(7-77)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

| 0 | 1 | I L L S C 1 (2) LICENSEE CODE | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) LICENSE NUMBER | 4 1 0 0 0 (4) LICENSE TYPE | (5) CAT |

CON'T | 0 | 1 | REPORT SOURCE L (6) | 0 5 0 0 0 3 7 3 (7) DOCKET NUMBER | 0 7 1 9 8 3 (8) EVENT DATE | 0 8 1 6 8 3 (9) REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

| 0 | 2 | At 1030 on July 19 1983 the "LPCS Injection Valve Permissive" alarm was up on the
| 0 | 3 | 1H13-P601 panel with the reactor pressure at 600 psig. Alarm should be clear at Rx
| 0 | 4 | pressure greater than 500 psig. Press. switch 1B21-413A was found to be continuously
| 0 | 5 | in the alarm position. The LPCS injection valve had an open permissive signal because
| 0 | 6 | the LPCS check valve seats well, inadvertent opening of the injection valve would not
| 0 | 7 | have caused an intersystem LOCA. LPCI A was still operable since its own pressure switch was functioning properly. HPCS, the three LPCI, and RCIC were all operable.
| 0 | 8 | Safe operation of the unit was maintained at all times.

| 0 | 9 | SYSTEM CODE: S F (11) | CAUSE CODE: E (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE: E (13) | COMPONENT CODE: I N S T R U (14) | COMP. SUBCODE: S (15) | VALVE SUBCODE: Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: EVENT YEAR 8 3 | — | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 7 8 | / | OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 | REPORT TYPE L | — | REVISION NO. 0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
B (18)	Z (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	N (25)	5 3 8 2

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

| 1 | 0 | The cause of the occurrence was that the microswitch in the pressure switch was stuck
| 1 | 1 | closed. The pressure switch was freed and exercised, recalibrated and functionally
| 1 | 2 | checked, and declared operable at 1200 on July 19, 1983.
| 1 | 3 |
| 1 | 4 |

| 1 | 5 | FACILITY STATUS: B (28) | % POWER: 0 0 0 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30): NA | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: A (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): Work Request L26101

| 1 | 6 | ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): NA

| 1 | 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES: NUMBER 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39): NA

| 1 | 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES: NUMBER 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41): NA

| 1 | 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43): TYPE Z (42) | DESCRIPTION: NA

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| 2 | 0 | PUBLICITY: ISSUED N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45): | NRC USE ONLY

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PDR ADOCK 05000373
S PDR

NAME OF PREPARER: Paul S. Watford

PHONE: 815/357-6761 Ext 323

I. LER NUMBER: 83-078/03L-0

II. LASALLE COUNTY STATION: Unit 1

III. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-373

IV. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

At 1030 on July 19, 1983, the LPCC Injection Valve Permissive alarm was up on the 1H13-P601 panel with the reactor pressure at 600 psi. Alarm should be clear at reactor pressure greater than 500 psig. The plant was in Mode 3, Shutdown. The LPCS system was declared inoperable.

V. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.3.3 requires that the Division I Trip System for LPCS Injection Valve Reactor Pressure-Low Permissive to have a minimum of one operable channel per trip or declare the associated ECCS inoperable. HPCS, the three LPCI, and RCIC systems were all operable.

For the LPCS alarm to sound, two signals are required: one from the Nuclear Boiler and one from the LPCS line between the Injection Valve and the LPCS Check Valve. Both switches have the same setpoints. When the reactor pressure is greater than 500 psig, both pressure switches' relay contacts should open, the injection valve would be interlocked closed, and no alarm would sound. However, one of the boiler pressure switches stayed closed. In addition, since the LPCS injection check valve seats well, the pressure switch between the check valve and the LPCS injection valve lags behind the reactor pressure and this had not increased to the 500 psig setpoint.

Division I LPCS/LPCI A Injection Valve Reactor Pressure Low Interlock Switch A would have allowed the LPCS injection valve to open since it had an open permissive signal. However, since LPCS check valve seats well, inadvertent opening of the injection valve would not have caused an intersystem LOCA. 1B21-N413A did affect LPCI A but LPCI A was still operable because its own pressure switch 1E12-N413A was functioning properly and sensing 600 psig reactor pressure.

Prior to startup, a work request was written; the inoperable pressure switch was repaired and returned to operable status the same day. This was the first occurrence of this event. Safe operation of the unit was maintained.

VI. CAUSE:

The cause of this occurrence was the microswitch in the pressure switch was stuck closed. The repaired microswitch was in pressure switch, Model #FN6, and was manufactured by Static-O-Ring.

VII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Work Request L26101 was written to repair the microswitch. The pressure switch was freed and exercised, recalibrated and functionally checked per approved station procedure LIS-NB-18, and declared operable at 1200 on July 19, 1983.

Prepared by: Paul S. Watford

Commonwealth Edison
LaSalle County Nuclear Station
Rural Route #1, Box 220
Marseilles, Illinois 61341
Telephone 815/357-6761

August 16, 1983

James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator
Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Dear Sir:

Reportable Occurrence Report #83-078/03L-0 Docket #050-373 is being submitted to your office in accordance with LaSalle County Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.(b), conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation or plant shutdown required by a limiting condition for operation.

C E Sargent
for G. J. Diederich
Superintendent
LaSalle County Station

RHH/GW/bej

Enclosure

xc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
Director of Management Information & Program Control
U. S. NRC Document Management Branch
Inpo-Records Center
File/NRC

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