

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 V A S P S 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
 LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

CONT
01 L 6 0 5 0 0 0 0 2 8 0 7 0 7 1 4 8 3 8 0 8 0 1 8 3 9
7 8 60 61 66 69 74 75 80
 REPORT SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

02 On July 14, 1983, with the unit at full power, the control rods powered from
03 cabinet 2BD would not respond during PT-6. This is contrary to T.S.-3.12.C.2 and
04 reportable per T.S.-6.6.2.b.(2). The control rods were capable of being tripped
05 and were returned to an operable status within the time limits of T.S., therefore,
06 the health and safety of the public were not affected.

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08

09 R B 11 E 12 F 13 C K T B R K 14 X 15 Z 16
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
17 8 3 0 2 9 0 3 L 0
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
 EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.
A 18 Z 19 Z 20 0 0 0 0 Y 23 N 24 N 25 W 1 2 0 26
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
 ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NRC FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

10 The cause was due to a blown fuse in the three phase power supply for cabinet 2BD.
11 The fuse blew upon initiation of rod movement. The fuse was replaced and rod
12 movement was verified.

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15 E 28 1 0 0 29 N/A B 31 Surveillance Testing 32
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
 FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
16 Z 33 Z 34 N/A N/A N/A LOCATION OF RELEASE 36
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY
17 0 0 0 37 Z 38 N/A
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION
18 0 0 0 40 N/A
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION
19 0 0 0 41 N/A
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION
20 Z 42 N/A
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
 PUBLICITY
21 N 44 8308120119 830801
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
 ISSUED DESCRIPTION PDR ADOCK 05000280 PDR
 NRC USE ONLY

ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1
DOCKET NO: 50-280
REPORT NO: 83-029/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 07-14-83

TITLE OF THE EVENT: ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE

1. Description of the Event

With the unit at full power while performing Periodic Test 6, Control Rod assembly Partial Movement, an urgent failure alarm occurred and the control rods from cabinet 2BD would not respond to a demand signal. This event is contrary to T.S.-3.12.C.2 and is reportable per T.S.-6.6.2.b.(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment

The control rods must be capable of being inserted to fulfill part of the shutdown margin requirements. At all times during this event, all control rods were capable of being tripped, therefore the public's health and safety remained unaffected.

3. Cause

The urgent failure was caused by a blown fuse. Fuse FU3 protects 1 phase of the current to group 2 of the bank "B" control rods. The fuse blew during the initial current pulse when "B" bank was moved for PT-6.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

The initial action was to locate the cause of the urgent failure. Also, the immediate actions of Abnormal Procedure 1.1 (Rod Control System Malfunction) were completed.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action

The blown fuse and its indicator fuse were replaced. Proper rod motion was verified and PT-6 was satisfactorily completed.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

This is an isolated event, therefore no further actions are necessary.

7. Generic Implications

None.