

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

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 (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	0	H	D	B	S	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5
7	8	9					14	15											25	26							57	CAT	58
LICENSEE CODE		LICENSE NUMBER																LICENSE TYPE											

CON'T

0	1
7	8

REPORT SOURCE

L	6	0	5	0	0	0	3	4	6	7	0	7	2	7	8	3	8	0	8	2	6	8	3	9
60	61	DOCKET NUMBER						68	69	EVENT DATE						74	75	REPORT DATE						80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 (NP-33-83-50) On 7/27/83, three fire dampers were found nonfunctional. On 7/29/83 at
0 3 1030 hours, a 4" square cable duct was found not properly sealed with Kaowool in Cabi-
0 4 net C-5760A. These occurrences placed the unit in the action statement of Technical
0 5 Specification 3.7.10. There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or
0 6 station personnel. The areas involved in both occurrences are protected by sprinkler
0 7 and fire detection systems.

SYSTEM CODE A B		CAUSE CODE B		CAUSE SUBCODE C		COMPONENT CODE V A L V E X				COMP. SUBCODE N		VALVE SUBCODE D	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 3		EVENT YEAR 8 3		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 4 1		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3		REPORT TYPE 1		REVISION NO. 0			
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32		
ACTION TAKEN X		FUTURE ACTION X		EFFECT ON PLANT Z		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z		HOURS 0 0 0		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y			
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44		
NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER Z		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER Z 9 9									
45	46	47	48	49	50								

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The dampers failed to close due to excessive side pressure from the surrounding concrete. The dampers were forcibly closed, returning the fire barrier to functional.

1 1

1 2 The dampers will be repaired or replaced. The cause of the improperly sealed cable duct was a construction installation error. The duct was immediately stuffed with

1 3

1 4 Kaowool, removing the unit from the action statement.

FACILITY STATUS						% POWER			OTHER STATUS							METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION							
1	5	D	(28)					(29)	NA							B	(31)	During performance of ST 5016.11							

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 2 33 NA

7 8 9 10 11

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)

NA

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	37	Z	38	NA		

PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION (41)	
1	8	0	0	0	(40) NA

7	8	9	11	12	80
		LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)			
		TYPE DESCRIPTION			
		1.2.1 NA			Te 2

7 8 9 10 80

PUBLICITY		ISSUED		DESCRIPTION		45		8309070286 830828		NRC USE ONLY	
2	0	N	(44)	NA				PDR	ADOCK	05000346	
								PDR			

8309070286 830826
PDR ADCK 05000346
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

| | | | |

419-259-5000, Ext. 299

PHONE: 419-259-3000, Ext. 299

917-926

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-50

DATE OF EVENT: July 27, 1983 and July 29, 1983

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Fire dampers non-functional and improper sealing of a fire barrier.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 5, with Power (MWt) = 0 and Load (Gross MWe) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On July 27, 1983, the following fire dampers were found non-functional while performing a portion of the Fire Protection System Barrier Surveillance Test, ST 5016.11:

- 1) FD1018, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System
- 2) FD1042, between rooms 322 and 321
- 3) FD1110, between room 109 and hallway 110

On July 29, 1983, at 1030 hours, a 4" square cable duct was found not properly sealed with Kaowool in Control Room Cabinet C-5760A.

These occurrences placed the unit in the action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.10 for nonfunctional fire barriers.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of the inoperable fire dampers is due to an initial construction error. The dampers failed to close during testing due to excessive side pressure from the surrounding concrete. It is believed that these dampers may not have been acceptance tested when turned over from construction. This is the first time ST 5016.11 has been required to be performed on fire dampers.

The cause of the second occurrence is believed to be due to a construction installation error. However, the time period when the work was performed or who performed the work is unknown.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. The areas on either side of fire dampers FD1042 and FD1110 are protected by either a fire detection system or a sprinkler system. The duct work downstream from FD1018 is protected by a second damper before it enters any room.

The Control Room and Cable Spread Room are protected by both a sprinkler system and a fire detection system.

Corrective Action: The non-functional fire dampers were forcibly closed to return the fire barrier to a functional status. Maintenance Work Orders 83-4028, 83-4029, and 83-4027 were written to repair/replace the inoperable dampers.

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-50
PAGE 2

All fire dampers, which are required by Technical Specifications to be functional, will be checked before ST 5016.11 is completed.

The improperly sealed cable duct was immediately stuffed with Kaowool, removing the unit from the action statement.

Failure Data: There have been no previous occurrences of non-functional fire dampers. There have been no previous occurrences of improperly sealed cable duct within the past year.

LER #83-041



August 26, 1983

Log No. 83-1162
File: RR2 (NP33-83-50)

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator, Region III
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

LER No. 83-041
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
Date of Occurrence: July 27, 1983

Enclosed are three copies of Licensee Event Report 83-041 which are being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide 30 day written notification of the subject occurrence.

Yours truly,

Terry D. Murray
Station Superintendent
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

TDM/ljk

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Enclosures

cc: Mr. Richard DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Encl: 30 copies

Mr. Norman Haller, Director
Office of Management and Program Analysis
Encl: 3 copies

Mr. Walt Rogers
NRC Resident Inspector
Encl: 1 copy

AUG 31 1983

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