survived the TMI-2 accident and the post accident period with only a limited number of failures.

Item (8)

The primary and backup display channels should be designed to provide 99% availability for each channel with respect to functional capability to display minimum of four thermocouples per core quadrant. The availability shall be addressed in technical specifications.

Response

A Tech. Spec. Change Request concerning incore thermocouples is under preparation.

Item (9)

The quality assurance provisions cited in Appendix B, item 5, should be applied except for the primary display and associated hardware beyond the isolation device.

Response

The Quality Assurance requirement shall be in accordance with the GPU OQA Plan with specific requirements applied. Acceptance testing of the new equipment added by these modifications are in accordance with startup and test procedures written for these modifications.

Incore Thermocouple Display Computer Functions

The desired computer functions involving the incore temperature thermocouples are as follows:

1. Determine core exit thermocouple temperature by averaging the five highest valid incore thermocouple readings. The operator can compare this result with Figure 1 to determine if an alarm condition exists.
2. Produce trend plot of core exit thermocouple temperature as determined in #1 versus time.
3. On demand display readings of all incore thermocouples and have the option to delete any malfunctioning thermocouples from being used in any calculation.
4. Compute temperature saturation margin based on the average of the five highest valid incore thermocouples and alarm at less than 20°F margin.
5. Determine mean core exit thermocouple temperature by averaging all of the valid incore thermocouple readings.
6. Determine reactor vessel downcomer temperature with no RC pumps running by averaging the five highest valid incore thermocouple temperature readings and compare this value to saturation temperature at the current RCS pressure. If the average thermocouple reading is more than 100°F subcooled then print an alarm.
7. On demand display a list of the minimum set of 16 incore thermocouple readings, four per quadrant.
8. Provide a display and/or print alarms if any of the minimum set of incore thermocouples have malfunctioned based upon thermocouple validity criteria.
NOTE: Isolation Devices for the backup system will partially inhibit the feature since direct continuity checks cannot be performed due to required isolation devices.
9. Provide an option to substitute any pre-selected alternate incore thermocouple for any of the minimum set thermocouples that fail.
10. A trend plot of any thermocouple reading versus time is provided from the time of the demand forward.
11. Provide capability to easily redefine the entire minimum set of incore thermocouples if this became necessary due to multiple failures during operation.
12. Provide a spatially oriented core map on demand indicating temperature across the core at each core exit thermocouple location. A core map of all incore thermocouples is planned for later 1982.
13. Allow printing in hard copy of any data displayed. (Range of 200°F - 2300°F .)

FIGURE 1 CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLE TEMPERATURE FOR INADEQUATE
RE COOLING





FIGURE 2



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the Matter of)
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY) Docket No. 50-289
) (Restart)
)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear)
Station, Unit No. 1))

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