

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 110000-000034111145
 7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 58

CON'T

01 REPORT SOURCE L6050002657042483805116839
 7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 At 0140 hours, on April 24, 1983, while performing the MSIV Closure Monthly Scram
 03 Sensor Functional Test, QOS 250-1, the A0 2-203-2D Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV)
 04 failed to initiate a half scram on Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channel 'B'. RPS
 05 Channel 'B' was manually tripped to comply with the requirements of Technical
 06 Specification 3.1.A, Table 3.1-3. The failure of a single limit switch will not
 07 prevent a Reactor scram on MSIV closure. Thus, the ability to safely shutdown the
 08 Reactor was not significantly affected as a result of this event.
 7 8 9 80

09 SYSTEM CODE 1A11 CAUSE CODE E12 CAUSE SUBCODE A13 COMPONENT CODE INSTRU14
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
 17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 83 EVENT YEAR 006 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 03 OCCURRENCE CODE L REPORT TYPE Z REVISION NO. 0
 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
 ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRO-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
 C18 Z19 Z20 Z21 0000 Y23 Y24 N25 N00726
 33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The cause of this occurrence was the failure of the 'B' RPS Channel 10% closure
 11 limit switch. This switch was binding internally and would not actuate on an MSIV
 12 closure. The limit switch was replaced with a like-for-like switch and tested
 13 satisfactorily. This corrective action is deemed adequate not to warrant
 14 further action.
 7 8 9 80

15 FACILITY STATUS E28 % POWER 05329 OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY B31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 Monthly Surveillance Test
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 80
 16 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36
 7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80
 17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 39
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 80
 18 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41
 7 8 9 10 11 12 80
 19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION 43
 7 8 9 10 80
 20 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION 45
 7 8 9 10 80

8305260286 830516
 PDR ADOCK 05000265
 S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER Anthony Fuhs PHONE 309-654-2241, ext 183



Commonwealth Edison
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station
22710 206 Avenue North
Cordova, Illinois 61242
Telephone 309/654-2241

DMB

NJK-83-176

May 16, 1983

J. Keppler, Regional Administrator
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137


Reference: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
Docket Number 50-265, DPR-30, Unit Two
Appendix A, Section 3.1.A, Table 3.1-3

Enclosed please find Reportable Occurrence Report Number RO 83-6/03L-0
for Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station.

This report is submitted to you in accordance with the requirements of
Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.b; conditions leading to operation in a
degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation.

Respectfully,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION


N. J. Kalivianakis
Station Superintendent

NJK:DGC/bb

Enclosure

cc R. Rybak
N. Chrissotimos
INPO Records Center

MAY 20 1983

IEJ2

- I. LER NUMBER: LER/RO 83-6/03L-0
- II. LICENSEE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Company
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
- III. FACILITY NAME: Unit Two
- IV. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-265
- V. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

At 1:40 a.m., on April 24, 1983, while performing the MSIV Closure Monthly Scram Sensor Functional Test, QOS 250-1, the AO 2-203-2D MSIV failed to initiate a half scram for Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channel 'B'. The 'B' Channel of the Reactor Protection System was manually tripped as required by Technical Specification Table 3.1-3. The fuse associated with the 2-203-2D MSIV trip logic was subsequently removed, and the Channel 'B' RPS manual trip signal was reset. Work Request Q25792 was written to repair the limit switch.

VI. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

The MSIV closure scram is set to trip when the isolation valves are greater than 10 percent closed from the full open position. This anticipatory scram is designed to minimize high pressure and neutron flux transients which might occur in the event of continued Reactor operation with restricted steam line flow.

The logic system provides the failure of a single MSIV limit switch will not prevent the Reactor from attaining a scram signal on MSIV closure. The scram circuits on the remaining seven MSIVs were demonstrated to be fully operable. Therefore, neither safe Reactor operation nor the health and safety of the public were affected by this occurrence.

VII. CAUSE:

The cause of this occurrence was the failure of the 'B' Channel 10 percent closure limit switch. The limit switch was binding internally and would not actuate on the MSIV closure. The limit switch is manufactured by Namco Controls, Model Number PT/EA 740-50100, and is an environmentally qualified switch.

VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action was to manually trip the 'B' Channel of RPS. The limit switch was replaced with a like-for-like switch. The most recent occurrence of this type occurred March 22, 1981, on MSIV AO 2-203-2A. This corrective action is deemed adequate not to warrant further action.