

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	N	J	S	G	S	2	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5		
7	8	LICENSEE CODE						14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE					30	57	CAT	56	

CON'T

REPORT SOURCE 01 16 05 00 03 11 17 06 17 83 80 70 68 30 75 07 06 83 90

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

On June 17, 1983, during routine shutdown operation, a test safety injection actuation was initiated for surveillance testing. No. 22 Charging Pump, which was supposed to be de-energized for the test, was inadvertently left in service. The pump compressed the pressurizer bubble and resulted in a pressure transient which caused the actuation of the Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System (POPS). The POPS functioned as designed and mitigated the transient; the plant was immediately returned to a stable shutdown condition. The event is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.2.

09		SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE						COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
		I	E	D	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z
LER RD REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO							
25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36						
8	3	0	2	9	9	L	0										
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	
37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54
G	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	0	0	0	0	Y	N	Z	Z	9	9	9	9

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Investigation revealed that the pump had been initially de-energized, in accordance
1 1 with the initial conditions of the surveillance procedure. The test was stopped due
1 2 to unrelated maintenance; the delay carried over to the next operating shift. In the
1 3 interim the pump was restarted for makeup to the RCS. Upon resuming the test, the
1 4 pump was left in operation. A precaution will be added to the procedure.

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

FACILITY STATUS (1) 5 (G) (28) % POWER (0) 0 (0) (29) OTHER STATUS (30) NA METHOD OF DISCOVERY (A) (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) Operator Observation

ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE (1) 6 (Z) (33) (Z) (34) NA AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) NA LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	(37)	2	(38)	NA	(39)

PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION	
1	H	0	0	0	40 NA

7 8 9 10 11 12

80

1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60	
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PUBLICITY										NRC USE ONLY									
ISSUED		DESCRIPTION																	
2	0	N	NA																

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER

R. Frahm

PHONE

(609) 935-6000 EXT 4309

017-920



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

July 28, 1983

Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Dr. Murley:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-029/99L

This letter is to correct errors in previously submitted
Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 83-029/99L. The corrected
report is attached.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J. M. Zupko, Jr.", is written above the typed name.

J. M. Zupko, Jr.
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RF:kl *247*

CC: Distribution

IE22
||

Report Number: 83-029/99L
Report Date: 07-06-83
Occurrence Date: 06-17-83
Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 2
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System - Inadvertent Actuation.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 83-112.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 5 - Rx Power 0 % - Unit Load 0 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At approximately 1700 hours, June 17, 1983, during routine shutdown operation, a test safety injection actuation was initiated in the performance of Surveillance Procedure SP(0)4.3.2.1a. No. 22 Charging Pump (centrifugal-type pump) which in accordance with the test should have been stopped, was inadvertently left in service. Valves 2SJ1,2,4,5,12 and 13 opened as designed and aligned the charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). A bubble existed in the pressurizer at the time; alignment of the pump to the RCS resulted in compression of the bubble and a pressure transient which caused actuation of the Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System (POPS) valves. The POPS functioned as designed and mitigated the pressure transient; maximum indicated RCS pressure was 376 PSIG. The plant was immediately returned to a stable shutdown condition.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Investigation of the incident revealed that the Initial Conditions section of Procedure SP(0)4.3.2.1a prohibited operation of the centrifugal charging pumps and safety injection pumps during the performance of the test. At the time the test was commenced, No. 23 Charging Pump (the reciprocating-type pump) was inoperable for maintenance, and the No. 22 Charging Pump was being utilized for makeup to the RCS. The centrifugal pump was de-energized to meet the initial condition requirement.

A delay in initiating the test occurred due to unrelated shutdown maintenance activities, and the pump was restarted to temporarily restore makeup to the RCS. The delay continued into the next operating shift; the requirement for the pump to be de-energized was overlooked later, when the test was resumed. A review of the test procedure showed that no precautionary note or step existed immediately prior to the one in which the safety injection actuation was initiated.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The operability of two POPS valves or an RCS vent opening of greater than 3.14 square inches ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure transients which could exceed the limits of Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 50, when one or more of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to 312°F. Either POPS has adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurization when the transient is limited to either the start of an idle reactor coolant pump with the secondary water temperature less than or equal to 50°F above the RCS cold leg temperatures, or the start of a safety injection pump and its injection of water into a water solid RCS.

As noted, the POPS functioned as designed, and the event involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public. Technical Specification 3.4.10.3 requires that in the event either the POPS or RCS vent are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days.


CORRECTIVE ACTION:

As stated, the plant was immediately returned to a stable condition. Recognizing that various delays and problems may be encountered during shutdown operation which may alter the desired plant initial conditions, a note will be added to the procedure immediately prior to the step initiating the safety injection actuation and cautioning personnel to verify none of the centrifugal pumps are in operation.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable

Prepared By R. Frahm



General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 83-089