



## Nebraska Public Power District

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION  
P.O. BOX 98, BROWNVILLE, NEBRASKA 68321  
TELEPHONE (402) 825-3811

NLS940102


October 31, 1994

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Cooper Nuclear Station Licensee Event Report 94-024 is forwarded as an attachment to this letter.

Sincerely,



J. T. Herron  
Plant Manager

/nr

Attachment

cc: L. J. Callan  
G. R. Horn  
J. H. Mueller  
R. G. Jones  
R. A. Sessoms  
K. C. Walden  
INPO Records Center  
NRC Resident Inspector  
R. J. Singer  
CNS Training  
CNS Quality Assurance

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PDR ADOCK 05000298  
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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH  
THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.  
FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO  
THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH  
(MNB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,  
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK  
REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF  
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)  
COOPER NUCLEAR STATIONDOCKET NUMBER (2)  
05000298PAGE (3)  
1 OF 3

TITLE (4) Inoperable Condition of the Halon System in Service Water Pump Room

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
10	02	94	94	-- 024 --	00	10	31	94	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
OPERATING MODE (9)		N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)		0	20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)	
			20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)	
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER	
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)		X 50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		(Specify in	
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		Abstract below	
			20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	

## LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME  
Gautam Sen, Senior Staff Nuclear Licensing & Safety Eng.TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)  
(402) 825-3811

## COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	No					

## SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES  
(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

X NO

EXPECTED  
SUBMISSION  
DATE (15)

MONTH DAY YEAR

## ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On October 2, 1994, at 9:30 am while performing an inspection of the Service Water Pump Room, it was discovered that Service Water Pump "B" casing was not seated to the floor due to ongoing maintenance. If the Halon System is activated in the room in case of a fire, Halon would be discharged and escape to the area below the Service Water Pump Room, thereby diluting the extinguishing agent.

At 9:30 am per Technical Specification 3.17.B, the Service Water Pump Room Halon System was declared inoperable and a fire watch was stationed within one hour.

Per NUREG-1022, the root cause of this event is inadequate procedures to address sufficient details for declaring the Halon System operable.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
COOPER NUCLEAR STATION		05000298	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 3
			94	-- 024 --	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

A. Plant Status

On October 2, 1994, when this condition was discovered, the plant was in cold shutdown with no fuel handling in progress.

B. Event Description

On October 2, 1994, at approximately 9:30 am, while performing an inspection of the Service Water Pump Room, it was discovered that the "B" Service Water Pump casing was not seated to the floor and that no fire watch was stationed in the area.

Under these circumstances, if the Halon 1301 Fire Suppression System protecting the Service Water Pump Room would have been activated, Halon would have been discharged and migrated to the area below the Service Water Pump Room. As a result, adequate fire suppression capability of the Halon System in the Service Water Pump Room could have been diminished.

At approximately 9:30 am, per Technical Specification 3.17.B, the Service Water Pump Room Halon System was declared inoperable and per Technical Specification 3.17.C(1), a fire watch was stationed within one hour in the Service Water Pump Room.

An investigation of the sequence of events revealed that on October 1, 1994, the day before the discovery of this event, work was being performed on Service Water Pump "B". At the end of that day, the ceiling plugs were installed, and the Control Room was requested to release the fire watch, but the pump casing was not fully seated to the floor. The actions required for closure of the fire protection impairment permit were checked completed and the fire watch was secured at approximately 8:20 pm on October 1, 1994. However, the Service Water Pump "B" was not seated to the floor at that time.

C. Cause

The root cause of this event is inadequate procedures. Applicable procedures do not contain sufficient detail for actions required for the closure section of the fire protection impairment permit. Nor does the Service Water Pump maintenance procedure adequately address Halon System operability requirements.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

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COOPER NUCLEAR STATION		05000298	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3 OF 3
			94	-- 024 --	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

D. Safety Significance

This event rendered the fire suppression system (Halon 1301 system) inoperable based on the fact that the Halon System, if activated, would have migrated to the area below the Service Water Pump "B" and that it would not have maintained a uniform concentration of 8 percent. Per Technical Specification Bases 3.17, uniform concentration of 8 percent is required to be maintained for adequate fire suppression capability to confine and extinguish a fire.

However, the time period during which the Service Water Pump Room Halon System is considered inoperable is approximately 12 hours and during that period the probability of actuating the Halon System in case of a fire in that area is low. Therefore, the safety significance of this event is minimal.

E. Corrective Action

In order to prevent any recurrence of this type of event, the following corrective actions will be taken:

1. Procedure 0.39, Fire Watch, will be revised to require the Fire Protection engineer to verify and ensure that the affected area and the actions taken for closure of the Fire Protection Impairment Permit are adequate.
2. Fire Protection System Operating Procedure 2.2.30 will be revised to require the Service Water Pump Room to have an intact room envelope before the Halon system in that room can be declared operable.
3. Service Water Pump Column maintenance and Bowl Assembly Replacement Procedure 7.2.15, will be revised to ensure that the fire protection requirements of the Service Water Pump Room are met.
4. Shift Supervisors, operating crews, and fire protection engineers will be counseled through fire protection training sessions with regard to conditions required for the Halon System operability.

F. Similar Events

None