

(7-77)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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REPORT SOURCE

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60	61	DOCKET NUMBER					68	69	EVENT DATE					74	75	REPORT DATE					80			

0 2 On July 10, 1983, No. 1A Emergency Diesel Generator tripped during routine surveillance

0 3 testing. The generator was declared inoperable and Action Statement 3.8.1.1a was

0 4 entered. An operator was dispatched to investigate the trip. Investigation revealed

0 5 that a security guard stationed in the diesel generator control room had inadvertently

0 6 struck the emergency trip button. The event constituted operation in a degraded mode

0 7 in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

0	8																80												
7	8	9	SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE					COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE													
0	9		E	E	11	A	12	F	13	C	K	T	B	R	K	14	E	15	Z	16									
7	8		9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26									
LER RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR				SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.				OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE				REVISION NO.													
17		8	3			0	3	0		0	3		I			0													
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER													
H	18	G	19	Z	20	Z	21	0	0	0	0	Y	23	N	24	A	25	B	0	9	3	26							
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50												

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The diesel was restarted and satisfactorily tested; the action statement was terminated.

1 1 The individual involved was eliminated from the security force; the incident was

1 2 discussed in pre-duty briefings. A review of administrative controls will be performed

1 3 to identify possible improvements which will mitigate potential for such incidents in

1 4 future, similar post situations.

FACILITY STATUS (1) 5 (E) (28) % POWER (1) 0 0 (29) OTHER STATUS (30) N/A METHOD OF DISCOVERY (A) (31) Operational Event DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) N/A
 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39) N/A
 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41) N/A
 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION (43) N/A
 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) N/A
 8308120024 830729
 PDR ADOCK 05000272
 S PDR

NAME OF PREPARER

R. Frahm

PHONE: (609) 935-6000 Ext. 4309



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

August 4, 1983

Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Dr. Murley:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-030/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 83-030/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "J. M. Zupko, Jr.".

J. M. Zupko, Jr.
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RF:kl1

CC: Distribution

Report Number: 83-030/03L
Report Date: 07-29-83
Occurrence Date: 07-10-83
Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 1
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Electrical Power Sources - No. 1A Emergency Diesel Generator - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 83-121.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 100 % - Unit Load 1125 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0507 hours, July 10, 1983, during routine surveillance testing of the No. 1A Emergency Diesel Generator, the Control Room Operator observed an apparent emergency trip of the generator. An operator was immediately dispatched to investigate the incident. The No. 1A Diesel Generator was declared inoperable and Technical Specification Action Statement 3.8.1.1a was entered.

Investigation revealed that a security guard stationed in the Diesel Generator Control Room had inadvertently struck the emergency trip button, stopping the generator. The operator reset the trip relay, and the generator was subsequently satisfactorily tested. All redundant power sources were operable during the period of concern.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Further investigation of the incident revealed the security guard had accidentally hit the trip button with his hand while stretching his arms. The guard was in the process of being relieved at shift change, and was exercising his limbs in preparation for leaving the post. A local alarm was received due to the generator trip, and the guard pushed the alarm reset button. Due to concern over possible disciplinary action, the individual did not immediately notify the Control Room.

The existing training program for security guards thoroughly addresses the importance of avoiding contact with plant equipment; the individual involved was aware of the significance of his actions. A temporary post had been established in the diesel room due to modification of Door 33, which was being fitted with an automatic fire door in accordance with Design Change Request 1EC-1333. A previous, similar event had occurred at the post on May 7, 1983 (see LER 83-021/03L), and appropriate corrective action had been taken at that time. A different individual was involved; the combination of

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

remoteness of the post together with unusual proximity to safety equipment controls apparently resulted in an increased likelihood of such problems.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The operability of the minimum specified A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during operation ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety related equipment required for 1) the safe shutdown of the facility and 2) the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility. The action requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation.

Action Statement 3.8.1.1a requires:

With either an offsite circuit and one diesel generator of the required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the operability of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.1a and 4.8.1.1.2a2 within one hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; restore at least two of the offsite circuits and three diesel generators to operable status within 72 hours or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

As noted, the redundant power sources were operable throughout the occurrence and the inoperable generator was restored to an operable status in a timely fashion. The event therefore involved no undue risk to the health and safety of the public. The occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

As mentioned, No. 1A Diesel Generator was reset and was satisfactorily tested. The generator was declared operable and at 0606 hours, July 10, 1983, Action Statement 3.8.1.1a was terminated. For failing to notify supervision of the inadvertent operation of the trip device, the individual involved was terminated from employment with the security force.

The incident was addressed at the security pre-duty briefing on all shifts to reinforce training in this area; the importance of notifying the Control Room in such instances was emphasized. Although the post has been removed from the diesel generator control room, a need likely exists for the future posting of security guards in areas with similar potential for such events. A review of security force administrative controls will be performed to identify possible improvements which will mitigate the potential in these instances; appropriate action will be taken upon completion of this review.

LER 83-030/03L

-3-

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable

Prepared By R. Frahm

J. M. Zysbo
General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 83-102