

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 While performing "MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE EXERCISE TEST" proce-

0 3 dure HNP-1-3119, operating personnel found that MSIV Closure Relay C71-K3D

0 4 would not de-energize, stopping MSIV's B21-F022B, B21-F028B from

0 5 going OPEN, contrary to Tech. Specs. Table 3.1-1 Item 10. Three remaining

0 6 MSIV Scram Channels were proven operable. Plant operation continued with

0 7 affected valves CLOSED under an LCO per T.S. section 3.7.D.2. Public

0 8 health and safety were not affected by this non-repetitive event.

0 9 SYSTEM CODE I A 11 CAUSE CODE E 12 CAUSE SUBCODE A 13 COMPONENT CODE R E L A Y X 14 COMP. SUBCODE A 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 3 21 22 0 7 1 24 26 0 3 28 29 L 30 31 0 32

ACTION TAKEN A 18 FUTURE ACTION Z 19 EFFECT ON PLANT B 20 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21 HOLRS 0 p l 5 37 40 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N 24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N 25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER G O 8 0 26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 This event is the result of a failed MSIV closure relay. The defective

1 1 relay was replaced and the new relay was calibrated and functionally

1 2 tested per the "MSIV CLOSURE INSTRUMENT F.T.& C." procedure HNP-1-3006.

1 3 The LCO was cleared and the MSIV RPS trip system was returned to normal

1 4 operation on 07/19/83.

1 5 FACILITY STATUS E 28 % POWER 1 0 0 29 NA OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY B 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Operator Observation 32

1 6 ACTIVITY CONTENT Z 33 RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE NA 36

1 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 37 TYPE Z 38 DESCRIPTION NA 39

1 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 40 DESCRIPTION NA 41

1 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION NA 43

2 0 PUBLICITY N 44 DESCRIPTION NA 45

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PDR ADOCK 05000321
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NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER S. B. Tipps

PHONE: (912)367-7851

NARRATIVE REPORT
FOR LER 50-321/1983-071

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-321

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

This 30 day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.b due to the event's demonstrating that the unit was not meeting the requirements of Tech. Specs. Table 3.1-1, item 10.

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

The plant was in a steady state of operation at 2436 MWT (approximately 100% power) when this event occurred.

Detailed description of the event(s):

On 07/19/83, while performing the "MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE EXERCISE TEST" procedure (HNP-1-3119), operating personnel discovered that MSIV Closure Relay C71-K3D associated with B21-F022B and B21-F028B MSIV's was inoperable in the energized position, preventing the valves from returning to the OPEN position.

Consequences of the event(s):

Plant operation continued under an LCO permitted by Tech. Specs. section 3.7.D.2. Additionally the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 4.1.A were met. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

Series MSIV's B21-F022B and B21-F028B were both inoperable, making one of the four required trip system channels inoperable. The remaining three channels were demonstrated operable by performance of "MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE EXERCISE TEST" procedure HNP-1-3119.

Justification for continued operation:

Plant operation was continued as permitted by Tech. Specs. section 3.7.D.2.

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

This certain HFA relay failure is non-repetitive; however, other HFA relays have failed as last reported on LER 50-321/1983-042.

Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

This event had no effect on any other Unit 1 system, nor did it have any effect on Unit 2.

Cause(s) of the event(s):

This event is the result of the MSIV Closure Relay (C71-K3D) failing to de-energize due to the relay's contacts being stuck in the closed position.

Immediate Corrective Action:

The MSIV closure relay (C71-K3D) was replaced. The replacement relay was then calibrated and functionally tested satisfactorily per the "MSIV CLOSURE INSTRUMENT F.T. & C." procedure (HNP-1-3006). The system returned to service on 07/19/83.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

No supplemental corrective action is required.

Scheduled (future) corrective action:

The existing HFA relay coils will be replaced with the century series type HFA coils via DCR-82-171 during the 1984 refueling outage.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

See scheduled (future) corrective action.

Georgia Power Company
Post Office Box 439
Baxley, Georgia 31513
Telephone 912 367-7781
912 537-9444

SNRO REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant



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
August 11, 1983
GM-83-729

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-321

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

ATTENTION: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-321/1983-071. This report is required by Hatch Unit 1 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.1.9.b.


H. C. Nix
General Manager

HCN/SBT/djs

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