

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

May 16, 1983

BLRD-50-438/83-04
BLRD-50-439/83-02

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:


BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - UNAUTHORIZED USE OF QC STAMP -
BLRD-50-438/83-04, BLRD-50-439/83-02 - FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector Paul Fredrickson on December 16, 1982 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 2129. This was followed by our first interim report dated January 17, 1983. Enclosed is our final report.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center (Enclosure)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

8305200187 830516
PDR ADOCK 05000438
S PDR

OFFICIAL COPY

IE 27

ENCLOSURE

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
UNAUTHORIZED USE OF QC STAMP
NCR 2129
BLRD-50-438/83-04, BLRD-50-439/83-02
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

Electrical conduit supports fabricated under the authorization of BNP-QCP-10.5, Field Fabrication Orders, were stamped with a unique stamp by someone other than the welding QC inspector to whom the stamp was issued. The unique stamp was subsequently reported lost by the inspector. The inspector made an allegation concerning the misuse of the unique stamp and the allegation was investigated in accordance with BNP-QCP-10.35, Employee Concerns and Differing Opinions. Further evidence indicated some of the inspection records for those conduit supports were completed by someone other than the QC inspector who originated the records. The conditions described by this deficiency were a result of the improper use of the inspector's stamp and the stamp being lost in conjunction with improper record completion.

Safety Implications

Stamping of welds by an unauthorized individual and the subsequent improper completion of associated weld records could result in approval of inadequate welds for use in safety-related structures. Failure of these structures due to inadequate welds could result in a condition adverse to safe plant operation.

Corrective Action

The identification markings on the items cited by this nonconformance report (NCR) have been obliterated and the items scrapped. The inspection records found to have been completed for the items cited were invalidated and this NCR referenced on them. Welding QC inspectors were instructed on the proper methods for completing QA documentation in order to prevent unauthorized completion of the documentation. All QC personnel have been trained on the proper use and security of unique identifiers. The unique stamp was recovered and is no longer in use.