

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 ALBRF1 000-000000-000 41111 05
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CONT

01 REPORT SOURCE 1050000259 061383 071283 09
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 While performing S.I. 4.7.B-2 (Standby Gas Treatment System Humidity Control
03 Capacity Test), Train "B" was found inoperable due to heaters being unavailable
04 in automatic. (T.S. 3.7.B.3) Trains "A" and "C" were determined to be operable.
05 The SBT system is common to all three units. There was no effect on public
06 health and safety in that no event occurred which required the SBT system.
07 T.S. 3.7.B.3 permits operation for 7 days with one train inoperable. Train "B"
08 was inoperable for 22 hours.

09 SYSTEM CODE SC CAUSE CODE D CAUSE SUBCODE Z COMPONENT CODE Z Z Z Z Z Z Z COMP SUBCODE Z VALVE SUBCODE Z
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 83 EVENT YEAR 034 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 03 OCCURRENCE CODE 03 REPORT TYPE L REVISION NO. 0
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

ACTION TAKEN E G EFFECT ON PLANT Z SHUTDOWN METHOD Z HOURS 0000 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y NPD-4 FORM SUB. N PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER Z COMPONENT MANUFACTURER Z 9 9 9
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 Incorrect damper adjustment resulted in flow switches not being actuated.
11 Supplementary flow measurements were taken, the damper readjusted and associated
12 flow instrumentation repaired and calibrated. For recurrence control see
13 LER 259/83035.

14

15 FACILITY STATUS H % POWER 000 OTHER STATUS NA METHOD OF DISCOVERY B DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Surveillance tests
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

16 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE Z AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA LOCATION OF RELEASE NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 000 TYPE Z DESCRIPTION NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

18 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 000 DESCRIPTION NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z DESCRIPTION NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

20 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION N
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

NAME OF PREPARER Howard W. Vail, III

PHONE (205) 729-0891

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 259 / 83034 Technical Specification Involved 3.7.B.3

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(2) * Date Due NRC 7/13/83

Event Narrative:

Unit 1 was in the refuel mode, unit 2 was operating normally at 90-percent power, and unit 3 was operating normally at 99-percent power. SI 4.7.B-2 (Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System Humidity Control Capacity Test) was being performed. SBGT Train A was successfully tested. During the Train B test the 40KW relative humidity control heater failed to operate. Damper 0-65-503 was adjusted to improve flow switch operation so the heater would operate. However, this resulted in excessive flow indicated in the control room. Flow was readjusted per control room instruments. Since surveillance requirement 4.7.B.1.b could not be met the "B" SBGT Train was declared inoperable. Per Technical Specification (T.S.) 3.7.B.3 units 1, 2, and 3 entered a seven day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO). Trains A and C operability time limitation of 2 hours to demonstrate operability of "A" and "C" trains was exceeded and an IP-2 (Notification of Unusual Event) was initiated. IP-2 was initiated because units 2 and 3 had entered a 6-hour LCO (T.S. 1.C.1) to achieve hot standby. Five minutes after IP-2 was initiated, Trains A and C operability tests were completed and the IP-2 was cancelled. Subsequent investigation of Train B revealed that misadjustment of dampers prevented flow switch operation and consequently caused heater inoperability. See LER 259/83035 for recurrence control for this problem. Train B was readjusted using supplementary flow measurement devices and control room flow indication instruments were repaired and calibrated. Train B was returned to service at 1930 hours on June 14, 1983.

* Previous Similar Events:

BFRO-50-259/83018, 83029, 83035 are related events.

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: JRP

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
USNRG - GEORGIA
ATL CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
1750 Chestnut Street Tower II

83 JUL 15 P 1: 53

July 12, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET
NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
REPORT BFRO-50-259/83034

The enclosed report provides details concerning an inoperable standby gas
treatment train because of humidity heaters being unavailable in automatic
mode. This report is submitted in accordance with Browns Ferry unit 1
Technical Specification 6.7.2.b(2).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

H. J. Green
H. J. Green
Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, Browns Ferry

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