



ENTERGY

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October 20, 1994

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, D.C. 20555

Attention: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Unit 1
Docket No. 50-416
License No. NPF-29
Potential Breach of Control Building Pressure Boundary
LER 94-010-00
GNRO-94/00126

Gentlemen:

Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) 94-010 which is a final report.

Yours truly,

CRH/CDH/
attachment

cc:

Mr. J. E. Tedrow (w/a)
Mr. H. W. Keiser (w/a)
Mr. R. B. McGehee (w/a)
Mr. N. S. Reynolds (w/a)
Mr. H. L. Thomas (w/o)

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NRC FORM 366 (5-82)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION			APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95						
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)								ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503			
FACILITY NAME (1) Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1								DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000-416		PAGE (3) 01 of 03	
TITLE (4) Potential Breach of Control Building Pressure Boundary											
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER	
09	30	94	94	010	00	10	20	94	N/A	05000	
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER	
									N/A	05000	
OPERATING MODE (9)		1		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more (11))							
				20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)	
POWER LEVEL (10)		100		20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)	
				20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER	
				20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		(Specify in abstract below and in text, NRC Form 366A)	
				20.405(a)(1)(iv)		X 50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			
				20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)			
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)											
NAME Charles Holifield / Licensing Engineer						TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 601-437-6439					
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)								EXPECTED	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)				X NO				SUBMISSION DATE (15)			
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i. e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)											
<p>During a walkdown of Control and Auxiliary Building pressure doors, Control Building pressure door OC312 was found propped open. Door OC312 is one of the pressure doors for the Control Building designed to withstand 3 PSID due to tornado depressurization. An evaluation of non-pressure door OC313, which is normally closed in lieu of door OC312, indicated that it could not withstand 3 PSID. Since the Off-Normal Event Procedure for Hurricanes, Tornadoes, and Severe Weather only specified that the outside doors be shut in case of severe weather, there was no way to ensure that door OC312 would be closed.</p> <p>The apparent cause of the condition is attributed to inadequate procedural guidance. A night order was issued informing Operations of the requirement to shut the pressure door on detection of an approaching tornado. A change was initiated to the Off-Normal Event procedure which specified that door OC312 be closed on detection of an approaching tornado.</p>											

NRC FORM 366A (5-82)	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION	APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95	
<p align="center">LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION</p>		<p>ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.</p>	
		FACILITY NAME (1) Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000-416

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

A. Reportable Occurrence

The Design Bases of the plant require that the exterior doors and louvers of the control building be equipped with seals which make the openings capable of withstanding differential atmospheric pressures of 3 PSI so that, in the event of imminent extreme environmental conditions, the openings will be sealed to prevent depressurization of the building.

During a review of the pressure doors, it was identified that plant procedures were not specific enough to ensure that pressure door OC312 would be closed. This is a condition that resulted in the plant being outside its design bases. Therefore, it is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (ii) (B).

B. Initial Conditions

At the time of discovery, the reactor was in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 with reactor power indicating 100 percent power and reactor temperature indicating approximately 530 degrees F.

C. Description of Occurrence

On May 12, 1994, plant personnel conducted a walkdown of the Control Building [NA] and the Auxiliary Building [NF] pressure doors [DR]. During this walkdown, door OC312 was found propped open. After discussions with Operations personnel, it was determined that this door had been left open for an undetermined period of time. UFSAR Section 3.8.4.1.1.5 requires exterior openings of the Control Building to be sealed "in the event of imminent extreme environmental conditions".

Door OC312 is one of the pressure doors for the Control Building and is designed to withstand 3 PSID due to tornado depressurization. An engineering evaluation of non-pressure door OC313, the front/outside Control Building door which is normally kept closed in lieu of door OC312, indicated that it could not withstand 3 PSID. Procedure 05-1-02-VI-2, "Off-Normal Event Procedure - Hurricanes, Tornadoes, and Severe Weather", only specified that the outside doors be shut on detection of an approaching tornado. Therefore, it could not be ensured that door OC312 would be closed.

This condition was deemed reportable per 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (ii) (B) on September 30, 1994.

NRC FORM 366A (5-92)	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION	APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95	
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

D. Apparent Cause

The cause of the condition is attributed to inadequate procedural guidance. This created a situation where, if severe weather conditions had existed, the wrong door would have been relied upon to seal the Control Building.

E. Corrective Actions

- 1) A night order was issued informing Operations of the requirement to shut the pressure door in case of severe weather conditions such as a tornado.
- 2) A change was made to the Off-Normal Event procedure which specified that door OC312 be closed on detection of an approaching tornado.

F. Safety Assessment

Although the appropriate pressure door was not closed, conditions have never existed to the extent that the assumed pressure drop was experienced. The door which was closed in lieu of OC312 was evaluated to fail at approximately 0.4 PSID. Therefore, it can reasonably be assumed that the Control Building structure has not been subjected to a 3 PSI pressure differential.

G. Additional Information

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text within brackets[].