



Northern States Power Company

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant

1717 Wakonade Dr. East
Welch, Minnesota 55089

October 26, 1994

10 CFR Part 50
Section 50.73

U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
Docket Nos. 50-282 License Nos. DPR-42
50-306 DPR-60

Inoperability of Continuous Air Monitor
When Power Supply Was Tripped Without Control Room Knowledge

The Licensee Event Report for this occurrence is attached. In the report, we made one new NRC commitment:

A dedicated power source for CAM-5 will be provided by April 30, 1995.

This event was reported via the Emergency Notification System in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.72, on September 26, 1994. Please contact us if you require additional information related to this event.

Jack Leveille for

Roger O Anderson
Director
Licensing and Management Issues

c: Regional Administrator - Region III, NRC
NRR Project Manager, NRC
Senior Resident Inspector, NRC
Kris Sanda, State of Minnesota

Attachment

*ICP
11*

9411020097 941026
PDR ADDCK 05000282
S PDR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant U1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000 282

PAGE (3)

1 OF 3

TITLE (4) Inoperability of Continuous Air Monitor When Power Supply Was Tripped Without Control Room Knowledge

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
9	26	94	94	-- 08 --	00	10	26	94	Prairie Island U2	05000 306
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)						
POWER LEVEL (10)	100%	20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
		20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Arne A Hunstad

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

612-388-1121

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES

(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

X

NO

EXPECTED
SUBMISSION
DATE (15)

MONTH

DAY

YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On September 26, 1994, both units were at 100% power. A Nuclear Plant Services Attendant (NPSA) was buffing the floor near Continuous Air Monitor No. 5 (CAM-5). At about 1315 hours, the buffer went dead so the NPSA tried plugging the buffer into other receptacles in the area until he found one that worked, and continued buffing the floor. At 0724 on September 27, the Auxiliary Building Operator on normal rounds noticed that CAM-5 was not operating and notified the Control Room. The Control Room Operator secured Spent Fuel Pit normal ventilation while the Auxiliary Building Operator and the Duty Chemist worked to repower CAM-5. At 0745 the Duty Chemist repowered CAM-5 from an alternate source, and the Control Room Operator restarted SFP normal ventilation. At 0807 the Auxiliary Building Operator found that the normal supply for CAM-5 was tripped and reset it. The Duty Chemist then connected CAM-5 to its normal source of power.

NRC FORM 366A (5-92)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95	
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION				ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.	
FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (6)	
Prairie Island Unit 1		05000 282		YEAR 94	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER -- 08 --
				REVISION NUMBER 00	PAGE (3) 2 OF 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On September 26, 1994, both units were at 100% power. A Nuclear Plant Services Attendant (NPSA) was buffing the floor near Continuous Air Monitor No. 5 (CAM-5). At about 1315 hours, the buffer went dead so the NPSA tried plugging the buffer into other receptacles in the area until he found one that worked, and continued buffing the floor. At 0724 on September 27, the Auxiliary Building Operator on normal rounds noticed that CAM-5 was not operating and notified the Control Room. The Control Room Operator secured Spent Fuel Pit normal ventilation while the Auxiliary Building Operator and the Duty Chemist worked to repower CAM-5. At 0745 the Duty Chemist repowered CAM-5 from an alternate source, and the Control Room Operator restarted SFP normal ventilation. At 0807 the Auxiliary Building Operator found that the normal supply for CAM-5 was tripped and reset it. The Duty Chemist then connected CAM-5 to its normal source of power, circuit 2RPA4-9.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The power supply for CAM-5 was tripped without knowledge of the Control Room operators.

ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

CAM-5 provides sampling of the Spent Fuel Pit (SFP) area for particulate and iodine as required in Technical Specification Tables TS.3.9-2 and TS.4.17-4. Also, the silica gel used for tritium sampling as required in Table 4.17-4 is connected to CAM-5. Continuous sampling is required during releases through the SFP normal ventilation system. From 1315 on September 26 to 0745 on September 27, an unmonitored release path from the SFP area existed. The event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) since particulate, iodine and tritium sample requirements were not met. Noble gas monitors R-25 and R-31 were operable throughout the event.

This event did not affect the health or safety of the public because there was no release of radioactive material during the time CAM-5 was inoperable. Samples taken before and after the time that CAM-5 was inoperable showed no airborne activity. Also, R-25 and R-31 showed no increase during this time. History shows that changes in particulate, iodine or tritium do not occur without a change in gas activity or SFP conditions. There was no work in progress in the SFP and SFP conditions did not change while CAM-5 was inoperable. Also, there was no source of iodine in the SFP water.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

When the Auxiliary Building Operator noticed that CAM-5 was not operating, he immediately notified the Control Room Operator, who then secured SFP normal ventilation.

The Duty Chemist repowered CAM-5 from an alternate source, and the Control Room Operator restarted SFP normal ventilation.

The Auxiliary Building Operator found the monitor's normal power source tripped and reset

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

it.

The Duty Chemist took a local air sample to determine airborne activity.

All receptacles on circuit 2RPA4-9 were identified and labeled to prevent their use without permission of the Shift Supervisor. This was completed the same day as discovery of the event.

Nuclear Plant Services Attendants were informed of the need to contact the Control Room when a circuit is tripped.

A dedicated power source for CAM-5 will be provided by April 30, 1995.

Other corrective actions being considered are:

- increase surveillance of CAM-5 by operators.
- provide an alarm to alert control room operators of any inoperability of CAM-5.

FAILED COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION

None.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

This circuit was tripped previously (in 1993), but was quickly reset. As a result of that event, work was initiated to place CAM-5 on a dedicated circuit, but the work was not completed.

There have been previous instances of effluent monitor inoperability that resulted in an unmonitored effluent path. These events were reported as Unit 1 LER's 91-006 and 94-002.