NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1	LICENSEE CODE: G A E I H 2 (2)	LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3)	LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4)	CAT: (5)

CON'T 0 1	REPORT SOURCE: L (6)	DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6 (7)	EVENT DATE: 0 6 2 5 8 3 (8)	REPORT DATE: 0 7 2 1 8 3 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 On June 25, 1983, the "A" train of standby gas treatment (SBGT) failed
0 3 to start on a test initiation signal. The plant was unable to meet the
0 4 requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.9.5.3. When "A" train of SBGT
0 5 failed to start, personnel discovered that the heater circuitry was
0 6 tripped. The heater circuitry was reset manually and then the "A" train
0 7 of SBGT started on the initiation signal. The health and safety of the
0 8 public were not affected by this non-repetitive event.

0 9	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
	S C (11)	B (12)	A (13)	Z Z Z Z Z Z (14)	Z (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	8 3	—	0 4 8	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
X (18)	F (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	Z (25)	Z 9 9 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause of this event was attributed to overtemperature cutoff trip
1 1 switches being designed without an automatic reset to reset SBGT system
1 2 heaters. The design will be corrected with a design change request;
1 3 however, until this can be implemented personnel will reset the heaters
1 4 manually approximately 30 minutes after securing SBGT from service.

1 5	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
	H (28)	0 0 0 (29)	NA	A (31)	Operator Observation

1 6	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

1 7	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1 8	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
	0 0 0 (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

1 9	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
	Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

2 0	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)
	N (44)	NA

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PDR ADOCK 05000366
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER S. B. Tipps PHONE: (912)367-7851

GPO 917-926

NARRATIVE REPORT
FOR LER 50-366/1983-048

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-366

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

This 30 day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.b. due to the event's showing that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.9.5.3.

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

On June 25, 1983, the plant was in refuel.

Detailed description of the event(s):

The "A" train of the standby gas treatment system (SBGT) failed to start on a test initiation signal (i.e., the initiation signal was generated by test being performed in the plant).

Consequences of the event(s):

This event had no effect on plant operation. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

Both Unit 1 SBGT trains were operable, and the "B" train of SBGT for Unit 2 was operable.

Justification for continued operation:

The heaters were reset upon discovery, and the "A" train then started as required.

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

This is a non-repetitive event.

Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

The same event could affect the reduntant SBGT system and the SBGT systems of Unit 1.

Cause(s) of the event(s):

The cause of this event was attributed to the overtemperature cutoff trip switches being designed without an automatic reset to reset the SBGT system heaters. The overtemperature cutoff trip switches are installed approximately one foot away from the SBGT system heaters on Unit 2. After the "A" train SBGT system was secured from service, latent heat buildup caused the overtemperature cutoff trip switches to trip the SBGT system heaters. Since there is no automatic reset, this trip caused the "A" train SBGT system heater to be inoperable, which in turn disables the train from operating. Thus, the system would not perform its intended function when needed.

Immediate Corrective Action:

The "A" train of SBGT heaters were reset and the "A" SBGT train was observed to start upon the initiation signal which was still present.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

A standing order will be issued for personnel on Unit 2 to check and reset heaters when found tripped (approximately 30 minutes after securing a SBGT train from service), until a Design Change Request can be implemented on Unit 1 and Unit 2 to add automatic reset capability to the SBGT system heaters.

Scheduled (future) corrective action:

A study is being made to determine the feasibility of relocating the overtemperature sensors.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

N/A

Georgia Power Company
Post Office Box 439
Baxley, Georgia 31513
Telephone 912 367-7781
912 537-9444

Georgia Power

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

GM-83-675
July 21, 1983

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-366

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

ATTENTION: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-366/1983-048. This report is required by Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.1.9.c.

H. C. Nix
General Manager

SEE
HCN/SBT/djs

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