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July 29, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Catawba Nuclear Station
Unit 1
Docket No. 50-413

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55e, please find attached a final response to Significant Deficiency Report SD 413/83-07.

Very truly yours,

H.B. Tucker

Hal B. Tucker

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Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector
Catawba Nuclear Station

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Duke Power Company
Catawba Nuclear Station
Significant Deficiency

Report Number: SD 413/83-07

Initial Report Date: May 13, 1983

Final Report Date: July 29, 1983

Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1

Identification of Deficiency: Vent valve 1ND105 was not installed in accordance with Design and Construction criteria. This item was identified by Design Engineering during a field visit on March 25, 1983.

Initial Report: Initial report was made to Mr. V. Brownlee, Region II, NRC, on April 14, 1983 by W. O. Henry, C. A. Bell, and T. A. Ford of Duke Power Company, Charlotte, North Carolina 28242.

Final Response: As reported by NCIR 16510, vent valve 1ND105 was not installed per the latest revision of design isometric CN-1492-ND029.

This item was discovered by personnel in Design Engineering during a field walk-down of the Residual Heat Removal (ND) system. It is sometimes the practice of individuals in the stress analysis group to do a field walk of a system prior to beginning system certification. This was the case in this instance. The discovery was made after system installation completion and system inspection by QC.

Revision 2 of the design isometric added the particular vent in question. This revision showed a detailed configuration of the vent with an overall length of 6' -1 11/16". Prior to actual installation of the vent, revision 3 of the drawing was issued which deleted the detailed configuration of the vent and added reference to a standard detail drawing for vent installation, CN-1680-47. The standard detail drawing had been developed by Design in order to reduce analysis time and also to reduce the overall number of support/restraints in the plant. It established a maximum overall length requirement of 18" for safety related piping system vent and drains.

Seventeen months after revision 3 of CN-1492-ND029 had been issued, the vent was installed. The current revision of the isometric at that time was revision 5. During installation, the overall length criterionspecified by the standard drawing was exceeded; however, configuration installed was allowed by the drawing. Overall length installed was approximately 4' -3". This discrepancy was not discovered by Construction personnel or QC even though governing procedures require a detailed configuration and dimensional inspection. Interviews with both the craft personnel responsible for checking this work and the QC inspector did not reveal why this item was missed. Both said that they were familiar with the requirements of CN-1680-47 at the time and could provide no further explanation for the oversight.

No changes to our inspection program are anticipated at this time because investigation shows this to be an isolated case of human error. Vents on five other ND drawings which were inspected during this time period by the same inspector were

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rechecked and found to have no problem. Nine other drawings in six other systems (NB-2 drawings, RN-1 drawing, YM-2 drawings, CF-1 drawing, CA-2 drawings, KC-1 drawing) were checked and found to have no problems. Also, discussions with four QC inspectors revealed that deviations from CN-1680-47 are seldom made by craft, based on inspection experience. Our program is adequate to prevent future occurrence.

The vent was corrected to conform with CN-1680-47 on June 17, 1983. Re-hydro on this portion of the system will be controlled per shutdown request, F-13A #2771.