

Enclosure 1

NRC DOCKET 50-366  
OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5  
EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2  
REQUEST TO AMEND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

The proposed change to the Technical Specifications (Appendix A to Operating License NPF-5) would be incorporated as follows:

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TABLE 4.3.4-1REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNITS</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level- Low Low	D	M	Q
b. Condensate Storage Tank Level- Low	NA	M	Q
c. Suppression Pool Water Level- High	NA	M	Q

TABLE 3.3.4-1REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNITS</u>	<u>MINIMUM NUMBER OF OPERABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM</u>
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low (2B21-N031 A, B, C, D)	2
b. Condensate Storage Tank Water Level - Low (2E51-N060, 2E51-N061)	2(a)
c. Suppression Pool Water Level-High (2E51-N062A, B)	2(a)

(a) Provides Signal to RCIC Pump Suction Valves Only

TABLE 3.3.4-2

REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNITS</u>	<u>TRIP SETPOINT</u>	<u>ALLOWABLE VALUE</u>
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low	$\geq -38$ inches*	$\geq -38$ inches*
b. Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low	$\geq 0$ inches**	$\geq 0$ inches**
c. Suppression Pool Water Level-High	$\leq 151$ inches	$\leq 151$ inches
<u>*See Bases Figure B 3/4 3-1</u>		
** This corresponds to a level of 131'-0" above mean sea level.		

## PLANT SYSTEM

### 3/4.7.3 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.7.3 The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System shall be OPERABLE with an OPERABLE flow path capable of (AUTOMATICALLY) taking suction from the suppression pool and transferring the water to the reactor pressure vessel.

APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the RCIC system inoperable, operation may continue and the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable provided the HPCI system is OPERABLE; restore the RCIC system to OPERABLE status within 14 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and reduce reactor steam dome pressure to < 150 psig within the following 24 hours.
- b. With the surveillance requirements of Specification 4.7.3 not performed at the required intervals due to low reactor steam pressure, the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable provided the appropriate surveillance is performed within 12 hours after reactor steam pressure is adequate to perform the tests.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.7.3 The RCIC system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by:
  1. Verifying that the system piping from the pump discharge valve to the system isolation valve is filled with water, and
  2. Verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
- b. At least once per 92 days by verifying that the RCIC pump develops a flow of 400 gpm on recirculation flow when steam is being supplied to the turbine at normal reactor vessel operating pressure, 1000 + 20, - 80 psig.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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c. At least once per 18 months by:

1. Performing a system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation and verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position, but may exclude actual injection of coolant into the reactor vessel.
2. Verifying that the system will develop a flow of at least 400 gpm on recirculation flow when steam is supplied to the turbine at a pressure of  $150 \pm 15$ , - 0 psig.
3. Verifying that suction for the RCIC system is automatically transferred from the condensate storage tank to the suppression pool or a low condensate storage tank level or a high suppression pool level signal.

### 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

#### BASES

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#### 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of the service water systems ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of these systems, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident conditions within acceptable limits.

#### 3/4.7.2 MAIN CONTROL ROOM ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the main control room environmental control system ensures that (1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system, and (2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during the following all credible accident conditions. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or its equivalent. This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criterion 10 of Appendix "A", 10 CFR Part 50.

#### 3/4.7.3 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM

The reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system is provided to assure adequate core cooling in the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel without requiring actuation of any of the emergency core cooling equipment. The RCIC system is conservatively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor pressure exceeds 150 psig even though the residual heat removal (RHR) system provides adequate core cooling up to 350 psig.

The RCIC system specifications are applicable during CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3 when reactor vessel pressure exceeds 150 psig because RCIC is the primary non-ECCS source of emergency core cooling when the reactor is pressurized.

Two sources of water are available to the RCIC system. Suction is initially taken from the condensate storage tank and is automatically transferred to the suppression pool upon low CST level or high suppression pool level.

With RCIC inoperable, adequate core cooling is assured by the demonstrated OPERABILITY of the HPCI system and justifies the specified 14 day out-of-service period.

### 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

#### BASES (Continued)

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The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that RCIC will be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage and to start cooling at the earliest moment.

#### 3/4.7.4 HYDRAULIC SNUBBERS

The hydraulic snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system and all other safety related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. The only snubbers excluded from this inspection program are those installed on nonsafety related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed, would have no adverse effect on any safety related system.

The inspection frequency applicable to snubbers containing seals fabricated from materials which have been demonstrated compatible with their operating environment, only ethylene propylene compounds to date, is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection. Therefore, the required inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures. The number of inoperable snubbers found during an inspection of these snubbers determines the time interval for the next required inspection of these snubbers. Inspections performed before that interval has elapsed may be used as a new reference point to determine the next inspection. However, the results of such early inspections performed before the original required time interval has elapsed, nominal time less 25%, may not be used to lengthen the required inspection interval. Any inspection whose results require a shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.

To provide further assurance of snubber reliability, a representative sample of the installed snubbers will be functionally tested during plant shutdowns at 18 month intervals. These tests will include stroking of the snubbers to verify proper piston movement, lock-up and bleed. Observed failures of these sample snubbers will require functional testing of additional units. To minimize personnel exposures, snubbers installed in high radiation zones or in especially difficult to remove locations, as identified in Table 3.7.4-1, may be exempted from these functional testing requirements provided the OPERABILITY of these snubbers was demonstrated during functional testing at either the completion of their fabrication or at a subsequent date.



ENCLOSURE 2

NRC DOCKET 50-366  
OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5  
EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2  
REQUEST TO AMEND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92, Georgia Power Company has evaluated the attached proposed amendment and has determined that its adoption would not involve a significant hazard. The basis for this determination is as follows:

a. PROPOSED CHANGE

Change the RCIC system Limiting Condition for Operation to require operability of the automatic suction transfer to the Suppression Pool.

BASIS

This change constitutes an additional restriction not presently included in the Technical Specifications. This change does not affect the probability or consequences of an accident or malfunction analyzed in the FSAR. This change does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any analyzed in the FSAR. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not affected. The effect of this change is therefore within the acceptance criteria and the change is consistent with Item (ii) of the "Examples of Amendments that are Considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazards Considerations" listed on page 14,870 of the April 6, 1983, issue of the Federal Register.

b. PROPOSED CHANGE

Change the RCIC system surveillance requirements such that the automatic suction transfer must be demonstrated operable at least once per 18 months.

BASIS

This change constitutes an additional restriction not presently included in the Technical Specifications. This change does not affect the probability or consequences of an accident or malfunction analyzed in the FSAR. This change does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any analyzed in the FSAR. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not affected. The effect of this change is therefore within the acceptance criteria and the change is consistent with Item (ii) of the "Examples of Amendments that are Considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazards Considerations" listed on page 14,870 of the April 6, 1983, issue of the Federal Register.

c. PROPOSED CHANGE

Add the Condensate Storage Tank low level switches and the Suppression Pool high level switches to the list of instrumentation which controls the RCIC system.

BASIS

This change constitutes an additional restriction not presently included in the Technical Specifications. This change does not affect the probability or consequences of an accident or malfunction analyzed in the FSAR. This change does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any analyzed in the FSAR. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not affected. The effect of this change is therefore within the acceptance criteria and the change is consistent with Item (ii) of the "Examples of Amendments that are Considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazards Considerations" listed on page 14,870 of the April 6, 1983, issue of the Federal Register.

d. PROPOSED CHANGE

Specify allowable trip setpoints of 0 inches minimum for low Condensate Storage Tank level and 151 inches maximum for high Suppression Pool level.

BASIS

The allowable setpoint for the Condensate Storage Tank level switches ensures that the PCIC system will have an uninterrupted supply of water during suction transfer. The allowable setpoint for the Suppression Pool level switches protects against the accumulation of an excessive volume of water. This change constitutes an additional restriction not presently included in the Technical Specifications. This change does not affect the probability or consequences of an accident or malfunction analyzed in the FSAR. This change does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any analyzed in the FSAR. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not affected. The effect of this change is therefore within the acceptance criteria and the change is consistent with Item (ii) of the "Examples of Amendments that are Considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazards Considerations" listed on page 14,870 of the April 6, 1983, issue of the Federal Register.

e. PROPOSED CHANGE

Change the RCIC system instrumentation surveillance requirements to include monthly functional test and quarterly calibration of the Condensate Storage Tank level switches and Suppression Pool level switches.

#### BASIS

This change constitutes an additional restriction not presently included in the Technical Specifications. This change does not affect the probability or consequences of an accident or malfunction analyzed in the FSAR. This change does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any analyzed in the FSAR. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not affected. The effect of this change is therefore within the acceptance criteria and the change is consistent with Item (ii) of the "Examples of Amendments that are Considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazards Considerations" listed on page 14,870 of the April 6, 1983, issue of the Federal Register.

#### f. PROPOSED CHANGE

Change bases to reflect the above changes.

#### BASIS

This is a purely administrative change to the Technical Specifications. This change does not affect the probability or consequences of an accident or malfunction analyzed in the FSAR. This change does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any analyzed in the FSAR. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not affected. The effect of this change is therefore within the acceptance criteria and the change is consistent with Item (i) of the "Examples of Amendments that are Considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazards Considerations" listed on page 14,870 of the April 6, 1983, issue of the Federal Register.

ENCLOSURE 3

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REQUEST TO AMEND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Pursuant to 10CFR 170.22, Georgia Power Company has evaluated the attached proposed amendment to Operating License NPF-5 and has determined that:

- a. The proposed amendment does not requires the evaluation of a new safety analysis report or a rewrite of the facility license;
- b. The proposed amendment does not require evaluation of several complex issues, involve ACRS review, or require an environmental impact statement;
- c. The proposed amendment involves one safety issue, namely the Technical Specification change associated with implementation of NUREG-0737 Item II.K.3.22.
- d. The proposed amendment is therefore a Class III amendment.