

## EXHIBIT A

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## SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

REPORT NO.: 50-302/83-031-03L-0

FACILITY: Crystal River Unit 3

REPORT DATE: August 24, 1983

OCCURRENCE DATE: July 25, 1983

### IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Containment isolation valves CAV-6 and 7 will not stroke fully closed under system pressure of 1,000 psi. This failure is being reported in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9(b).

### CONDITION PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

### DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On July 25, 1983, personnel discovered a slight packing leak on CAV-7, steam generator "B" secondary sampling valve. The packing was tightened, and the leak was stopped. The valve was then stroked successfully to the fully closed position. Personnel recognized that the evolution must also be timed; the valve was stroked again. The valve failed this test (0710 on July 25, 1983). The packing was loosened, and the valve still failed to stroke fully closed.

The penetration was isolated using CAV-5, and maintenance was initiated. When repair personnel tested CAV-7, with CAV-5 isolated, they found the valve to be operable. Thus, at 0630 on July 26, 1983, CAV-7 was declared operable. CAV-5 was opened, and the penetration returned to its normal configuration.

With CAV-5 open, at 0730 on July 26, 1983, CAV-7 again failed to stroke fully closed against system pressure of 1,000 psi. The valve was declared inoperable, and the penetration was isolated once again.

Later, at 0845, CAV-6, steam generator "A" secondary sampling valve, also failed to stroke fully closed. CAV-6 was isolated using CAV-4.

### DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE:

The failures of CAV-6 and 7 to stroke fully closed in these events were caused by insufficient design assumptions and/or overtightening the valve packing.

CAV-6 and 7 are actuated by a spring. This spring produces 750 pounds of force when compressed and 500 pounds of force when the valve is closed. Calculations indicated that for a significantly large coefficient of friction, this spring cannot close this valve at a system pressure of 1,000 psig. Apparently, the design of this valve considered a smaller coefficient of friction or system pressure than is actually there. The coefficient of friction is directly proportional to the tightness of the valve packing. Thus, these failures could have been caused by inadequate design assumptions or maintenance practices.

#### ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:


This failure is currently under review. A supplement to this report will be submitted within 30 days documenting the results of the review.

#### CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The affected penetrations have been isolated. A stronger spring will be installed in these valves during the next outage of sufficient duration.

#### FAILURE DATA:

This is the third reported failure for CAV-6 and the first for CAV-7.



**Florida  
Power**  
CORPORATION

USNRC REGION II  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

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August 24, 1983  
3F-0883-18

Mr. James P. O'Reilly  
Regional Administrator, Region II  
Office of Inspection & Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900  
Atlanta, GA 30303

Subject: Crystal River Unit 3  
Docket No. 50-302  
Operating License No. DPR-72  
Licensee Event Report No. 83-031

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report No. 83-031 and the attached supplementary information sheet, which are submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9(b).

Should there be any questions, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

G. R. Westafer  
Manager  
Nuclear Operations Licensing and Fuel Management

AEF:mm

Enclosure

cc: Document Control Desk  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

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