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REPORT SOURCE

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60	61									68	69						74	75						80
DOCKET NUMBER										EVENT DATE							REPORT DATE							

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

On July 25, 1983, during routine power operation, No. 11 Boric Acid Transfer Pump (BATP) tripped shortly after being started, following completion of a batch transfer evolution. No. 12 BATP had just been tagged out for planned maintenance. With no BATP operable, Action Statement 3.1.2.6 was entered. No reactivity control problems were involved; the tags on No. 12 BATP were released and it was restored to operability. The event constituted operation in a degraded mode in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

SYSTEM CODE R B 11		CAUSE CODE C 12		CAUSE SUBCODE Z 13		COMPONENT CODE C K T B R K 14				COMP SUBCODE A 15		VALVE SUBCODE Z 16					
EVENT YEAR 8 3 21 22		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 3 2 24 26		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 28 29		REPORT TYPE L 30		REVISION NO. 0 32									
ACTION TAKEN X 18		FUTURE ACTION Z 19		EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21		HOURS 0 0 0 0 22		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23		NPRD-4 FORM SUB Y 24		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A 25		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER I 0 0 5 26	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The pump, including breaker control and operation, tested satisfactorily. No further
1 1 problems were noted, and it was assumed that solid boron from the batching operation
1 2 may have obstructed the pump impeller, causing an isolated trip. Additional thermal
1 3 load due to higher summer ambient temperatures and normal bearing wear could also
3 4 be involved.

8 9
FACILITY STATUS (E) (28) 1 0 0 (29) N/A (30) OTHER STATUS
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

45 46
METHOD OF DISCOVERY (A) (31) Operator Observation (32) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE (Z) (33) (Z) (34) N/A (35) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
NUMBER (0) (0) (0) (37) (Z) (38) N/A (39) DESCRIPTION
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
PERSONNEL INJURIES
NUMBER (0) (0) (0) (40) N/A (41) DESCRIPTION
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY
TYPE (Z) (42) N/A (43) DESCRIPTION
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
PUBLICITY
ISSUED (N) (44) N/A (45) DESCRIPTION
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
NRC USE ONLY
752-2 68 69

8309070336 830822
PDR ADOCK C5000272
S PDR

8309070336 830822
PDR ADGCK C5000272
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER

R. Frahm

PHONE: (609) 935-6000 Ext. 4309



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

August 22, 1983

Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Dr. Murley:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 83-032/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 83-032/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J. M. Zupko, Jr.", is written above the typed name.

J. M. Zupko, Jr.
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RF:kl194f

CC: Distribution

FE22
11

Report Number: 83-032/03L
Report Date: 08-22-83
Occurrence Date: 07-25-83
Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 1
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Reactivity Control and Emergency Core Cooling Systems - No. 11 Boric Acid Transfer Pump - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 83-126.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 100 % - Unit Load 1120 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0755 hours, July 25, 1983, during routine power operation, No. 11 Boric Acid Transfer Pump (BATP) was started following completion of a batch transfer evolution. The pump supply breaker immediately opened, de-energizing the pump. No. 12 BATP had been tagged out on the shift in preparation for planned maintenance on the upcoming dayshift. No. 11 BATP was declared inoperable, and with no pump operable in the required boron injection flow path, Technical Specification Action Statement 3.1.2.6 was entered. No reactivity control problems were encountered during the period involved; the tags were cleared on No. 12 BATP and it was restored to an operable status in compliance with the Technical Specifications.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The pump was inspected for free rotation, and megger checks of the pump windings were satisfactory. Proper operation of the breaker and pump control circuitry was verified. No further problems with the pump were noted. The incident was attributed to an isolated overload situation possibly resulting from obstruction of the pump impeller by solid boron from the batching operation. Additional thermal load imposed by relatively high summer ambient temperatures or normal pump bearing wear could also be involved.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Limitations on the boron injection system, including the BATPs, insure that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. With the RCS temperature above 200°F, a minimum of two separate and redundant boron injection systems are provided to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the systems inoperable. The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a shutdown margin from all operating conditions of 1.6% delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

to 200°F.

Action Statement 3.1.2.6 requires:

With no BATP operable, restore at least one BATP to operable status within the next 72 hours or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and borated to a shutdown margin equivalent to 1% delta k/k at 200°F; restore at least one BATP to operable status within the next 7 days or be in cold shutdown within the next 30 hours.

Allowable out-of-service periods ensure that minor component repair or corrective action may be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system failures during the repair period. As noted, an operable pump was returned to operation in a timely fashion, and no reactivity control problems occurred. The event therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public. Due to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, the occurrence is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.


CORRECTIVE ACTION:

No. 12 BATP was declared operable at 0812 hours, July 25, 1983, and Action Statement 3.1.2.6 was terminated. As noted, No. 11 BATP tested satisfactorily, with no further problems observed. The pump was returned to service later that day. No further action was deemed necessary in view of the nature of the occurrence.

FAILURE DATA:

ITE Imperial Co.
Power Circuit Breaker
Type K-600

Prepared By R. Frahm



General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 83-107