

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

UPDATED REPORT - PREVIOUS REPORT DATED 09-04/82

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 V A S P S 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5

CONT 01 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0 7 0 8 2 6 8 2 8 0 7 1 9 8 3 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

02 With Unit 1 at 98%, the signal from the loop A steam line pressure transmitter
03 (PT-1-474) failed high. This is contrary to T.S. Table 3.7.2 and is a degraded
04 mode of operation permitted by T.S.3.7.A and is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2).
05 Header pressure greater than line pressures on 2/3 channels will initiate a S.I.
06 signal. The redundant steam line pressure channels remained operable and the
07 affected channel's bistable was placed in trip mode. Therefore, the health and
08 safety of the public were not affected.

09 SYSTEM CODE I B 11 CAUSE CODE E 12 CAUSE SUBCODE X 13 COMPONENT CODE I N S T R U 14 COMP. SUBCODE T 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 2 21 EVENT YEAR 0 8 8 24 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 3 28 OCCURRENCE CODE X 30 REPORT TYPE 1 32 REVISION NO.
18 ACTION TAKEN X 33 FUTURE ACTION X 34 EFFECT ON PLANT Z 35 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 36 HOURS 0 0 0 0 37 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 40 NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N 42 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER L 43 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER R 3 6 9 44

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

10 The exact cause of the failure has not been determined. It is suspected that the
11 crimped wire connection of the transmitter lead to field wire contributed to the
12 failure. A thorough examination of the instrument loop was performed and no
13 evidence of the cause of failure could be discovered. D.C. 81-104 has added solder
14 to the crimped connection.

15 FACILITY STATUS E 28 % POWER 0 9 8 29 OTHER STATUS N/A 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY A 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Operator Observation 32
16 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 33 Z 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY N/A 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE N/A 36
17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 37 TYPE Z 38 DESCRIPTION N/A 39
18 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 40 DESCRIPTION N/A 41
19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION N/A 43

20 PUBLICITY ISSUED N 44 DESCRIPTION N/A 45

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 PDR ADOCK 05000280
 S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARED J. L. Wilson

PHONE: (804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT 1

SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO: 50-280

REPORT NO: 82-088/03X-1

EVENT DATE: 08-26-82

TITLE OF THE EVENT: PT-1-474 FAILED HIGH

1. Description of the Event

With unit 1 at 98% power, the signal from the Loop A steam line pressure transmitter (PT-1-474) failed high. This is contrary to Technical Specification Table 3.7.2 and is a degraded mode of operation permitted by T.S.3.7.A. This is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment

The steam lines and header are provided with three pressure channels each. Steam header pressure greater than any steam line pressure by 120 psi on 2/3 channels will initiate a safety injection in order to mitigate the effects of a steam line break. The other two channels associated with the steam line remained operable and the failed channel's bistable was placed in the trip mode. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. Cause

The exact cause of the failure has not been determined. However, it is suspected that the crimped wire connection of the solid wire transmitter lead to stranded field wire contributed to the failure.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

The bistable for the affected channel was placed in the trip mode.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action

An unsuccessful attempt was made to determine the cause of the failure with the transmitter remaining in the loop. The transmitter was then removed from the loop, bench tested satisfactorily, and reinstalled in the loop with no recurrence of any problem. Also, the bistable for the affected channel was returned to its normal operating position.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

A thorough examination of the instrument loop was performed and no evidence of the cause of failure was discovered. Design Change 81-104 has revised the crimped solid to stranded wire connection by adding solder to the connection which will make it less susceptible to failure.

7. Generic Implications

None.

Vepco

USNRC REGIONAL
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
Surry Power Station
P. O. Box 315
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#8:29

JUL 19 1983

Serial No: 83-052

Docket No: 50-280

License No: DPR-32

Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Regional Administrator
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Surry Unit 1.

Report Number

82-088/03X-1

Applicable Technical Specification

T. S. 6.6.2.b(2)

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by Safety Evaluation and Control.

Very truly yours,

J. L. Wilson

J. L. Wilson
Station Manager

Enclosure

cc: Document Control Desk, USNRC
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Washington, D. C. 20555

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