

3150-0011

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'T

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REPORT SOURCE

L	(6)	0	5	0	0	0	3	8	7	(7)	0	8	1	8	8	3	(8)	0	9	0	1	8	3	(9)
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60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 66 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

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02 During a maintenance activity, spray pond riser network 'A' inlet manual isolation valve would travel only in the closed direction. When the valve reached 15% open, the 'A' loops of ESW and RHRSW were declared inoperable and the unit entered LCO 3.0.3. The valve was restored to its proper position and the LCO cleared. While the valve was positioned at less than 15% open, the equipment served by the 'A' loops of ESW and RHRSW would have functioned if called upon, but with reduced effectiveness. No ECCS actuations were required during this time.

SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE				COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE					
0	9	W	G	E	B	V	A	L	V	O	P	B	X				
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20				
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.							
17	8	3	—	1	0	7	/	0	1	T	—	0					
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32						
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRO-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	
E	H	Z	Z	0	0	0	Y	N	A	L	2	0	0				
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46				

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1	0	The event was caused by the valve operator's open stopnut moving out of position
1	1	which prevented the valve from moving in the open position. The mechanical stop
1	2	casing was loosened which allowed the valve to be opened.
1	3	
1	4	

FACILITY STATUS (1) 5 (E) (28) 1 0 0 (29) NA (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY (A) (31) Operations/engineering evaluation (32)
 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE (1) 6 (Z) (33) (Z) (34) NA (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION
1	7	0	0	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION		(41)	
1	8	0	0	0	40	NA	

1 9 Z (42) NA 8309120442 830901
PDR ADOCK 05000387
S PDR

PUBLICITY		ISSUED		DESCRIPTION		(45)	
2	0	N	(44)	NA			

PHONE: (717) 542-2181

ATTACHMENT

LER # 83-107/01T-0

Pennsylvania Power & Light Company
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station
Docket Number: 50-387

Binding of the spray pond riser network 'A' inlet manual isolation valve occurred during the performance of a special test. The valve could not be repositioned open beyond approximately 50%. The test was performed to collect data to verify that the spray pond is capable of operating for thirty days without makeup and to maintain water temperature below 95°F under conservative meteorological conditions. Shift Supervision and engineering personnel directing the test determined that the Emergency Service Water (ESW)/Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) system's operability was not affected by the valve's stuck position because system flow during the test was sufficient to support proper operation of the equipment served by the ESW/RHRSW systems.

A work authorization was written to investigate the cause of the valve binding and during implementation on August 18, 1983, an Auxiliary System Operator (ASO) was directed by a Plant Control Operator (PCO) to operate the valve as requested by Mechanical Maintenance personnel during investigation. The valve is a manually operated, locked throttled valve. The ASO verified that the valve would not move toward full open, but operated properly in the close direction to approximately 15% open.

At the 15% open position, the valve could not be reopened. The ASO notified the PCO and the 'A' loops of ESW and RHRSW were declared inoperable. Entry into LCO 3.0.3 began at 1155 on August 18.

It was found that the mechanical stop mechanism's open stop nut moved out of position (toward close). Premature engagement of the stop mechanism prevented returning to the open position. The mechanical stop casing on the valve was loosened, which permitted the valve to be reopened to 85%, which permitted clearing LCO 3.0.3 at 1245.

While the valve was positioned at the approximate 15% open position, the various ECCS room, seal water and motor oil coolers, the 'A' Residual Heat Removal heat exchanger and various diesel generator cooling components would have operated, but at reduced effectiveness. The 'B' loops of RHRSW and ESW were unaffected by the stuck valve. Since no ECCS actuations were required during this time, public health and safety were not affected.



Pennsylvania Power & Light Company

Two North Ninth Street • Allentown, PA 18101 • 215 / 770-5151

September 1, 1983

Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 83-107/01T-0
ER 100450 FILE 841-23
FLA-1818

Docket No. 50-337
License No. NPF-14

Dear Dr. Murley:

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 83-107/01T-0. This event was determined to be reportable per Technical Specification 6.9.1.8.b, in that the 'A' loop of the Emergency Service Water (ESW) and Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RIIRSW) Systems was declared inoperable due to a valve malfunction. Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3 was effective during the period.

H.W. Keiser
Superintendent of Plant-Susquehanna

JJG/pjg

Attachment

cc: G.G. Rhoads
Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P.O. Box 52
Shickshinny, PA 18655

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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