

CONTROL BLOCK: ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)01 ALJMF1 200-00000-00 341111 45
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

CONT

01 REPORT SOURCE L 605000348 7081183 8090883 9
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 At 2158 on 8/11/83 and again at 0013 on 8/12/83, due to a loss of power to 120

03 VAC Distribution Panel 1K, the following components were declared inoperable: B

04 Train Containment Hydrogen Analyzers, B Train Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup

05 System, B Train RCS Subcooling Margin Monitor, LI 3282B (Containment Water Level-

06 Narrow Range) instrumentation channel, LI 3594B (Containment Water Level - Wide

07 Range) instrumentation channel, B Train Chlorine Detector, dampers HV3356B and

08 HV3357B (B Train Penetration Room Filtration System) and damper (see attachment)

09 SYSTEM CODE E B 11 CAUSE CODE E 12 CAUSE SUBCODE A 13 COMPONENT CODE E L E C O N 14 COMP. SUBCODE Z 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16

17 LGR/RO REPORT NUMBER 83 EVENT YEAR 83 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 046 OCCURRENCE CODE 03 REPORT TYPE L REVISION NO. 0

18 ACTION TAKEN F 19 FUTURE ACTION Z 20 EFFECT ON PLANT Z 21 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 22 HOURS 0000 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N 24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A 25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER X 999

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 These events were caused by tripping of the power supply breaker to 120 VAC

11 Distribution Panel 1K. After the first event, the power supply was restored and

12 the affected components were declared operable at 2205 on 8/11/83. After the

13 second event, the panel was aligned to an alternate power supply and the affected

14 components were declared operable at 0017 on 8/12/83. Subsequent(see attachment)

15 FACILITY STATUS E 28 % POWER 100 29 OTHER STATUS NA 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY A 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Operational Event 32

16 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 33 Z 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE NA 36

17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 000 37 TYPE Z 38 DESCRIPTION NA 39

18 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 000 40 DESCRIPTION NA 41

19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION NA 43

20 PUBLICITY ISSUED N 44 DESCRIPTION NA 45

8307190070 830908
PDR ADOCK 05000348
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER W. G. Hairston, III

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Licensee Event Report
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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (continued)

HV3872B (Reactor Cavity Hydrogen Dilution System). Various Tech. Spec. sections require these components to be operable. Appropriate Tech. Spec. action statement requirements were met. Health/safety of the public was not affected. With regard to the B Train Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System and the B Train Chlorine Detector, this LER is applicable to both Unit 1 and Unit 2.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (continued)

investigation revealed a high resistance connection between the normal power supply breaker and the bus bar. Both the normal and alternate power supply breakers were moved to alternate locations.