

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT**

CONTROL BLOCK: | 

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

The diagram illustrates the layout of a license plate with four main sections separated by vertical bars. The first section contains two boxes labeled '0' and '1' below them, with positions 7 and 8 indicated underneath. The second section contains the letters 'I', 'L', 'Q', and 'A' above the bars, with the label 'LICENSEE CODE' centered below it and position 9 indicated to its left. The third section contains the digits '2', '0', '0', '0', followed by a hyphen, then '0', '0', '0', another hyphen, and finally '0', '0', '0'. Below this sequence are the labels 'LICENSE NUMBER' and the position number 14 to the left. The fourth section contains the digit '3' above the first bar, followed by the digit '4' above the next bar, then five bars each containing a single '1', and finally a box labeled '4' above the last bar. Below this sequence are the labels 'LICENSE TYPE' and the position number 26 to the left. To the right of the license type section is the 'CAT' field, which consists of three bars, each containing a single '1', followed by a box labeled '5' above the final bar. Below this sequence are the labels '57 CAT 58'.

CON'T

REPORT SOURCE 0 1 7 8

DOCKET NUMBER 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

EVENT DATE 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 4 7 0 6 2 1 8 3 8 0 7 0 7 8 3 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | At 1330 hours, on June 21, 1983, while investigating a position indication problem  
0 3 | on the RHR return to Torus valve MO-1-1001-34B, the Maintenance Department observed  
0 4 | that the valve yoke had pulled away from the valve bonnet and the valve stem was  
0 5 | bent. The 'B' loop of RHR Containment Cooling was declared inoperable until the  
0 6 | valve was manually opened at 1435 hours the same day. The necessary surveillances  
0 7 | were performed to satisfy the requirements of Technical Specification 3.5.B.3. All  
0 8 | of the low pressure ECCS systems were fully operable; therefore, the safety  
0 9 | implications of this event were minimal.

SYSTEM CODE C F 11		CAUSE CODE E 12		CAUSE SUBCODE B 13		COMP. SUBCODE E 15		VALVE SUBCODE D 16	
EVENT YEAR 8 3		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 2 5		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3		REPORT TYPE L		REVISION NO. 0	
ACTION TAKEN B 18		FUTURE ACTION A 19		EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21		HOURS 0 0 0 0	
ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N 24		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N 25		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER C 6 6 5			

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | Investigations revealed that two of the four bolts which hold the valve yoke to the

1 1 | bonnet had vibrated loose. This permitted the yoke to separate from the bonnet

1 2 | causing the valve stem to excessively bind and bend slightly. The bent stem was

1 3 | straightened and locking tabs were installed on the yoke to bonnet bolting. The

1 4 | stem will be replaced during the next outage of sufficient duration.

8 9  
FACILITY STATUS (28) 0 9 3 (29) NA (30)  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44  
METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) A Routine Maintenance Activity (32)  
45 46 80  
ACTIVITY CONTENT  
RELEASED OF RELEASE (33) Z (34) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) NA  
7 8 9 10 11 44  
LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) NA  
45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	(37)	Z	(38)	NA	(39)

PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION	
1	8	0	0	0	NA

1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12	
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1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12	
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1		2		3		4		5															

8 9 10  
PUBLICITY  
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)  
2 0 N (44)  
7 8 9 10  
8307220234 830707  
PDR ADOCK 05000254  
S PDR  
NRC USE ONLY  
68 69 70

NAME OF PREPARER

G Carney

PHONE: 309-654-2241, ext 175

- I. LER NUMBER: LER/RO 83-25/03L-0
- II. LICENSEE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Company  
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
- III. FACILITY NAME: Unit One
- IV. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-254
- V. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On June 21, 1983, at 1:30 p.m., Unit One was in the RUN mode operating at a load of 772 MWe and 2425 MWt. While responding to a work request to investigate a dual indication problem on the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) return to Torus valve MO-1-1001-34B, the Maintenance Department found that the yoke had pulled away from the valve bonnet and the valve stem was bent. Since the valve would not open fully, the 'B' loop of the Containment Cooling mode of RHR was declared inoperable. The required testing was immediately started; thereby satisfying the requirements of Technical Specification 3.5.B.3. At 2:35 p.m., the Maintenance Department succeeded in manually opening the valve and the 'B' loop was declared operable.

A similar event occurred on the Recirculation Pump Discharge valve, MO-2-202-5A, and is documented in LER/RO 82-19/03L-0.

VI. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

The 'B' loop of Containment Cooling was inoperable only for a short time. The Core Spray, Low Pressure Coolant Injection, and the RHR Containment Cooling valve operability tests for the 'A' loop were successfully performed. Therefore, the safety implications of this occurrence were minimal.

VII. CAUSE:

The failure of the MO-1001-34B valve to open fully is attributed to the yoke separating from the bonnet and bending the valve stem. The yoke separated from the bonnet because two of the four bolts fastening the operator yoke to the valve bonnet had fallen out due to vibration. The valve is manufactured by the Crane Company.

VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The corrective action taken was to remove the motor operator and yoke, and then straighten the valve stem. Locking tabs were attached to the bolts to prevent the bolts from vibrating loose. After repair, the valve was satisfactorily stroked three times. A new valve stem will be installed in this valve at the next outage of sufficient duration. All motor operated valves of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems of both Units One and Two will be inspected and locking tabs will be installed on all yoke to bonnet bolting. This should prevent a recurrence of this type of failure.



**Commonwealth Edison**

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station  
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Cordova, Illinois 61242  
Telephone 309/654-2241

NJK-83-237

July 7, 1983

J. Keppler, Regional Administrator  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region III  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Reference: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station  
Docket Number 50-254, DPR-29, Unit One  
Appendix A, Section 3.5.B.3

Enclosed please find Reportable Occurrence Report Number R0 83-25/03L-0  
for Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station.

This report is submitted to you in accordance with the requirements of  
Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.b; condition of operation leading to  
operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition of  
operation.

Respectfully,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY  
QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION

*L. J. Hermer for*  
N. J. Kalivianakis  
Station Superintendent

NJK:DGC/bb

Enclosures

cc B. Rybak  
A. Morrongiello  
INPO Records Center

JUL 18 1983

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