NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

[0 1] [N C B E P 1] (2) [0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0] (3) [4 1 1 1 1] (4) [ ] (5)
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[0 1] REPORT SOURCE [L] (6) [0 5 0 - 0 3 2 4] (7) [0 8 1 1 8 3] (8) [0 8 2 5 8 3] (9)
DOCKET NUMBER | EVENT DATE | REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

[0 2] Following the initial reactor criticality and shutdown after an extended maintenance
[0 3] and refueling outage, it was discovered that the instrument isolation valves to
[0 4] 1-CAC-PDS-4222 and 4223, which are the differential pressure sensing switches to the
[0 5] Reactor Building to suppression chamber vacuum breakers, were closed. This rendered
[0 6] the vacuum breakers inoperable. This event did not affect the health and safety of
[0 7] the public.
[0 8] Technical Specifications 3.6.4.2, 6.9.1.8f

[0 9]
SYSTEM CODE [S D] (11) | CAUSE CODE [D] (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE [Z] (13) | COMPONENT CODE [I N S T R U] (14) | COMP. SUBCODE [S] (15) | VALVE SUBCODE [Z] (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: EVENT YEAR [8 3] | [—] | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. [0 3 4] | [/] | OCCURRENCE CODE [0 1] | REPORT TYPE [T] | [—] | REVISION NO. [0]

ACTION TAKEN [X] (18) | FUTURE ACTION [X] (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT [Z] (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD [Z] (21) | HOURS (22) [0 0 0 0] | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED [Y] (23) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. [N] (24) | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER [Z] (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER [Z 9 9 9] (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

[1 0] The subject valves were left closed on May 4, 1983, in accordance with the cancellation
[1 1] of an equipment clearance and had remained closed as they were not covered in system
[1 2] valve lineups done prior to reactor startup. The subject valves were reopened to
[1 3] restore the operability of the vacuum breakers. A valve lineup of technical specifi-
[1 4] cation related instrumentation was done with no additional problems found.

[1 5] FACILITY STATUS [X] (28) | % POWER [0 0 0] (29) | OTHER STATUS (30) [NA] | METHOD OF DISCOVERY [A] (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) [Plant Surveillance]

[1 6] ACTIVITY RELEASED [Z] (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE [Z] (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) [NA] | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) [NA]

[1 7] PERSONNEL EXPOSURES: NUMBER [0 0 0] (37) | TYPE [Z] (38) | DESCRIPTION (39) [NA]

[1 8] PERSONNEL INJURIES: NUMBER [0 0 0] (40) | DESCRIPTION (41) [NA]

[1 9] LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43): TYPE [Z] (42) | DESCRIPTION [NA]

8309060096 830825
PDR ADOCK 05000324
S PDR

[2 0] PUBLICITY ISSUED [N] (44) | DESCRIPTION (45) [NA]

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NAME OF PREPARER M. J. Pastva, Jr. PHONE 919-457-9521

GPO 917-926

LER ATTACHMENT - RO #1-83-34

Facility: BSEP Unit No. 1 Event Date: July 30, 1983

On July 30, 1983, during the performance of corrective maintenance on a drywell pressure transmitter, it was discovered that the respective instrument isolation valves to 1-CAC-PDS-4222 and 4223 were closed. Immediately following the discovery, the subject valves were opened to return each instrument to service.

Switches 1-CAC-PDS-4222 and 4223 each provide an actuation signal to the Reactor Building to suppression chamber vacuum breakers' respective butterfly valves, 1-CAC-V16 and V17. Closure of the subject instrument isolation valves prevented the PDS-4222 and 4223 switches from detecting a pressure differential, thus rendering V16 and V17 inoperable.

On August 11, 1983, it was determined that on May 4, 1983, the subject instrument isolation valves were left closed while canceling an equipment clearance to support acceptance testing on new plant equipment. The clearance involved plant modification work on drywell pressure switches which utilize the same pressure sensing legs as PS-4222 and 4223.

Following acceptance testing of the involved plant modification, there was no reference made back to the clearance form to ensure that the instrument isolation valves to the PS-4222 and 4223 were reopened. In addition, the subject instrument isolation valves were not part of the system valve lineup verifications and, therefore, were not reopened prior to initial criticality of the reactor following completion of the extended refueling maintenance outage.

This event was discovered immediately after plant shutdown following the initial reactor criticality after an extended maintenance and refueling outage. The investigation determined plant operation was limited to approximately five hours and was maintained in the reactor startup power range during the period of time the subject isolation valves were closed.

As a result of this event, immediate corrective follow-up was performed to verify that proper valve lineups for technical specification-related instrumentation on each unit were in effect. This verification utilized a listing of technical specification-related instrumentation, valve lineups for plant instrumentation, and technical specifications to help ensure the accuracy of the applicable valve lineup lists by performing the following:

1. Ensuring that the valves are included in their respective system lineup by means of a system hand-over-hand verification.

2. Ensuring that valves are properly identified by use of identification tags.

3. Ensuring that valves were properly positioned for those without identification labels or not on the valve lineups.

4. Ensuring that valves associated with the instruments, including root valves, are included in the valve lineup listing.

LER ATTACHMENT - RO #1-83-34
(Continued)

As a result of a September 30, 1982, reactor scram, which resulted from the isolation of main condenser vacuum switches and was reported in LER 2-82-111 and IE Inspection Report 82-39, a program was initiated in 1982 to correct identified problems by improvement within the following areas:

1. Plant operating procedures. A complete rewrite of plant operating procedures was begun to help ensure systems' valves are reflected in the applicable system valve lineups.

2. Plant modifications. Review of plant modifications performed on both Unit Nos. 1 and 2 to ensure they have been properly completed and that applicable changes to plant operating procedures and system drawings are performed.

3. Plant operating guidelines. Stress, by inclusion in the plant operations standing instructions, that plant valves will have identification tags and that plant system valve lineups cannot be completed unless valves in the lineup are properly tagged for identification. Provide a written general guideline to plant operators on the proper methods for performing plant system valve and electrical lineup verification. This was accomplished by issuance of Operating Instruction 13, Valve and Breaker Alignment.

It must be noted that at the time of this event the subject improvement program was approximately 60% complete. It is felt the program to date indicates that Carolina Power & Light Company's approach to accomplishing the goals of this program is logical and conservative.

As a result of this event, the subject instrument isolation valves were included as part of the system valve position lineup verification listing. In addition, appropriate plant Operations personnel will review this report to ensure their cognizance of the event.

CP&L

Carolina Power & Light Company

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
P. O. Box 10429
Southport, NC 28461-0429

August 25, 1983

FILE: B09-13510C
SERIAL: BSEP/83-2803

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street NW
Atlanta, GA 30303

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 1
DOCKET NO. 50-325
LICENSE NO. DPR-71
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1-83-34

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In accordance with Section 6.9.1.8f of the Technical Specifications for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 1, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within fourteen (14) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-0161, July 1977.

Very truly yours,

C. R. Dietz, General Manager
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

RMP/shb/LETSB2

Enclosure

cc: Mr. R. C. DeYoung
NRC Document Control Desk