

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'T

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)7 87 87 e

PHONE: (803) 383-4524

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
FOR
LICENSE EVENT REPORT 83-014

I. Cause Description and Analysis

On July 4, 1983, at 1125 hours, with the unit at 80% power, a service water leak was discovered on Containment Fan Cooler HVH-2. The service water to and from the fan cooler was immediately isolated, and HVH-2 was declared inoperable at 1136 hours. Further investigation revealed that the leak was confined to one of the six tube bundles in the fan cooler. The failure is attributed to corrosion/erosion of the cooler tubing.

This event is considered a degradation of a containment boundary pursuant to IE Bulletin 80-24 and is reported in accordance with Plant Technical Specification 6.9.2.a.3. The redundant fan coolers were operable, and there was no activity released as a result of this event. Thus, there was no threat to the public health and safety.

II. Corrective Action

As stated above, service water to and from HVH-2 was immediately isolated thereby reestablishing containment integrity. Also, in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.2.2.a, operability testing of the Containment Spray pumps was completed at 1251 hours on July 4, 1983.

Following unsuccessful attempts to repair the defective tube bundle, a decision to isolate only the defective tube bundle was made. A previous analysis performed by the fan cooler vendor indicated that the total containment heat removal capability with one of six tube bundles isolated in one of four Containment Fan Coolers exceeded the value assumed in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Operation in this configuration is, therefore, deemed acceptable.

Subsequently, the defective tube bundle was isolated by installing blank flanges on the inlet and discharge service water headers. HVH-2 was then tested and declared operable at 1042 hours on July 5, 1983.

On July 8, 1983, at 0930 hours, HVH-2 was again removed from service, and the defective tube bundle was repaired using a ceramic sealant material. This repair effort was successful due to the tube bundle being thoroughly dry. The blank flanges were removed on HVH-2, with all six tube bundles in service, and was declared operable at 1211 hours on July 8, 1983.

III. Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence

As stated in LER 83-003, a complete review of the Service Water System has been initiated. Also, following the occurrence of this event, an investigation into the availability of a more corrosion resistant cooler tubing material was initiated. Any further corrective actions with respect to the Containment Fan Coolers resulting from the above efforts will be submitted as a supplement to this report.



Carolina Power & Light Company

H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT
Post Office Box 790
Hartsville, South Carolina 29550

JUL 18 1983

Robinson File No: 13510C

Serial: RSEP/83-939


Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO. 50-261
LICENSE NO. DPR-23
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 83-014

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In accordance with Section 6.9.2 of the Technical Specifications for the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirements for a written report within fourteen (14) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-0161, July, 1977.

Very truly yours,


R. B. Starkey, Jr.
General Manager
H. B. Robinson SEG Plant

HTC/th

Enclosure

cc: R. C. DeYoung (40)
R. A. Hartfield (3)

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