

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

public were not affected by this non-repetitive event.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

manually approximately 30 minutes after securing SBTG from service.

NAME OF PREPARER

PHONE:

(912) 367-7851

NARRATIVE REPORT
FOR LER 50-366/1983-048

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-366

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

This 30 day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.b. due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.9.5.3.

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

On June 25, 1983, the plant was in refuel.

Detailed description of the event(s):

The "A" train of the standby gas treatment system (SBGT) failed to start on a test initiation signal (i.e., the initiation signal was generated by test being performed in the plant).

Consequences of the event(s):

This event had no effect on plant operation. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

Both Unit 1 SBGT trains were operable, and the "B" train of SBGT for Unit 2 was operable.

Justification for continued operation:

The heaters were reset upon discovery, and the "A" train then started as required.

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

This is a non-repetitive event.

Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

The same event could affect the redundant SBGT system and the SBGT systems of Unit 1.

Cause(s) of the event(s):

The cause of this event was attributed to the overtemperature cutoff trip switches being designed without an automatic reset to reset the SBTG system heaters. The overtemperature cutoff trip switches are installed approximately one foot away from the SBTG system heaters on Unit 2. After the "A" train SBTG system was secured from service, latent heat buildup caused the overtemperature cutoff trip switches to trip the SBTG system heaters. Since there is no automatic reset, this trip caused the "A" train SBTG system heater to be inoperable, which in turn disables the train from operating. Thus, the system would not perform its intended function when needed.

Immediate Corrective Action:

The "A" train of SBTG heaters were reset and the "A" SBTG train was observed to start upon the initiation signal which was still present.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

A standing order will be issued for personnel on Unit 2 to check and reset heaters when found tripped (approximately 30 minutes after securing a SBTG train from service), until a Design Change Request can be implemented on Unit 1 and Unit 2 to add automatic reset capability to the SBTG system heaters.

Scheduled (future) corrective action:

A study is being made to determine the feasibility of relocating the overtemperature sensors.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

N/A

Georgia Power Company
Post Office Box 439
Baxley, Georgia 31513
Telephone 912 367-7781
912 537-9444

USNRC REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA



Georgia Power

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

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
GM-33-675
July 21, 1983

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-366

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

ATTENTION: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-366/1983-048. This report is required by Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.1.9.c.


H. C. Nix
General Manager

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HCN/SBT/djs

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