



Carolina Power & Light Company

P. O. Box 101, New Hill, N. C. 27562
May 13, 1983

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REG. REGION 1
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

NRC-70

Mr. James P. O'Reilly
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Northwest (Suite 3100)
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
1986-90 - 900,000 KW - UNITS 1 & 2
OMISSION OF PROTECTIVE COATING BEHIND PAD ATTACHMENT
INSIDE THE UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT DOME LINER, ITEM 67

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Attached is the final report on the subject item which was evaluated to be reportable per the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) on January 21, 1982. As stated in the attached report, instead of the 16 weepholes required for completion, there were actually 22. All have now been completed, and with this report, Carolina Power and Light Company considers this matter closed.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours very truly,

R. M. Parsons
Project General Manager
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant

RMP/sh

Attachment

cc: Mr. G. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)
Mr. R. Prevatte (NRC-SHNPP)
Mr. V. Stello (NRC)

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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

UNIT NO. 1

FINAL REPORT
May 13, 1983
ITEM 67

OMISSION OF PROTECTIVE COATING BEHIND PAD ATTACHMENT
INSIDE THE UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT DOME LINER

Reportable Under 10CFR50.55(e)

SUBJECT:

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant/Unit No. 1
10CFR50.55(e), reportable deficiency. Omission
of protective coating behind pad attachment inside
the Unit 1 containment dome liner.

ITEM:

The pad attachments inside the containment dome
liner were welded, leaving one inch (1") weephole
at the low part of the pad.

SUPPLIED BY:

Not a supplier - related deficiency. The pad
attachments were welded in the field.

NATURE OF DEFICIENCY:

As a result of the curvature of the dome, a small
space exists between the pads and the dome. These
small spaces/areas of the containment liner plate
under the pads (plates) are uncoated and are
exposed to containment atmosphere via the weephole
and present potential corrosion sites which may
result in a reduction in liner plate thickness
below the design allowable thickness. The erection
sequence and design configuration prohibit complete
coating under these pads.

DATE PROBLEM WAS
CONFIRMED TO EXIST:

December 28, 1981

DATE PROBLEM REPORTED:

On December 28, 1981, Mr. N. J. Chiangi notified the
NRC (Mr. C. Julian) of an item considered potentially
reportable per the provision of 10CFR50.55(e). On
January 21, 1982, Mr. L. E. Jones notified the NRC,
Region II (Mr. C. W. Burger) that this item was
reportable per the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).

SCOPE OF PROBLEM:

This problem is limited to the Unit 1 containment
dome liner. Approximately 200 to 250 of the pad
attachments were originally reported to have been
installed. The total was found to be 355.

SAFETY IMPLICATION:

The liner plate in the containment building furnishes
no structural value for the building, but rather
serves as an impervious barrier for containing any
possible type of radioactive contamination/release
that may exist inside the building. For this reason,
the liner plate has to be protected against corrosion.

SAFETY IMPLICATION (cont'd.)

Considering the worst possible environment that could exist in the containment for an extended period (design life), the possibility existed that the liner plate, without the protective coating, could have had a corrosion rate which would cause its wall thickness to fall below the minimum allowable.

REASON DEFICIENCY
IS REPORTABLE:

Reportable since the condition could possibly have resulted in the violation of containment liner plate minimum wall thickness required for a design basis accident.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

A field change request was written to allow Keeler & Long 6548-S epoxy surfacer to be used in filling the weep hole gap. It was previously reported that all the weep holes were completed except for 16 which had limited accessibility. Subsequently, an additional 8 were found. An additional FCR was written which provided an approved method to seal these 22 remaining weep holes, and this work has now been completed.