

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

SYSTEM CODE 0 9		CAUSE CODE E C		CAUSE SUBCODE E		COMPONENT CODE B A T T R Y				SUBCODE Z		SUBCODE Z					
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20				
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 17		EVENT YEAR 8 3		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 1		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3		REPORT TYPE L		REVISION NO. 0							
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32						
ACTION TAKEN X		FUTURE ACTION A		EFFECT ON PLANT Z		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z		HOURS 0 0 0 0		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 9 1 8 5	
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS	(30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	(32)

ACTIVITY CONTENT		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1	2		
7	77	NA	NA
7	74		

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION
1	7	0	0	NA
		(37)	Z	
		(38)		

PERSONNEL INJURIES					
NUMBER		DESCRIPTION			
1	2	3	4	(4)	NA

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

TYPE		DESCRIPTION
1	9	NA

PUBLICITY
ISSUED IN DESCRIPTION (45) NA S PDR

8305230459 830504
PDR ADCK 05000333

NRC USE ONLY

Robert Peters

NAME OF PREPARER Robert Peters

PHONE: (315) 342-3840

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-333

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-014/03L-0

PAGE 1 of 1

During normal plant operations, an alarm in the control room indicated a partial D.C. ground on the 125V D.C. System. Following unsuccessful performance of the procedure for isolating the D.C. ground, a visual inspection of the "B" side station battery was made. The inspection revealed three cracked cells that were leaking electrolyte. The leaking electrolyte caused an electrical path to ground through the battery racks. The battery was declared inoperable until such time that repairs could be made. The "A" side emergency diesel generators were tested and verified operable in accordance with Technical Specifications 3.9.E.2c and 4.9.B.5.

Further investigation after the battery was isolated from the system, indicated a fourth cell was cracked and showing a D.C. ground. Corrective action was to replace the four affected cells. Since no cells in a fully charged condition were immediately available, a decision was made to remove and jumper two of the affected cells on the "B" side station battery and to replace the two other defective cells with two cells taken from the "A" side battery. This decision was based on an engineering safety evaluation that showed removal of two cells from each battery would not decrease the batteries overall performance capacity below that specified in the FSAR.

A complete visual inspection of both the "A" & "B" station batteries revealed that 39 additional cells exhibited a non-through wall cracking condition. The exact nature of this cracking is indeterminant at this time. Discussions between the vendor and staff personnel has concluded that the most likely source of the cracking was a mishandling of the cells during original installation.

Defective cells are being sent to the vendor, Gould Incorporated, and another material testing laboratory for analysis to determine the reason for the cracking of the cell jars. Temporary jumpers for the two missing cells in each battery will remain in place until fully charged and tested cells (IEEE 450-1980) become available for use.

A similar failure of a cell occurred at this facility in 1977. Investigations at that time led to no conclusive results. These cases are isolated and have not degraded the ability of the battery to perform its intended safety function. Increased surveillance, to include visual inspection of the plant station batteries, shall be instituted immediately to detect any additional cell jar deficiencies, as well as surveillance testing now required by Technical Specifications 3.9.E. Additionally, 60 cells are being ordered for replacements of the cracked cells. It is anticipated that these cells will be replaced during the forthcoming 1983 refuel outage.