

CONTROL BLOCK: 1										(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)																																																																																																																																																			
01		M I D C C 1										00-000000-000										34		11111		4		5																																																																																																																																	
7		8		9		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80											
CON'T		01		REPORT SOURCE		L		6		0		5		0		0		0		3		1		5		7		0		7		0		9		8		3		8		0		8		0		8		8		3		9																																																																																																							
EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES		10		ON 7/9/83, THE QC DEPT. WAS ASKED TO INVESTIGATE WHY A FIRE BARRIER SEAL WAS BEING		INSTALLED IN THE SPRAY ADDITIVE TANK ROOM WHEN NUMEROUS OTHER UNSEALED PENETRATIONS		WERE NOTED WITHIN THE SAME ROOM. INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE SPRAY ADDITIVE TANK		AND NUCLEAR SAMPLING ROOMS WERE RECENTLY ADDED TO AN AEPSC FIRE PROTECTION SPEC.		HOWEVER, APPROPRIATE REVISION TO PLANT PROCEDURES HAD NOT BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. NON-		FUNCTIONAL PENETRATION FIRE BARRIERS ARE NONCONSERVATIVE REGARDING T.S. 3.7.10. PU-		BLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY WERE NOT AFFECTED. THIS IS THE FIRST OCCURRENCE OF THIS TYPE.		SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE		COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE		LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.		ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER																																																																																																			
02		03		04		05		06		07		08		09		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80	
10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80																	
11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63																																																					

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Con't

THE AEPSC PLANT FIRE PROTECTION SPECIFICATION ENTITLED MATERIAL AND APPLICATION SPECIFICATIONS - INITIAL AND REPAIR INSTALLATION OF WALL, FLOOR, AND CEILING OPENINGS: FIRE BARRIERS AND AIR SEALS, WAS REVISED ON 11/1/82. AS PART OF THIS REVISION TWO AREAS/ZONES WERE ADDED; THE SPRAY ADDITIVE TANK ROOM AND NUCLEAR SAMPLING ROOM. THE ORIGINATOR OF THE REVISION TO THIS SPECIFICATION DID NOT INFORM THE PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM AT THE PLANT THAT THESE NEW AREAS HAD BEEN ADDED AND WOULD REQUIRE THE INSTALLATION OF FIRE BARRIER SEALS. THIS WAS FURTHER COMPOUNDED BY THE DELAY IN TRANSMITTING THIS DOCUMENT TO THE SITE AND THE SUBSEQUENT OVERSIGHT OF THE DEPARTMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS PROGRAM TO IDENTIFY THESE ADDITIONS.

UPON DISCOVERY THAT THESE ROOMS WERE NOT SEALED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CRITERIA ESTABLISHED BY THE AEPSC FIRE PROTECTION SPECIFICATION, A FIRE WATCH WAS POSTED AND JOB ORDERS WERE INITIATED TO HAVE THESE ROOMS SEALED. THE SPRAY ADDITIVE TANK ROOM HAS BEEN COMPLETELY SEALED AND INSPECTED BY THE PLANT QC DEPARTMENT, THE NUCLEAR SAMPLING ROOM IS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING SEALED AND WILL BE FINISHED PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF THE UNIT 1 REFUELING OUTAGE. FIRE WATCHES WILL REMAIN IN THIS AREA UNTIL ALL ACTIONS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED RELATIVE TO THE INSTALLATION OF FIRE BARRIER SEALS.

TO PREVENT A SIMILAR EVENT FROM OCCURRING, THE PLANT QC SUPERINTENDENT ISSUED A MEMO TO THE AEPSC CORPORATE QA MANAGER ADVISING HIM OF THE EVENT. THIS MEMO REQUESTED THAT NO DCC PLANT SPECIFICATION SHOULD BE ISSUED WHICH COULD IMPACT COMPLIANCE TO THE PLANT'S TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS WITHOUT PRIOR NOTIFICATION, IN WRITING, TO THE RESPONSIBLE PLANT DEPARTMENT.



**INDIANA & MICHIGAN ELECTRIC COMPANY**

DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT  
P.O. Box 458, Bridgman, Michigan 49106  
(616) 465-5901

August 8, 1983

Mr. J.G. Keppler, Regional Administrator  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region III  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Operating License DPR-58  
Docket No. 50-315

Dear Mr. Keppler:

Pursuant to the requirements of the Appendix A Technical Specifications,  
the following report/s are submitted:

RO 83-065/03L-0.

Sincerely,

  
for W.G. Smith, Jr.  
Plant Manager

/bab

cc: J.E. Dolan  
M.P. Alexich  
R.F. Kroeger  
B. Germano  
E.R. Swanson/N.E. DuBry RO:III  
R.C. Callen MPSC  
G. Charnoff, Esq.  
J.M. Hennigan  
R.O. Bruggee EPRI  
INPO  
PNSRC  
J.F. Stietzel  
E.L. Townley  
Dir., IE (30 copies)  
Dir., MIPC (3 copies)

AUG 10 1983

IE22 111