


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August 5, 1983



Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000  
Arlington, Texas 76012

SUBJECT: Waterford SES Unit No. 3  
Docket No. 50-382  
Significant Construction Deficiency No. 86  
"3A-S Safety Inverter Output  
Capacitor Wiring Burned"  
First Interim Report

REFERENCE: Telecon dated July 8, 1983 from D. E. Baker to W. Crossman

Dear Mr. Collins:

In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 86, "3A-S Safety Inverter Output Capacitor Wiring Burned." This item was previously identified as PRD 119.

If you have any questions, please advise.

Very truly yours,

F. J. Drummond  
Manager Engineering & Technical Services

FJD/WAC/MAL;keh

Attachment

cc: 1) Director  
Office of Inspection & Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

2) Director  
Office of Management  
Information and Program Control  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

3) Mr. E. L. Blake

4) Mr. W. M. Stevenson

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INTERIM REPORT OF  
SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 86  
"3A-S SAFETY INVERTER OUTPUT CAPACITOR WIRING BURNED"

INTRODUCTION

This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes a deficiency in the output capacitor wiring of 10 KVA inverters supplied by the Elgar Corporation. The problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been identified to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM

During periodic inspection by LP&L startup personnel it was discovered that the output capacitor wiring of the 3A-S inverter (supplied by Elgar) was burned. This problem was traced to the use of push-on connectors at the capacitors resulting in a high resistance connection and subsequent heating. The 3B-S inverter was subsequently inspected and the same problem was identified.

The 3A-S and 3B-S inverters supplied by Elgar are part of the 120 volt uninterruptible AC system described by FSAR section 8.3. They supply power to safety related loads including solenoid valve operators, radiation monitors and auxiliary isolation relay panels. The four Plant Protection System inverters are manufactured by a different vendor and not involved in this deficiency.

SAFETY IMPLICATION

Loss of the 3A-S or 3B-S inverter would lead to loss of its respective safety related loads until an operator was able to perform a local manual transfer to the bypass supply (480V Motor Control Center 3A-313-S or 3B-313-S). This deficiency would, therefore, have resulted in delay or inoperability of safety related functions in an accident situation.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Elgar has investigated this problem and determined that it is best corrected by soldering the output leads directly to capacitors, thereby eliminating the high resistance push-on connectors. Nonconformance Report W3-6510 has been generated to document and track this deficiency. Corrective action is scheduled for completion by August 31, 1983. A Final Report will therefore be submitted to the NRC by September 15, 1983.

INTERIM REPORT OF  
SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 86  
"3A-S SAFETY INVERTER OUTPUT CAPACITOR WIRING BURNED"

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The 3A-S and 3B-S inverters supplied by Elgar are part of the 120 volt uninterruptible AC system described by FSAR section 8.3. They supply power to safety related loads including solenoid valve operators, radiation monitors and auxiliary isolation relay panels. The four Plant Protection System inverters are manufactured by a different vendor and not involved in this deficiency.

SAFETY IMPLICATION

Loss of the 3A-S or 3B-S inverter would lead to loss of its respective safety related loads until an operator was able to perform a local manual transfer to the bypass supply (480V Motor Control Center 3A-313-S or 3B-313-S). This deficiency would, therefore, have resulted in delay or inoperability of safety related functions in an accident situation.

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