

EXPIRES 4-30-82

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'T

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

17 LER/RO
REPORT
NUMBER

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

NAME OF PREPARER

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83 AUG 23 9:43

August 17, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50/395
Operating License No. NPF-12
Thirty Day Written Report
LER 83-084

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Licensee Event Report #83-084 for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Thirty Day Report is required by Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.(c) as a result of inadequate implementation of Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1.a of Technical Specification 3.6.1.1, "Containment Integrity," on July 22, 1983.

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,


O. W. Dixon, Jr.

RJB:OWD/mac/fjc
Attachment

cc: V. C. Summer
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Mr. James P. O'Reilly
LER No. 83-084
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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

On July 22, 1983, the NRC Resident Inspector notified the Licensee that Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 115.001, "Penetration Isolation Verification," did not adequately address Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1.a of Technical Specification 3.6.1.1, "Containment Integrity." Five (5) valves located outside of the containment and fourteen (14) valves inside the containment were not included in the subject STP. The omitted valves were added during the construction phase to allow local leak rate testing.

There were no adverse consequences due to this event. All valves were verified to be in their respective position.

CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The cause of this event was due to inadequate procedure. Immediate corrective action was an inspection of all outside containment isolation valves, including test valves, to verify that the valves were in the required position. A review was also made of all completed STP data sheets for individual penetrations to verify that all test connections inside the containment had been restored to their required position and a second verification made. No discrepancies were noted.

Final corrective action taken by the Licensee is the revision to STP-115.001 to include the omitted valves. The revision has been approved and should be issued by August 20, 1983.