

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

UPDATE REPORT

PREVIOUS REPORT DATE

05/16/83

CONTROL BLOCK:

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	G A E I H 1				2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5					
7	8	9				14				15				25				26				30				57				58	
		LICENSEE CODE								LICENSE NUMBER								LICENSE TYPE													

CON'T

0 1 7 8

REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 7 0 6 2 9 8 3 8 0 7 2 8 8 3 9

60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

On 3/20/83, the PRB determined that a lack of administrative control existed in complying with the "CABLE AND CABLE WAYS INSTALLATION" procedure (HNP-6921) because of the material condition of the cable trays. Engineering evaluation revealed that plant operating safety was not affected. Cable tray discrepancies were restored to acceptable limits. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this non-repetitive event.

0	9	SYSTEM CODE		X	X	11	CAUSE CODE		D	12	CAUSE SUBCODE		Z	13	COMPONENT CODE						Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	14	COMP. SUBCODE		Z	15	VALVE SUBCODE		Z	16					
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENCE REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.		ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUT-DOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER												
17		21		22	24		25	26	27		28	29	30		31	32		33		34	35		36	37	38	39	40	41		42	43	44	45	46	47					
8		3	0		3	6	0		1	4		G		X	Z		Z	Z		0	0	0	0	Y		N	Z	Z		9	9	9	9							

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The cause of this event is the lack of specific procedure instructions

1 1 | in delineating responsibilities. The procedure has been revised to

1 2 | clearly specify supervisory and quality control inspection responsi-

1 3 | bilities. Also, design acceptance criteria is available for installa-

1 4 | tion, maintenance, and inspection.

FACILITY STATUS (28) 1 5 E
 % POWER 0 9 9 (29) NA
 OTHER STATUS (30)
 METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) D NRC Inspection
 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 33 34 NA

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA	39

PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION	
1	11	0	0	0	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
TYPE DESCRIPTION
1 9 [Z] (42) NA
8308110223 830728
PDR ADOCK 05000321

8 9 10
PUBLICITY
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)
2 0 N (44) NA
NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER S. B. Tipps

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NARRATIVE REPORT
FOR LER 50-321/1983-036, Revision 4
Update Report - Previous Report Date 5/16/83

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-321

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

1. This LER is required by Unit 1 Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.c. (reference deviation report number 1-83-68).
2. This LER is required by Unit 1 Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.8.i due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Unit 1 Tech. Specs. section 3.5.B.3 (reference deviation report number 1-83-74).
3. This LER is required by Unit 1 Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.c (reference deviation report number 1-83-27A).
4. This LER is required by Unit 1 Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.c. (reference deviation report number 1-83-82).
5. This LER is required by Unit 2 Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.c. (reference deviation report number 2-83-49).
6. This LER is required by Unit 1 Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.b. (reference deviation report number 1-83-96).
7. This LER is required by Unit 1 and Unit 2 Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.c (reference deviation report number 1-83-152).

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

1. This event occurred on 3/20/83, with the Unit 1 mode switch in the run position and reactor power at 2424 MWt (approximately 99% power).
2. This event occurred on 3/23/83, with Unit 1 in steady state operation at 2433 MWt (approximately 100% power).
3. This event occurred on 3/22/83 with Unit 1 in steady state operation at 2430 MWt (approximately 100% power).
4. This event occurred on 4/5/83 with Unit 1 in steady state operation at 2429 MWt (approximately 100% power).
5. This event occurred on 4/5/83 with Unit 2 shutdown for refueling.

6. This event occurred on 4/26/83, with Unit 1 in steady state operation at 2402 MWt (approximately 98% power).
7. This event occurred on 06/29/83, with Unit 1 in steady state power at 2423 MWt (approximately 99% power), and with Unit 2 in cold shutdown for a refueling outage.

Detailed description of the event(s):

1. On 3/20/83, the Plant Review Board determined that there was a lack of administrative control concerning cable tray restoration. This determination was made due to the discovery of an inadequacy in procedural control and inspection of work performed on cable trays.
2. The "CABLE TRAY AND EQUIPMENT CONDITION INSPECTION" procedure was being performed. A four inch aluminum channel containing the power feed cables for RHR valve motor 1E11-F015B was found cracked. Also, a conduit support supporting the control cables for a RHR valve motor 1E11-F017A was found disconnected. The operability of both loops of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) LPCI system would be suspect during a seismic event which could be contrary to the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.5.B.3.
3. Safety related cables H11-P621-E57-C060 and H11-P621-E57-C061 were found routed in the non-seismic west cableway. These cables are associated with the automatic transfer of the RCIC suction from the condensate storage tank (CST) to the suppression chamber.
4. Safety related cables R24-S025-E57-C51C and R24-S025-E57-C55C were found routed in the non-seismic west cableway. These cables provide for the automatic closure of Plant Service Water (PSW) valves 1P41-F310A and 1P41-F310D on a condenser room flooding signal.
5. Safety related cables PVE703C04 and PVE704C04 were found routed in the non-seismic west cableway. These cables provide for the automatic closure of Plant Service Water (PSW) valves 2P41-F316A and 2P41-F316D on a condenser room flooding signal.
6. During performance of a cable tray walkdown per the "CABLE TRAY AND EQUIPMENT CONDITION INSPECTION" procedure, inspecting personnel discovered that Division I and Division II cable separation had not been maintained as required by FSAR Section 8.8.3.5.L.1: A section of Kaowool is missing from cable tray number TEN7-01 near NSSS cabinet 1H11-P630, and near cable trays TMG0-02 and TMG0-03.

Detailed description of the event(s)(Continued):

7. During the reviews conducted by the A/E following the cable tray walkdowns, the following problems were determined to have existed:

a. It was noted during the cable tray walkdown inspection that the span length between cable tray supports for cable trays RDA3-02 and REA3-02 were greater than eight feet apart. An engineering evaluation determined that one or more tray support components would be stressed beyond yield during a design basis earthquake. The following safety related circuits are routed through cable trays RDA3-02 and REA3-02:

1) R23-S003-ES3-M14A

This circuit provides 600 volt power to essential motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) from 600 volt switchgear bus "1C" (R23-S003). Loss of this circuit would result in the loss of 600 volt essential motor control center "1C".

2) R23-S003-ES3-M14B:

This circuit provides 600 volt power to essential motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) from 600 volt switchgear bus 1C (R23-S003). Loss of this circuit would result in the loss of 600 volt essential motor control center "1C"

3) R24-S011-ES3-M53:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from essential motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the RHR discharge to radwaste motor operated valve Ell-F040. Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

4) R23-S003-ES3-M05:

This circuit provides power from 600 volt bus "1C" (R23-S003) to 600 volt essential motor control center "1E-A" (R24-S018A). Loss of this circuit would result in the loss of the alternate feeder to this motor control center.

5) R24-S011-ES3-M01:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from essential motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the 40 horsepower motor for the Standby Liquid Control "A" pump (C41-C001A). Loss of this circuit would result in the loss of the motor, reactor explosive inlet valve (C41-F004A) and standby liquid explosive valve circuit check (C41-M600B).

Detailed description of the event(s)(Continued):

7.a (Continued):

6) R24-S011-ES3-M03:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from essential motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to a standby liquid control tank heater (C41-A001-B). Loss of this circuit would result in the loss of this standby liquid control tank heater.

7) R24-S011-ES3-M09:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from essential motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to a drywell cooling unit (T47-B007A-1). Loss of this circuit would result in the loss of this drywell cooling unit.

8) R24-S011-ES3-M10:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from essential motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to a drywell cooling unit (T47-B007B-1). Loss of this circuit would result in the loss of this drywell cooling unit.

9) R24-S011-ES3-M11:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from essential motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to a drywell cooling unit (T47-B008A-1). Loss of this circuit would result in the loss of this drywell cooling unit.

10) R24-S011-ES3-M12:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from essential motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to a drywell cooling unit (T47-B008B-1). Loss of this circuit would result in the loss of this drywell cooling unit.

11) R24-S011-ES3-M16:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from essential motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to a Core Spray and RHR pump room cooling unit (T41-B002A). Loss of this circuit would result in the loss of this cooling unit.

Detailed description of the event(s)(Continued):

7.a (Continued):

12) R24-S011-ES3-M17:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from essential motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to a RCIC pump room cooling unit (T41-B004A). Loss of this circuit would result in the loss of this cooling unit.

13) R24-S011-ES3-M33:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from essential motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the RHR "A" loop heat exchanger drain to suppression pool motor operated valve (E11-F011A). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

14) R24-S011-ES3-M37:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from essential motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the RHR "A" loop heat exchanger shell side outlet motor operated valve (E11-F003A). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

15) R24-S011-ES3-M39:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from essential motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to a CRD pump room cooling unit (T41-B001A). Loss of this circuit would result in the loss of this cooling unit.

16) R24-S011-ES3-M47:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from essential motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the RHR "A" loop heat exchanger drain to RCIC motor operated valve (E11-F026A). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

17) R24-S011-ES3-M55:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from essential motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the RHR "A" loop heat exchanger shell side inlet motor operated valve (E11-F047A). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

Detailed description of the event(s)(Continued):

7.a (Continued):

18) R24-S011-ES3-M57:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from essential motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the RHR "A" loop heat exchanger shell side bypass motor operated valve (E11-F048A). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

19) R24-S011-ES3-M59:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from essential motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the RHR "A" loop heat exchanger tube side discharge motor operated valve (E11-E068A). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

20) R24-S011-ES3-M61:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from essential motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the RHR "A" loop service water crosstie motor operated valve (E11-F073A). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

21) R24-S011-ES3-M65:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from essential motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the Core Spray "A" loop pump suction motor operated valve (E21-F001A). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

22) R24-S011-ES3-M67:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from essential motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the Core Spray "A" loop outboard isolation motor operated valve (E21-F004A). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

23) R24-S011-ES3-M69:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from essential motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the Core Spray "A" loop discharge inboard isolation motor operated valve (E21-F005A). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

Detailed description of the event(s)(Continued):

7.a (Continued):

24) R24-S011-ES3-M85:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the RHR "A" loop steam pressure reducing station shut-off motor operated valve (E11-F091A). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

25) R24-S011-ES3-M87:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the instrument air motor operated valve (P52-F877). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

26) R24-S011-ES3-M88:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the RHR "A" loop containment spray outboard motor operated valve (E11-F016A). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

27) R24-S011-ES3-M93:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the instrument air motor operated valve (P52-F876). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

28) R24-S011-ES3-M13:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the starter for a drywell area cooling unit (T47-B009A-1). Loss of this circuit would result in a loss of power to this unit and its associated cooling water supply valve (P41-F047A).

29) R24-S011-ES3-M15:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the starter for a drywell area cooling unit (T47-B009B-1). Loss of this circuit would result in a loss of power to this unit and its associated cooling water supply valve (P41-F047B).

Detailed description of the event(s)(Continued):

7.a (Continued):

30) R24-S011-ES3-M35:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from motor control circuit "1C" (R24-S011) to the "A" Standby Gas Treatment system exhaust fan (T46-C001A). Loss of this circuit would result in the "A" Standby Gas Treatment system filter train's being inoperable .

31) R24-S011-ES3-M36:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the starter for the "A" Standby Gas Treatment system filter heater (T46-D001A). Loss of this circuit would result in the heater's being inoperable.

32) R24-S011-ES3-M83:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the RHR "A" loop heat exchanger vent motor operated valve (E11-F104A). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

33) R24-S011-ES3-M91:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the RHR "A" loop heat exchanger vent motor operated valve (E11-F103A). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

34) R24-S011-ES3-M98:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the RCIC turbine exhaust vacuum breaker motor operated valve (E51-F104). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

35) R24-S011-ES3-M41:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the RHR "A" loop containment spray isolation motor operated valve (E11-F021A). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

Detailed description of the event(s)(Continued):

7.a (Continued):

36) R24-S011-ES3-M71:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the Core Spray "A" loop test bypass motor operated valve (E21-F015A). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

37) R24-S011-ES3-M73:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the Core Spray "A" loop pump minimum flow bypass motor operated valve (E21-F031A). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

38) R24-S011-ES3-M81:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the main steam line drain motor operated valve (B21-F016). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

39) R24-S011-ES3-M77:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the reactor water clean-up inboard isolation motor operated valve (G31-F001). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

40) R24-S011-ES3-M99:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the HPCI turbine exhaust vacuum breaker motor operated valve (E41-F104). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

41) R24-S011-ES3-M29:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to the RHR shutdown cooling isolation motor operated valve (E11-F009). Loss of this circuit would result in the valve's being electrically inoperable.

Detailed description of the event(s)(Continued):

7. (continued):

a.(continued):

42) R24-S011-ES3-M89:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from motor control center "1C" (R24-S011) to a Core Spray and RHR systems Jockey Pump (E21-C002A). Loss of this circuit would result in the pump's being inoperable.

43) R27-S010-ES3-M15:

This circuit provides 600 volt power from the R27-S010 (local starter) to a drywell cooling unit (T47-B009B-1). Loss of this circuit would result in the cooling unit's being inoperable.

- b. An engineering evaluation concluded that conduit ESS-I-493 would have been stressed beyond yield under postulated design basis earthquake loadings due to the conduit's not being supported sufficiently. The following circuits are routed through this conduit:

1) R25-S064-ES7-M44:

This circuit provides 120 VAC control power for a 250 VDC to 600 VAC inverter (R44-S002). The following equipment would be inoperable with the loss of this cable:

- a) A 250 VDC to 600 VAC inverter (R44-S002) and essential 600 volt motor control center "1E" (R24-S018A).
- b) The suction motor operated valve (B31-F023A) for the "A" reactor recirculation pump (B31-C001A).
- c) The discharge motor operated valve (B31-F031A) for the "A" reactor recirculation pump (B31-C001A).
- d) The inboard discharge motor operated valve (E11-F015A) for the "A" loop of the LPCI mode of the RHR system.
- e) The minimum flow bypass motor operated valve (E11-F007A) for RHR pumps "A & C" (E11-C002 A & C).

Detailed description of the event(s)(Continued):

7. (continued):

b. (continued):

2) R44-S002-ES7-C01:

This circuit provides control power indication and open-close indications for the input and output circuit breakers for a 250 VDC to 600 VAC inverter (R44-S002).

- c. An engineering evaluation concluded that conduit 2ESB174 would have been stressed beyond yield under postulated design basis earthquake loadings due to the conduit's not being supported sufficiently. The only circuit routed through this conduit is circuit RTE001D03.

This circuit controls the Unit 2 metering CT's for the 1B Diesel Generator. Loss of this circuit would result in the loss of a portion of Unit 2's metering (amps, kilowatts, kilovars) for the 1B Diesel Generator. Unit 1's Diesel Generator 1B metering would not be affected by the loss of this circuit.

- d. Cable tray REA8-02 was found to have an unattached tray cover lying upon the tray. This loose cover was neither designed nor required for cable tray REA8-02. An engineering evaluation determined that if the tray cover fell off the tray it would have the possibility of failing two adjacent control rod drive hydraulic control units. This failure could prevent two control rods from being inserted.
- e. Cable trays TLB8-01 and TLB8-02 were found to have unattached tray covers lying upon the trays. These loose covers were neither designed nor required for cable trays TLB8-01 and TLB8-02. An engineering evaluation determined that if a tray cover fell on the 1/4" copper tubing between the 1B diesel generation's air compressors and the receiver tanks, the tubing could fail. If the tray cover should break the valve connecting the copper tubing to the receiver tanks, the receiver tanks would bleed down to a pressure of 150 psig. in 59 seconds. This would prevent diesel generator 1B from starting.
- f. In the cable spreading room, a conduit support frame was found not supported enough to withstand a postulated design basis earthquake. This conduit support frame is the support for miscellaneous safety related circuits.

Detailed description of the event(s)(Continued):

7. (continued):

- g. It was noted during the cable tray walkdown inspection that the kaowool insulation in miscellaneous locations throughout Unit 1 was damaged and/or improperly installed.

Consequences of the event(s):

1. Plant operations were not affected by this event. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.
2. An orderly reactor shutdown was initiated per Tech. Specs. section 3.5.B.3. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.
3. This event had no effect on plant operation. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.
4. This event had no effect on plant operation. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.
5. This event had no effect on plant operation. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.
6. This event had no effect on plant operations. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.
7. Following is the consequences for each event under this item:
 - a. Plant operations were not affected by this event. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.
 - b. Plant operations were not affected by this event. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.
 - c. Plant operations were not affected by this event. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.
 - d. Plant operations were not affected by this event. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.
 - e. Plant operations were not affected by this event. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.
 - f. Plant operations were not affected by this event. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.
 - g. Plant operations were not affected by this event. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

1. N/A
2. The HPCI, RCIC, ADS, and CS systems were operable.
3. The HPCI, ADS, CS, and RHR systems were operable.
4. Each of the subject valves is backed-up by redundant valves whose circuitry is routed independently of the west cableway. These redundant valves were operable.
5. Each of the subject valves is backed-up by redundant valves whose circuitry is routed independently of the west cableway. These redundant valves were operable.
6. The status of the redundant cable trays is not a factor in this event because there was not an operability concern (see "Justification for continued operation").
7. Following is the breakdown for each event under this item:

a.

1. N/A
2. N/A
3. N/A
4. The normal feeder would be unaffected by this event.
5. The redundant Standby Liquid Control "B" pump (C41-C001B) and reactor explosive inlet valve (C41-F004B) would be unaffected by this event.
6. The redundant standby liquid control tank heater (C41-A001-A) would be unaffected by this event.
7. The redundant drywell cooling unit (T47-B007A-2) would be unaffected by this event.
8. The redundant drywell cooling unit (T47-B007B-2) would be unaffected by this event.
9. The redundant drywell cooling unit (T47-B008A-2) would be unaffected by this event.
10. The redundant drywell cooling unit (T47-B008B-2) would be unaffected by this event.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems (Continued):

7. (continued)

a. (continued)

11. The redundant Core Spray and RHR pump room cooling unit (T41-B002B) would be unaffected by this event.
12. The redundant RCIC pump room cooling unit (T41-B004B) would be unaffected by this event.
13. The redundant RHR "B" loop heat exchanger drain to suppression pool motor operated valve (E11-F011B) would be unaffected by this event.
14. The redundant RHR "B" loop heat exchanger shell side outlet motor operated valve (E11-F003B) would be unaffected by this event.
15. The redundant CRD pump room cooling unit (T41-B001B) would be unaffected by this event.
16. The redundant RHR "B" loop heat exchanger drain to RCIC motor operated valve (E11-F026B) would be unaffected by this event.
17. The redundant RHR "B" loop heat exchanger shell side inlet motor operated valve (E11-F047B) would be unaffected by this event.
18. The redundant RHR "B" loop heat exchanger shell side bypass motor operated valve (E11-F048B) would be unaffected by this event.
19. The redundant RHR "B" loop heat exchanger tube side discharge motor operated valve (E11-F068B) would be unaffected by this event.
20. The redundant RHR "B" loop service water crosstie motor operated valve (E11-F073B) would be unaffected by this event.
21. The redundant Core Spray "B" loop pump suction motor operated valve (E21-F001B) would be unaffected by this event.
22. The redundant Core Spray "B" loop outboard isolation motor operated valve (E11-F004B) would be unaffected by this event.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems (Continued):

7. (continued)

a. (continued)

23. The redundant Core Spray "B" loop discharge inboard isolation motor operated valve (E21-F005B) would be unaffected by this event.
24. The redundant RHR "B" loop steam pressure reducing station shut-off motor operated valve (E11-F091B) would be unaffected by this event.
25. The redundant instrument air motor operated valve (P52-F876) would be unaffected by this event.
26. The redundant RHR "B" loop containment spray outboard motor operated valve (E11-F016B) would be unaffected by this event.
27. The redundant instrument air motor operated valve (P52-F877) would be unaffected by this event.
28. The redundant drywell area cooling unit (T47-B009A-2) would be unaffected by this event.
29. The redundant drywell area cooling unit (T47-B009B-2) would be unaffected by this event.
30. The redundant "B" Standby Gas Treatment system exhaust fan (T46-C001B) would be unaffected by this event.
31. The redundant "B" Standby Gas Treatment system filter heater (T46-D001) would be unaffected by this event.
32. The redundant RHR "B" loop heat exchanger vent motor operated valve (E11-F104B) would be unaffected by this event.
33. The redundant RHR "B" loop heat exchanger vent motor operated valve (E11-F103B) would be unaffected by this event.
34. N/A
35. The redundant RHR "B" loop containment spray isolation motor operated valve (E11-F021B) would be unaffected by this event.

36. The redundant Core Spray "B" loop test bypass motor operated valve (E21-F015B) would be unaffected by this event.
37. The redundant Core Spray "B" loop pump minimum flow bypass motor operated valve (E21-F031B) would be unaffected by this event.
38. N/A
39. N/A
40. N/A
41. N/A
42. The redundant Core Spray and RHR systems Jockey Pump (E21-C002B) would be unaffected by this event.
43. The redundant drywell cooling unit (T47-B009B-2) would be unaffected by this event.

b.

- 1) N/A
- 2) N/A

c. N/A

d. N/A

e. N/A

f. N/A

g. N/A

Justification for continued operation:

1. After the initial inspection, engineering determined that no operational problem existed; however, the cable tray discrepancies that were found during the initial inspection were restored to acceptable limits using a generic model as a guideline for determining the acceptance criteria.
2. The damaged four inch aluminum channel was replaced and the conduit supports reconnected. The system was returned to operable status within 24 hours. Also, the HPCI, RCIC, ADS, and CS systems were operable.

Justification for continued operation (Continued):

3. Bechtel Power Corp. performed a study which showed that a failure of the subject cables will not jeopardize primary containment integrity, will not have adverse safety implications on RCIC operability, and will not prevent a desired suction transfer. Also, the HPCI, ADS, CS, and RHR systems were operable.
4. Bechtel Power Corp. provided an analysis which covered the effects of failures of the subject cables regardless of redundant equipment. The analysis concluded that no adverse safety implications resulted from the routing of the subject cables in the west cableway. Also, each of the subject valves is backed-up by redundant valves whose circuitry is routed independently of the west cableway.
5. Bechtel Power Corp. provided an analysis which covered the effects of failures of the subject cables regardless of redundant equipment. The analysis concluded that no adverse safety implications resulted from the routing of the subject cables in the west cableway. Also, each of the subject valves is backed-up by redundant valves whose circuitry is routed independently of the west cableway.
6. A fire watch was established immediately after the event was discovered.
7. The justifications for each of the events contained in this item are as follow:
 - a. The necessary repairs were made thus ensuring operability.
 - b. The ESS-I-493 conduit was supported sufficiently by adding additional supports.
 - c. The 2ESB174 conduit was supported sufficiently by adding additional supports.
 - d. The cable tray cover was removed from cable tray REA8-02.
 - e. The cable tray covers were removed from cable trays TLB8-01 and TLB8-02.
 - f. The conduit support frame was repaired so that it could withstand a postulated design basis earthquake.
 - g. A firewatch was established per Tech. Specs. section 3.13.6, ACTION a when the kaowool discrephancies were found in safety related areas. The kaowool was replaced as necessary.

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

1. This is a non-repetitive event.
2. This is a non-repetitive event.
3. This is a non-repetitive event.
4. This is a repetitive event. LER 50-321/1983-036, Rev. 1, Item 3, discusses other safety related cables found in the non-seismic west cableway.
5. This is a repetitive event. LER 50-321/1983-036, Rev. 1, Item 3, discusses other safety related cables found in the non-seismic west cableway.
6. This is a non-repetitive event.
7. Following is the breakdown for each event under this item:
 - a. This is a non-repetitive event.
 - b. This is a non-repetitive event.
 - c. This is a non-repetitive event.
 - d. This is a non-repetitive event.
 - e. This is a non-repetitive event.
 - f. This is a non-repetitive event.
 - g. This is a non-repetitive event.

Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

1. Unit 2 was affected by this event due to the "CABLE AND CABLEWAYS INSTALLATION" procedure (HNP-6921) being common to both units. An extensive inspection of the safety-related cable trays for Unit 2 is scheduled for the up-coming refueling outage (approximate start date 4/5/83).
2. This event had no impact on Unit 2 and no impact to other systems on Unit 1.
3. This event had no impact on Unit 2 and no impact to other systems on Unit 1.

Impact to other systems and/or Unit (continued):

4. This event had no impact on Unit 2 and no impact to other systems on Unit 1.
5. This event had no impact on Unit 1 and no impact to other systems on Unit 2.
6. This event did not affect any other Unit 1 or Unit 2 systems.
7. The impact caused by each of the events in this item is as follows:
 - a. This event had no impact on Unit 2 and no impact to other systems on Unit 1.
 - b. This event had no impact on Unit 2 and no impact to other systems on Unit 1.
 - c. This event had no impact on Unit 1 and no impact to other systems on Unit 2.
 - d. This event had no impact on Unit 2 and no impact to other systems on Unit 1.
 - e. This event affected both Units 1 and 2; however, it did not affect any other Unit 1 nor Unit 2 system.
 - f. Miscellaneous circuits were affected on both Units 1 and 2.
 - g. This event had no impact on Unit 2 and no impact to other systems on Unit 1.

Cause(s) of the event(s):

1. The cause of this event was due to the "CABLE AND CABLE WAYS INSTALLATION" procedure (HNP-6921) not clearly defining the responsibilities of the responsible personnel. Additionally the necessary design detail information for determining acceptance criteria was not on hand at the time of this event.
2. The cause of this event was due to a construction and/or installation error.
3. The cause of this event was a design error.
4. The cause of this event was a design error.
5. The cause of this event was a design error.
6. The cause of this event is due to construction and/or installation error.

Cause(s) of the event(s) (continued):

7. The cause of each of the events in this item are as follows:
 - a. The cause of this event was a design error.
 - b. The cause of this event was a design error.
 - c. The cause of this event was a design error.
 - d. The cause of this event was an installation error.
 - e. The cause of this event was an installation error.
 - f. The cause of this event was a design error.
 - g. The cause of this event was an installation error.

Immediate Corrective Action:

1. When it was recognized that lack of administrative control existed, electrical modifications and cable pulling were stopped and the "CABLE AND CABLE WAYS INSTALLATION" procedure (HNP-6921) was revised to require adequate supervision and quality control inspection when construction or maintenance work is performed on cables and cable ways. Inspection personnel (i.e., Quality Control, Engineers) were trained to recognize deficiencies related to proper installation and re-installation of cables and cable ways.
2. Upon discovery, the damaged four inch aluminum channel was replaced and the conduit support reconnected.
3. No immediate corrective action is required.
4. No immediate corrective action is required.
5. No immediate corrective action is required.
6. A fire watch was established as a precautionary measure and will continue until the cable tray fire barrier is installed.

Immediate Corrective Action (continued):

7. Following is the breakdown for each of the events in this item:

- a. The required cable tray supports were installed as necessary. The support's installation was completed approximately June 27, 1983.
- b. Additional supports were added for conduit ESS-I-493 to ensure operability in the event of a design basis earthquake. This repair was completed approximately April 15, 1983.
- c. Additional supports were added for conduit 2ESB174 to ensure operability in the event of a design basis earthquake. This repair was completed approximately April 15, 1983.
- d. The undesired tray cover was removed from cable tray REA8-02 immediately upon discovery approximately March 31, 1983.
- e. The undesired tray covers were removed from cable trays TLB8-01 and TLB8-02 immediately upon discovery approximately March 31, 1983.
- f. The conduit support frame was repaired by adding additional supports. These repairs were completed approximately April 15, 1983.
- g. The kaowool was correctly installed as necessary. The necessary installations of kaowool were completed approximately June 30, 1983.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

1. No supplemental corrective action was required.
2. No supplemental corrective action was required.
3. No supplemental corrective action was required.
4. No supplemental corrective action was required.
5. No supplemental corrective action was required.
6. No supplemental corrective action was required.

Supplemental Corrective Action (continued):

7. Following is the breakdown for each of the events in this item:

- a. No supplemental corrective action was required.
- b. No supplemental corrective action was required.
- c. No supplemental corrective action was required.
- d. No supplemental corrective action was required.
- e. No supplemental corrective action was required.
- f. No supplemental corrective action was required.
- g. No supplemental corrective action was required.

Scheduled (future) corrective action:

1. Future corrective action will include a revised quality assurance program checklist and an upgraded applicable quality assurance audit plant. Additionally, contractors will be provided with detailed directions with management acceptance criteria.
2. No further action is required.
3. Bechtel Power Corp. will provide a recommendation regarding the disposition of the subject cables.
4. Bechtel Power Corp. will provide a recommendation regarding the disposition of the subject cables.
5. Bechtel Power Corp. will provide a recommendation regarding the disposition of the subject cables.
6. A maintenance request has been generated which reflects this deficiency. The Kaowool fire barrier will be installed after the walkdown and engineering evaluation is complete, and during cable tray restoration.

Scheduled (future) corrective action (continued):

7. Following is the breakdown for each of the events in this item:

- a. No future corrective action is required.
- b. No future corrective action is required.
- c. No future corrective action is required.
- d. No future corrective action is required.
- e. No future corrective action is required.
- f. No future corrective action is required.
- g. No future corrective action is required.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

- 1. The "CABLE AND CABLE WAYS INSTALLATION" procedure (HNP-6921) has been revised to more clearly define the responsibilities of supervision, engineering and Quality Control inspection of all raceway installations, cable installations and raceway restoration. Maintenance, construction and Quality Control inspections require the completion of an appropriate procedure data package. Additionally, Quality Control personnel and supervision (foreman and above) of Engineering Maintenance and Retrofit are being trained to recognize deficiencies related to proper installation and re-installation of cables and cableways.
- 2. No further action will be required.
- 3. No further action will be required, other than the scheduled (future) action.
- 4. No further action will be required, other than the scheduled (future) action.
- 5. No further action will be required, other than the scheduled (future) action.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions)
(continued):

6. The "CABLE AND CABLE WAYS INSTALLATION" procedure (HNP-6921) has been revised to more clearly define the responsibilities of Supervision, Engineering, and Quality Control inspection of all raceway installation, cable installations and raceway restoration. Maintenance, construction, and Quality Control inspections require the completion of an appropriate procedure data package. Additionally, Quality Control personnel and supervision (foreman and above) of Engineering, Maintenance and Retrofit are being trained to recognize deficiencies related to proper re-installation of cables and cable ways.
7. Following is the breakdown for each of the events in this item:
 - a. N/A
 - b. N/A
 - c. N/A
 - d. N/A
 - e. N/A
 - f. N/A
 - g. N/A

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USNRC REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA



Georgia Power

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

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
July 28, 1983
GM-83-679


PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-321

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

ATTENTION: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-321/1983-036, Revision 4. This report is required by Hatch Unit One Technical Specifications Sections 6.9.1.9.b, 6.9.1.9.c and 6.9.1.8.i. and Hatch Unit Two Technical Specifications Section 6.9.1.9.c.


H. C. Nix
General Manager


HCN/GBT/djs

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