

ATTACHMENT 1  
PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION FOR  
UNIT 2 AT 2RE02

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

ATTACHMENT 1  
ST-HL-AE-3828  
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### 3/4.5.6 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SYSTEM

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.6 Three independent Residual Heat Removal (RHR) loops shall be OPERABLE with each loop comprised of:

- a. One OPERABLE RHR pump,
- b. One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger, and
- c. \*One OPERABLE flowpath capable of taking suction from its associated RCS hot leg and discharging to its associated RCS cold leg.\*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

#### ACTION:

- a. With one RHR loop inoperable, restore the required loop to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- b. With two RHR loops inoperable, restore at least two RHR loops to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- c. With three RHR loops inoperable, immediately initiate corrective action to restore at least one RHR loop to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.6.1 Each RHR loop shall be demonstrated OPERABLE pursuant to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5

4.5.6.2 At least once per 18 months by verifying automatic isolation and interlock action of the RHR system from the Reactor Coolant System to ensure that:

- a. With a simulated or actual Reactor Coolant System pressure signal greater than or equal to 350 psig, the interlocks prevent the valves from being opened, and
- ~~\*\*~~ b. With a simulated or actual Reactor Coolant System pressure signal less than or equal to 700 psig, the interlocks will cause the valves to automatically close.

\*Valves MOV-0060 A, B, and C and MOV-0061 A, B, and C may have power removed to support the FHAR (Fire Hazard Analysis Report) assumptions.

*\*\* This surveillance is applicable to Unit 1 only.*

BASES

3/4.5.6. RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the RHR system ensures adequate heat removal capabilities for Long-Term Core Cooling in the event of a small-break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), an isolatable LOCA, or a secondary break in MODES 1, 2, and 3. The limits on the OPERABILITY of the RHR system ensure that at least one RHR loop is available for cooling including single active failure criteria.

The surveillances ensure that RHR system isolation valves close upon an overpressure protection system signal. \*

\* This surveillance is applicable to Unit 1 only.

ATTACHMENT 2  
PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION FOR  
UNIT 1 AT 1RE04

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

ATTACHMENT 2  
ST-HL-AE-3828  
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### 3/4.5.6 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SYSTEM

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

#### ACTION:

- a. With one RHR loop inoperable, restore the required loop to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- b. With two RHR loops inoperable, restore at least two RHR loops to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- c. With three RHR loops inoperable, immediately initiate corrective action to restore at least one RHR loop to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

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4.5.6.1 Each RHR loop shall be demonstrated OPERABLE pursuant to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5.

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BASES

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The OPERABILITY of the RHR system ensures adequate heat removal capabilities for Long-Term Core Cooling in the event of a small-break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), an isolatable LOCA, or a secondary break in MODES 1, 2, and 3. The limits on the OPERABILITY of the RHR system ensure that at least one RHR loop is available for cooling including single active failure criteria.

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