

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:                      (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 FILTIPS4 2 00-000000-00 3 41111 4 5

CON'T  
01 REPORTSOURCE L6 0500025 7 080983 8 090883 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 While Unit 4 was at cold shutdown, both power operated relief valves (PORVs) were  
03 out of service and closed for a period longer than 24 hours with RCS temperature less  
04 than 275 degrees F. During this time, depressurization and venting of the RCS was  
05 done via the RCS Venting System. This path does not amount to the minimum  
06 required area of 2.20 square inches. This is reportable in accordance with  
07 T.S.6.9.2.b.3. The health and safety of the public were not affected. This is the first  
08 occurrence of this type.

09 CJ 11 X 12 Z 13 VALVEX 14 F 15 B 16  
17 83 21 011 24 03 28 L 30 0 32  
18 X 33 19 Z 20 Z 21 0000 22 Y 23 N 24 N 25 C635 26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The root causes were determined to be: a) Lack of coordination between the  
11 Maintenance and Operations Departments because the work necessary required that  
12 the block valve internals be removed and the 24 hour time frame was not properly  
13 explained to the Maintenance Department. b) Removal of the block valve internals  
14 was particularly difficult due to radiological controls and binding of the valve disc.

15 G 28 000 29 N/A 30 A 31 Notification by Maintenance 32  
16 Z 33 Z 34 N/A 35 N/A 36

17 000 37 Z 38 N/A 39

18 000 40 N/A 41

19 Z 42 N/A 43

20 N 44 N/A 45

NAME OF PREPARER Jesus Arias, Jr.

PHONE 305/245-2910 X-200

### Corrective Actions

Actions taken during the time of the incident which minimized the possibility of an overpressure transient were:

- 1) All high head safety injection flow paths to the RCS were isolated prior to cooldown of RCS below 380 degrees F. This is done by procedure on a cold shutdown.
- 2) Within 8 hours following both PORVs being declared out of service and closed, RCS drain down was initiated.
- 3) The first block valve internals were removed approximately 36 hours after the PORVs were declared out of service. By this action, a 2.20 square inch area was made available to vent the RCS.

The importance of proper coordination for maintenance work on equipment affected by limiting conditions for operation in the Technical Specifications will be discussed with operations supervising staff.



SEP 12 4 08:19  
September 8, 1983  
PNS-LI-83-599

Mr. James P. O'Reilly  
Regional Administrator, Region II  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 251-83-011

TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 AND 4

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: AUGUST 9, 1983

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 6.9.2.b.3

PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES

The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide 30-day notification of the subject occurrence.

Very truly yours,

J. W. Williams, Jr.  
Vice President  
Nuclear Energy

JWW/NWG/js

Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30)  
Harold F. Reis, Esquire  
File 933.1 TP

OFFICIAL COPY

LC 2211