



**GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY**

RIVER BEND STATION    RCST OFFICE BOX 220    ST. FRANCISVILLE, LOUISIANA 70775  
AREA CODE 804    638-8094    346-8851

July 12, 1991  
RBG- 35311  
File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Des.  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1  
Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Supplement 1 to License Event Report No. 91-002 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This supplemental report is submitted to provide the status of GSU's corrective actions for this event.

Sincerely,

*W. H. Odell*

W. H. Odell  
Manager - Oversight  
River Bend Nuclear Group

*LAE/PDG/GAB/DCH/REB/kvm*  
LAE/PDG/GAB/DCH/REB/kvm

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ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

AREA CODE

5	0	4	3	8	1	-	4	1	4	5
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If you complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NO		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (If)				
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**ABSTRACT** (limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (18)

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104  
EXPIRES 8/31/92

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (3)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
RIVER BEND STATION	0500045891	91	002	01	02	OF 03

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

REPORTED CONDITION

At approximately 1059 on 2-16-91 with the reactor in Operational Condition 1 (Power Operation), while performing STP-051-4510, "Reactor Protection/Residual Heat Removal (RPS/RHR) Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure High", I&C technicians noticed that isolation logic lights 1B21H-DS24B and 1B21H-DS26B were de-energized. The test was stopped and the control operating foreman was notified. An investigation determined that fuse (\*FU\*) 1B21H-F76B, located in the control room, had failed. As a result of the failed fuse, the reactor water sample containment isolation valve (\*ISV\*) 1B33\*AOVF019 automatically isolated and the isolation logic indication lights de-energized. Since the closure of this containment isolation valve constitutes an ESF actuation, this report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

INVESTIGATION

The ESF actuation was caused by the failure of control power fuse (\*FU\*) 1B21H-F76B which de-energized the isolation logic and isolated the reactor water sample valve (\*ISV\*) 1B33\*AOVF019. All the other valves controlled by this logic did not change position because they were already closed at the time of the event.

A review of the steps performed during STP-051-4510 revealed no lifted leads or jumpers being used which could cause the fuse to fail. A discussion with the technician involved confirmed that nothing was done that would result in a failed fuse. Subsequent to the event, the surveillance test was run again without incident. In addition, this particular surveillance test has been performed monthly since initial operation of the unit without causing a previous occurrence of this event. There is no indication that the fuse is undersized or that a spurious circuit fault exists. Therefore, the root cause of this event is indeterminate.

Similar events were identified in LER 89-001 and 90-018. These LERs identified three previous failures of fuse (\*FU\*) 1B21-F76B resulting in the isolation of (\*ISV\*) 1B33\*AOVF019. LER 89-001 implicates inadvertent grounding as the likely cause of the failure that occurred on 1/8/89, but does not state that this is certain. Also reported in LER 89-001 was a previous event that occurred on 12/2/86. In addition, LER 90-018 reports an event in which the fuse failed, causing an isolation. In these cases, the failures were indeterminate.

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/90

FACILITY NAME (1)  RIVER BEND STATION	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 4 5 8 9 1	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		9 1	0 0 2	0 1	0 3	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Immediate corrective action consisted of replacing the fuse, resetting the isolation logic, and reopening the reactor water sample valve. As a result of the repeated occurrences of fuse 1B21H-F076B failing for undetermined reasons, all associated STPs that test this circuit will be revised to require valve 1B33\*AOVF019 to be isolated prior to performing surveillance testing. The revision effort is in progress and all of the STPs will be revised by September 2, 1991.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

There was no adverse impact on the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public as a result of the sample valve isolation. Isolation of the valve placed it in its safe position.

Note: Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as (\*XX\*).