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J. T. Beckham, Jr.
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October 31, 1994

Docket No. 50-366

HL-4727


U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 2
Special Report 2-94-002
Inappropriately Terminated Fire Watch Results in
Special Report as Required by the Fire Hazards Analysis

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications and Fire Hazards Analysis, Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed Special Report concerning an event wherein a fire watch was inappropriately terminated. This event occurred at Plant Hatch - Unit 2.

Sincerely,


J. T. Beckham, Jr.

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Enclosure: Special Report 2-94-002

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
October 31, 1994

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cc: Georgia Power Company
Mr. H. L. Sumner, General Manager - Nuclear Plant
NORMS

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
Mr. K. Jabbour, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II
Mr. S. D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator
Mr. B. L. Holbrook, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch

Enclosure

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Special Report as Required by the Fire Hazards Analysis

A. Requirement For Report

This report is required by the Plant Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.2, and the Plant Hatch Fire Hazards Analysis, Appendix B, Section 1.1.1. Specifically, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.2 states:

Special Reports for fire protection equipment operating and surveillance requirements shall be submitted, as required, by the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) and its Appendix B requirements.

FHA Appendix B, Section 1.1.1, states:

Fire-rated assemblies and sealing devices in fire-rated assembly penetrations separating portions of safety-related fire areas or separating redundant systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area shall be OPERABLE.

Furthermore, Action Statement (a) of Appendix B, Section 1.1.1, allows the fire rated assembly and/or sealing device to be inoperable for up to 14 days provided, within 1 hour, a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly(ies) and/or sealing device(s) is established, or fire detectors are verified operable on at least one side of the inoperable barrier and an hourly fire watch patrol is established. In the event described in this report, a required hourly fire watch patrol was inappropriately terminated.

B. Unit Status At Time Of Event

On 10/7/94, at 0200 EDT, Unit 1 was shutdown for a refueling outage with all fuel removed from the reactor vessel. Unit 2 was in the Run mode at a power level of 2358 CMWT (96.8% rated thermal power).

C. Description Of Event

On 6/29/92, an hourly fire watch patrol was initiated for fire area 0040 to implement compensatory actions in response to NRC Bulletin 92-01. The hourly fire watch patrol for the fire area mentioned above was terminated on 10/2/94 due to removal of all fuel from the Unit 1 reactor vessel. The operating and surveillance requirements for fire-rated assemblies contained in the FHA are applicable when fuel is in the reactor vessel.

On 10/7/94, at 0200 EDT, a licensed shift supervisor was performing a review of FHA related Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO) and discovered that the required hourly fire watch patrol had been inappropriately terminated for fire area 0040. The fire area is common to both units and the fire watch should have been maintained to satisfy the FHA requirements for Unit 2. Deficiency Card 1-94-2650 was written to document the failure to maintain the required fire watch. The hourly fire watch patrol for the affected area was re-established on 10/7/94 at 0230 EDT as required by LCO 1-92-420.

D. Cause Of The Event

The cause of the inappropriate termination of the fire watch in fire area 0040 was personnel error. Specifically, licensed personnel did not recognize that fire area 0040 is common to both units.

E. Analysis Of Event

In this event, a required hourly fire watch patrol for fire area 0040 was not performed from 10/2/94 to 10/7/94. Upon discovery of the condition, an hourly fire watch patrol was re-established for the affected fire area in accordance with FHA Appendix B, Section 1.1.1.

The fire area affected by this event is equipped with a full coverage linear thermal detection system which, in the event of a fire, would provide an alarm both locally and in the Main Control Room to ensure prompt response by the plant fire brigade. The area is also protected by a wet pipe sprinkler system which would rapidly extinguish a fire. Additionally, a hose station and portable carbon dioxide fire extinguishers are available in nearby fire area 0014.

Enclosure

Special Report 2-94-002

Based on the above information, it is concluded that this event had no adverse effect on nuclear safety.

F. Corrective Actions

1. On 10/7/94, an hourly fire watch patrol was re-established for the affected fire area.
2. Involved personnel have been counseled.