

Washington Public Power Supply System

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Docket No. 50-397

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
Mr. J. B. Martin
Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, California 94596

Subject: 10CFR50.55(e) CONDITIONS: #221, NAMCO EA180 AND EA740
LIMIT SWITCHES; AND #251, LIMITORQUE MOTOR OPERATORS WITH
MOTORS FROM BALDOR ELECTRIC COMPANY

Reference: 1) Telecon QA2-83-003, dated January 4, 1983, L.C. Floyd to
J. Elin.
2) Telecon QA2-83-059, dated April 22, 1983, L.C. Floyd to
R. Dodds.

In accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e), your office was informed by telephone, of the above subject conditions. Attachment I provides the Project's final report on non-reportable Condition #221. Attachment II provides our interim report on Condition #251. We will continue to provide your office with quarterly updates on Condition #251 until resolved. The next report will be provided by October 21, 1983.

If you have any questions, contact Roger Johnson, WNP-2 Project QA Manager, at (509) 377-2501, extension 2712.



C. S. Carlisle
Program Director, WNP-2

LCF/kd

Attachments: (2) As stated

cc: W.S. Chin, BPA
N.D. Lewis, EFSEC
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Document Control Desk, NRC

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Attachment I

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2
DOCKET NO. 50-397
LICENSE NO. CPPR-93
10CFR50.55(e) CONDITION #221
NAMCO EA180 AND EA740 LIMIT SWITCHES

Final Report

Description of Deficiency

The Project was informed via a 10CFR50.55(e)/Part 21 report to the NRC Region II by the Bechtel Power Corporation (involved with the construction of the Grand Gulf Nuclear Unit) that NAMCO EA740 limit switches which did not have specific manufacturing codes may be produced containing materials not traceable to the Equipment Environment Qualification Report.

Safety Implications

The Project's initial review identified two limit switches (SGT-POS-V/2A and SGT-POS-V/2B) used to indicate the position (open/closed) of safety-related valves in the standby gas treatment system, to which the Part 21 was applicable. Failure of the limit switches would result in erroneous position indication, and would consequently be a violation of Regulatory Guide 1.4.7, Bypass and Inoperable Status Indication.

Corrective Action

The Equipment Qualification Group, through direct contact with NAMCO Controls, has acquired documentation which establishes what materials were used in the identified NAMCO switches of concern. An engineering comparative evaluation was performed which documents the similarity between older NAMCO EA180 and EA740 switches and the prototype which was tested and qualified. This has established the applicability of the acceptable qualification testing to the switches of concern, therefore, the switches have been determined to be qualified.

The conclusion is that the Part 21 report on EA740 NAMCO limit switches is not applicable to WNP-2 and therefore, the condition is not reportable under the criteria for a 10CFR50.55(e) report.

Cause for the Deficiency

The Part 21 was filed in the belief the materials used in certain limit switches could not be documented applicable to the qualification report.

Action to Prevent Recurrence

The vendor has primary responsibility for assuring that components supplied correlate with the qualification records submitted to substantiate their suitability for the service designated.

The Supply System Equipment Qualification Program represents a complete review of safety-related equipment relative to environmental and seismic qualification. This program assures that components are qualified for their design service conditions and will preclude unqualified components in completed plant installations, unless justified by specific evaluation, such as the J10.

Attachment II

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2
POCKET NO. 50-397
LICENSE NO. CPPR-93
10CFR50.55(e) CONDITION #251
LIMITORQUE MOTOR OPERATORS WITH
MOTORS FROM BALDOR ELECTRIC COMPANY

Interim Report

Description of Deficiency

Motor operated valves were received from the manufacturer with unqualified motors by Baldor Electric Company. Condition was discovered after valves were installed during equipment qualification group walkdown to obtain nameplate data on March 24, 1983. The valves involved are SW-MO-187A, -187B, -188A, and -188B.

Safety Significance

Valves SW-MO-187A and B and SW-MO-188A and B are Service Water System (SW) isolation valves at the interface with the Reactor Closed Cooling Water System (RCC) to provide an alternate cooling water source for the fuel pool cooling heat exchangers FPC-HX-1A and 1B. The valves will allow utilization of the Seismic Class I service water system for FPC cooling in the event of an earthquake. Operation of the valves is not required for normal plant operations, but only under emergency conditions. The unqualified motors would have the potential for jeopardizing corrective action to meet emergency conditions and the deficiency is, therefore, considered reportable.

Cause for the Deficiency

Error on the part of the manufacturer in that Limitorque supplied motor operators to WNP-2 with motors that were not qualified to IEEE 382 - 1972.

Corrective Action

The manufacturer, Limitorque, has been made aware that the motors were improperly supplied and is to replace the existing motors with units qualified to IEEE-382-1972 meeting requirements of NUREG-0588 Category II. Startup Deficiency Reports (SDR) #8308, 8309, 8310, and 8312 have been issued to identify the deficient condition. The physical replacement of the motor operators has been deferred until the first refueling outage. This decision is based on the 4 service water valves identified are part of the fuel pool cooling modification, which has been deferred.

Action to Prevent Recurrence

The vendor has primary responsibility for assuring that components supplied correlate with the qualification records submitted to substantiate their suitability for the service designated.

The Supply System Equipment Qualification Program represents a complete review of safety-related equipment relative to environmental and seismic qualification. This program assures that components are qualified for their design service conditions and will preclude unqualified components in completed plant installations, unless justified by specific evaluation, such as the J10.