

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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7	8	LICENSEE CODE						14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE					30	4			57	CAT	58	5

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0	1
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REPORT SOURCE

L	6	0	5	0	0	0	3	2	1	7	0	6	2	9	8	3	8	0	7	2	1	8	3	9
60	61									68	69						74	75						80
DOCKET NUMBER											EVENT DATE						REPORT DATE							

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During performance of the "ECCS STATUS CHECK" procedure, it was noted

0 3 that the indication lights for 1E51-F004 and 1E51-F025 were not lit.

0 4 During performance of the "RCIC STREAM LINE DELTA P INSTRUMENT FT&C"

0 5 procedure, the RCIC trip and throttle valve would not trip automatically

0 6 or manually. These events are contrary to Tech. Specs. section

0 7 3.5.E.1.A.(2). The health and safety of the public were not affected

0 8 by this repetitive event as last reported on LER 50-321/1983-056.

SYSTEM CODE C E		CAUSE CODE E	CAUSE SUBCODE B	COMPONENT CODE V A L V E X				COMP. SUBCODE E	VALVE SUBCODE P		
9 10		11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18		
EVENT YEAR 8 3		—	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 6 6		—	OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3		REPORT TYPE L	—	REVISION NO. 0	
21 22		23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	
ACTION TAKEN B	FUTURE ACTION X	EFFECT ON PLANT Z	SHUTDOWN METHOD Z		HOURS 0 0 0 0		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER F 1 2 7
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44 45 46 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)	
1	0
These events were caused by steam leaks and loose bolts on the half	
1	1
coupling on the trip and throttle valve stem to valve operator (see	
1	2
narrative for details). Repairs were performed as detailed in the	
1	3
narrative. RCIC was then satisfactorily functionally tested and	
2	4
returned to service on 06/30.	

FACILITY STATUS
[1][5] [E] (28) [1][0][0] (29) NA (30)
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44

METHOD OF DISCOVERY
[B] (31) Routine Surveillance (32)
45 46 80

% POWER
[1][0][0] (29) NA (30)

OTHER STATUS
(30)

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE
[1][6] [Z] (33) [Z] (34) NA (35)
7 8 9 10 11 44

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY
(35)

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
NA
45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)
[1][7] [0][0][0] (37) [Z] (38) NA (39)
1 8 9 11 12 13 80

PERSONNEL INJURIES
NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)
[1][8] [0][0][0] (40) NA (41)
7 8 9 11 12 80

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY
TYPE DESCRIPTION (43)
[1][9] [Z] (42) NA (43)
7 8 9 10 80

PUBLICITY
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)
[2][0] [N] (44) NA (45)
7 8 9 10 80

NRC USE ONLY
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []
68 69 80

8308030041 830721
PDR ADOCK 05000321
S PDR

NAME OF PREPARER S. B. Tipps

PHONE: (912) 367-7851

Narrative Report for LER 50-321/1983-066
Page Three

Immediate Corrective Action:

1. The valve stem packing was replaced on 1E51-F025, the position indicator micro switch for 1E51-F025 was replaced, and new fuses were installed in the position indicator light circuits. This was completed on 06/29/83.
2. The valve stem to valve operator half coupling bolts were torqued, and the trip assembly's sliding nut was lubricated. RCIC was satisfactorily functionally tested and returned to service on 06/30/83.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

1. No supplemental corrective action was required.
2. No supplemental corrective action was required.

Scheduled (future) corrective action:

1. No future corrective action is required.
2. A vendor's representative participated in the repair of the turbine trip and throttle valve. He will be supplying written recommendations for repair, adjustment, and preventive maintenance of the valve. These recommendations will be incorporated into the RCIC turbine preventive maintenance program.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

1. N/A
2. N/A

Georgia Power Company
Post Office Box 439
Baxley, Georgia 31513
Telephone 912 367-7781
912 537-9444

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

USNRC REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA
83 JUL 29 49:00
Georgia Power


GM-83-654
July 21, 1983

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-321

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

ATTENTION: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-321/1983-66. This report is required by Hatch Unit 1 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.1.9.b.


H. C. Nix
General Manager

SLC
HCN/SBT/djs

xc: R. J. Kelly
G. F. Head
J. T. Beckham, Jr.
P. D. Rice
K. M. Gillespie
S. B. Tipps
R. D. Baker
Control Room
Document Control

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NARRATIVE REPORT
FOR LER 50-321/1983-066

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-321

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report.

1. This 30 day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.b, because this event showed that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.5.E.1.a.(2).
2. This 30 day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.b, because this event showed that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.5.E.1.a.(2).

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

1. The plant was operating in steady state at 2432 MWT (approximately 100% power).
2. The plant was operating in steady state at 2422 MWT (approximately 100% power).

Detailed description of the event(s):

1. On 06/29/83, while performing the "ECCS STATUS CHECK" procedure (HNP-1-1119), plant personnel noted that the position indicator lights for valves 1E51-F004 (condensate pump discharge isolation valve) and 1E51-F025 (RCIC steam line drain isolation valve) were not illuminated. Thus, these valves were considered to be inoperable. (Refer to Deviation Report number 1-83-149)
2. Later on 06/29/83, while performing the "RCIC STEAM LINE DELTA P INSTRUMENT FT&C" procedure (HNP-1-3410) and with RCIC already inoperable per an LCO, surveillance technicians noted that the RCIC trip and throttle valve would not auto trip. Also, plant personnel could not trip the trip and throttle valve manually after efforts to trip it automatically had been unsuccessful. (Refer to Deviation Report number 1-83-153)

Consequences of the event(s):

1. When the valves became inoperable, RCIC was declared inoperable, and plant operation continued under a 7 day LCO as permitted by Tech. Specs. section 3.5.E.2. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.
2. Plant operation continued under a 7 day LCO which was previously initiated as a result of the first event. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

1. The HPCI system was demonstrated operable and then remained operable during this event as required by Tech. Specs. section 4.5.E.2 and 3.5.E.2.
2. The HPCI system remained operable during this event as required by Tech. Specs. section 3.5.E.2.

Justification for continued operation:

1. Plant operation continued under a 7 day LCO as permitted by Tech. Specs. section 3.5.E.2.
2. Plant operation continued under a 7 day LCO as permitted by Tech. Specs. section 3.5.E.2.

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

1. This is a non-repetitive event.
2. This is a repetitive event as last reported on LER number 50-321/1983-056.

Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

1. This event had no impact upon other systems in Unit 1, nor did it impact Unit 2.
2. This event had no impact upon other systems in Unit 1, nor did it impact Unit 2.

Cause(s) of the event(s):

1. An investigation revealed that the position indicator lights for valves 1E51-F004 and 1E51-F025 would not illuminate because of blown electrical circuit fuses. The fuses blew when steam escaping from valve 1E51-F025 shorted the position indicating micro switch circuitry, which is mounted on valve 1E51-F025.
2. An investigation revealed that the half-coupling bolts which secure the valve stem to the operator shaft were loose. This allowed excessive play which caused the valve shaft to bind. Also, steam leaks had dried the lubrication around the trip assembly's sliding nut which caused it to bind. This combination of loose bolts on the half coupling and the binding of the sliding nut caused a trip failure.